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 This dissertation examines how Cold War defense spending shaped the evolution of 
American political culture and public policy from the 1940s until the 1990s. It argues that the 
Cold War economy contributed to the realignment of American politics in the postwar era. The 
fight against global communism abroad altered the sructure, purpose, and public perception of 
the federal government following World War II, but also subsidized corporations, suburban 
communities, and individuals affected by defense spending. The militarization of the Cold War 
therefore created various dependents of America’s military and defense apparatus that 
continuously pressed for more defense spending during the Cold War, even if increases in the 
military budget were strategically and economically gratuitous. Americans in communities 
dependent upon defense contractors for employment and economic growth lobbied their political 
representatives to allocate more defense contracts to their towns, while defense companies and 
contractors formed alliances with activists, politicians, defense workers, and labor unions to 
ensure their profitability in the face of cuts to the defense budget. The combination of these 
forces created a unique “Cold War coalition” that worked to keep the defense economy active in 
shaping the domestic and foreign policies of the United States. 
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 As the constitutive elements of the defense economy were threatened with defense cuts 
and a thaw in the Cold War after the 1960s, they increasingly gravitated toward political figures 
and officials who promised continued defense spending. After the economic crisis of the 1970s, 
residents of such “Cold War communities” saw job losses to inflation and stagnation, but also to 
a drawdown in the Vietnam War and the era of détente. By the end of the Cold War, 
communities reliant upon the Department of Defense for mployment supported “conservative” 
proposals for the reduction of federal taxes and government influence in regulating local 
economies, while also campaigning for additional federal defense contracts to keep local 
economies afloat. By exploring the realignment of American politics through the context of 
global events—and their impact on local politics—this dissertation considers how the personal 
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professional and personal support from so many people. It is a pleasure to thank them. 
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graduate school and encouraging my progress throughout. When this dissertation was at the 
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 My dissertation adviser, Robert David “KC” Johnson, provided sage advice during the 
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my assertions, making sure I weighed all viewpoints before making my conclusions. Kim 
Phillips-Fein went beyond her responsibilities as a member of the dissertation committee, taking 
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time to read early drafts of chapters as well as write a letter of recommendation for me. The other 
members of my dissertation committee, Jon Rosenberg, David Nasaw, and Joshua Freeman 
provided important insights during the dissertation defense that helped me rethink some of my 
arguments.  
 Other professors at the Graduate Center have also shaped my graduate education. Judith 
Stein, James Oakes, and Andrew Robertson have all lft their imprint on this project. In his 
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their comments and suggestions, I thank Jennifer Delton, Jason Friedman, David Farber, Andrew 
Preston, and Julian Zelizer. Laura Jane Gifford and Dan Williams gave me the opportunity to 
publish portions of Chapter Two in their edited collection on conservatism in the 1960s, and 
offered invaluable criticism on my submission. 
 Every historian knows that archivists are their lifeline. For their ability to uncover 
valuable sources, archivists at the Bentley Historical Library, the Hagley Museum and Library, 
the Hoover Institution on War, Peace, and Revolution, the Library of Congress, the Richard 
Nixon Presidential Library, the Jimmy Carter Presidntial Library, the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library, and the Harry S. Truman Library deserve special mention. On the last day 
of my research at the Gerald Ford Presidential Library, Jeremy Schmidt pointed me toward some 
documents that helped significantly in the development of the fourth chapter. He also shared 
with me his research on the Helsinki Accords and sent me links to documents from the Ford 
Library archived online. Archivists at the Special Collections at the University of Washington 
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granted me access to the only classified box left in the Henry Jackson Papers.  I also would not 
have seen important archival collections without the permission of several individuals. 
Christopher Buckley let me research his father’s papers at Yale, while the family members of 
Paul H. Nitze gave me permission to use his papers at the Library of Congress. The late William 
Rusher also granted me access to his papers at the Library of Congress before he passed away.  
 The research for this project took me into many parts of the “Gunbelt.” I would not have 
been able to make these trips without the gracious and generous financial assistance from the 
John Anson Kittredge Fund, the Gerald R. Ford President al Library, the Harry S. Truman 
Library Institute, the Bentley Historical Library, and the City University of New York. A grant 
from the Robert A. Divine Travel Fund from the Society of Historians of American Foreign 
Relations allowed me to present some of this dissertation’s findings at their annual conference. I 
must especially thank the Executive Director of the Graduate Center’s History Department, 
Helena Rosenblatt, who found funds deep within the rec sses of the History Department budget 
to provide me with a fellowship at a very crucial tme in my life.  
 For much of my graduate career, I taught courses in U.S. history at Hunter College. 
Teaching at Hunter was a profound experience that deeply shaped my approach to thinking about 
and teaching U.S. history. Jon Rosenberg, Donna Haverty-Stacke, Benjamin Hett, and Rick 
Belsky allowed me to be their teaching assistants my first years in graduate school and tutored 
me in the joys and pitfalls of undergraduate teaching. Barbara Welter (along with Josh Freeman) 
gave me a teaching fellowship at Hunter my second year in graduate school which helped pay 
the bills. 
 I knew the CUNY Graduate Center was an excellent academic institution when I joined 
its student body, but I did not know it was a place where I would meet lifelong friends. For their 
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took time from his own dissertation to read much of this work, giving it his editorial expertise 
and close reading.  Conversations with Brent Cebul and Seth Offenbach also helped make this 
dissertation better. Brent also read the last chapter of the dissertation and offered constructive 
criticism. 
  Final thanks go to my family and close friends. Kevin Lee opened his spare bedroom to 
me when I came to do research in Washington, D.C.  More than Kevin’s willingness to provide 
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life than reading books and typing away in front of a computer screen. I could not have asked for 
more supportive in-laws than Paul and Karen Wereszynski. From providing everything from 
friendly advice to childcare, they have been a regular source of comfort and help throughout this 
process. Karen Parsons regularly told me how proud she was of me, which is all a son needs to 
hear from his mother.  Lastly, I thank my wife, Michelle. Michelle has made a number of 
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 In 1990, Theresa Bruno was a thirty-year employee of the Stratford, Connecticut based 
defense contractor Textron Lycoming when the federal government decided to cancel the 
company’s contract for the M-1 tank. With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and 
amidst pressure to reduce the federal deficit, President George H.W. Bush felt the M-1 tank 
program in Stratford (and in Greer, South Carolina) w s outdated. Bruno worked to inspect M-1 
tanks before they left the plant, and she worried the cancellation of the M-1 meant her job was in 
jeopardy. “We work and strive to give [the federal government] a good product,” she said, and 
had trouble understanding “why they have to eliminate it.” Robert Koetsch, a security guard at 
the plant, believed the end of the M-1 tank program was representative of “a plan to get our 
defenses down, get our guard down. If they shut this place down, and something happens in two 
or three years, it’s going to take a while to start up again.” A recent retiree of Textron Lycoming, 
John Morrison, concluded the cuts must mean “the gen rals have enough tanks to play with for a 
while.” But Robert Miere, who made parts for M-1 engines, found this logic unacceptable. While 
the Cold War might be over, international politics were still unstable, and it was no time for the 
federal government to sever its responsibility to defense workers. “Just because the Berlin Wall 
went down doesn’t mean there’s no threat. There are still other countries,” he said.1 
 Home to Sikorsky Aircraft and the Stratford Army-Engine Plant (until 1998 when it was 
closed), as well as Textron Lycoming, Stratford was a town dependent upon defense contracts 
and the Cold War that provided them.   The state of Connecticut received 4.9 billion dollars from 
the Department of Defense—eighth highest in the country—even though it was twenty-eighth in 
                                                
1 “At Defense Plant, No Peace if Jobs are Lost,” New York Times, February 4, 1990; “Dynamics Set to Trim 27,000 
Jobs,” New York Times, May 2, 1991. 
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overall population. Defense business was largely concentrated in Southern and Western 
Connecticut. Sikorsky Aircraft in Stratford was the largest defense contractor in the western part 
of the state, while General Dynamics Eastern Boat Company in Groton, which made submarines 
for the U.S. Navy, was located in the east. Like Textron, General Dynamics began to lay off 
workers following the demise of tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. By 1991, 
General Dynamics eliminated over twenty-five percent of its workforce. Such cuts were 
necessary, executives claimed, to keep the company afloat in a time of peace. In a twist of irony, 
General Dynamics’ executives were rewarded for the cutbacks, receiving bonuses based on their 
ability to increase the price of the company’s stock, which would be achieved by eliminating 
labor costs.2 
 The economic situation for General Dynamics in Groton was so dire that the company 
threatened to close its doors if it did not receive a new contract for the Seawolf submarine. The 
elected official fighting the hardest to keep General Dynamics solvent was Connecticut senator 
Christopher Dodd. Dodd, a Democrat, was part of the class of “Watergate Babies” elected to 
Congress in 1974. He supported the interests of organized labor and the expansion of the social 
safety net, but also aimed to stimulate the growth of business (including the financial sector) in 
his state through deregulation. Disliked by right-wing activists for his politics, Dodd earned a 
nine percent approval rating from conservative groups like the American Conservative Union 
(ACU) and the Chamber of Commerce, while a ninety-three percent rating from the Committee 
on Political Education of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO).3  On foreign policy and national defense, Dodd opposed the Reagan defense buildup 
in the 1980s, strongly criticized the administration’s Central American policies, and voted 
                                                
2 Dynamics Set to Trim 27,000 Jobs,” New York Times, May 2, 1991. 
3 Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, Douglas Matthews, The Almanac of American Politics: 1991( Washington, D.C: 
The National Journal, 1991), 218. 
3 
 
against additional funding for the missile defense program entitled Strategic Defense Initiative 
(SDI). 
 But on the Seawolf submarine, Dodd was a defense hawk.  Lobbying for the Seawolf 
contract alongside Dodd was his Connecticut colleagu  in the House, Democrat Sam Gejdenson. 
But both had sought to cut defense spending during the Reagan years, which led The New York 
Times to comment on the “paradox” of Dodd and Gejdenson’ national defense policies. “When 
the cold war was alive, Mr. Dodd and Mr. Gejdenson made careers of fighting the Reagan 
administration’s military buildup. Now they are warning that the country had better not cut 
military spending too sharply, even when peace is at hand.” Dodd argued the Seawolf program 
was vital to the economy of southeastern Connecticut, but it also protected the interests of 
national security, because “[s]tealth marine technology is critical to the country.” In attracting 
support for the Seawolf, Dodd accumulated unlikely al ies, maneuvering a coalition of 
Democrats and Republicans in the Northeast to obtain more federal funds for the Seawolf, 
earning the nickname “the wolf” for his diligent efforts.  
 Visiting Groton after obtaining an additional contract for Seawolf submarines in 1992, 
Dodd and Gejdenson were greeted with cheers, the union leadership telling workers, “Say hello 
to Chris and Sam. They’re the guys keeping us afloat. We would have lost our jobs without 
them.” Sue Mack, a weight estimator at the Groton pla t, said that Dodd had “given us a sigh of 
relief” and she and her fellow defense workers are “going to be loyal to these legislators,” 
presumably during the next election cycle.  On the other side of the aisle, Republican senator 
John McCain was quick to call Dodd a hypocrite. While McCain opposed the Seawolf program, 
he generally favored increased military spending. McCain quipped that he wished that 
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Democrats like Dodd would “at some point develop an equal passion for the overall defense of 
our nation and weapons systems that are not made in th ir state.”4 
 The example of the Seawolf submarine—and its relationship to local, national, and 
international events—demonstrates how national defens  politics have acutely influenced 
American political culture.  “For Right and Might” examines this history, exploring how the 
long-term consequences of defense spending (and its effects on American foreign policy) altered 
and destabilized American politics in the postwar er , affecting the personal experiences, 
economic livelihoods, and political affiliations ofpeople like Theresa Bruno and Sue Mack. 
Large-scale defense spending provided the structural basis for the United States’ projection of 
power abroad, as the expansion of America’s military apparatus enabled the U.S. to carry out its 
global mission of preventing the spread of communism. But the militarization of the Cold War 
also gave rise to a transformation in the federal state after 1945. The national security state 
created to fight communism abroad shaped the institutions of American democracy at home. 
These changes ultimately led to a more conservative political climate that continues to inform 
contemporary political debates. Cold War militarization, I therefore argue, contributed to the 
realignment of American politics in the latter half of the postwar era.5 
                                                
4 “Political Rarity: 2 Lawmakers Bask in Thanks,” New York Times, May 9, 1992; “House Votes Overwhelmingly to 
Restore Seawolf Submarine Funds,” New York Times, May 8, 1992; “In Battle of Budget, Democrats Defend 
Miltiary Hardware, New York Times, May 17, 1992. 
5 I borrow the term “militarization” from Michael Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Sherry defines militarization as “the process by which war and national 
security became consuming anxieties and provided th memories, models, and metaphors that shaped broada e s of 
national life.” See Sherry, In the Shadow of War, xi. Sherry is predominantly concerned with how a discourse of 
militarization manifested itself in the United States during the postwar era, and less on structural issues, including 
electoral politics and political economy. I view militarization as a “process” as well, but one that shapes the 
institutions and foundations of government and the economy more than discourse. For militarization applied to an 
analysis of gender and culture, see Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday 
Life in the Fifties (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). Other works focus on the militarization of 
American political economy during the early Cold War years, particularly the development of a “military-industrial 
complex.” See Alex Roland, The Military-Industrial Complex (Washington, D.C.: American Historical Association, 
2001); Aaron Friedberg, In the Shadow of the Garrison State: American Anti-Statism and its Cold War Grand 
Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: 
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 The militarization of the Cold War created a “marri ge of convenience” between diverse 
groups of political actors who pushed to increase def nse spending. A range of foreign policy 
issues like the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War, and the Panama Canal 
Treaty played a significant role in mobilizing individuals and groups constitutive of the defense 
apparatus, including defense industry executives, white-collar and blue-collar defense 
employees, ex-military officials, political activists, politicians, and local boosters, to campaign 
for higher defense budgets. Militarization meant that Americans who depended on defense 
spending for personal, ideological, or material interests became wedded to the national security 
state, regardless of where they fell on the political spectrum. When threatened by defense 
cutbacks, the financial benefactors of the Cold War gr vitated toward political candidates who 
wanted to increase defense spending to perpetuate the benefits the Cold War state provided.  
 Cold War defense spending also made cities and localities throughout the United States 
dependent upon the Department of Defense. These “Cold War communities” or “defense 
communities,” many of them suburban, economically re ied upon the next defense contract to the 
local factory that made planes, parts for tanks, silos for missiles, or military uniforms that 
fulfilled the promise of middle-class prosperity Cold War communities strove to preserve.6 
Global events had a functional impact on the economy in defense communities, as American 
involvement in wars and conflicts abroad led to shift  in employment, industrial development, 
and local electoral politics at home. Cold War communities were therefore cognizant of foreign 
policy events to a degree that was atypical in other localities that had less of a connection to the 
                                                                                                                                                
The Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy, 1949-1951 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1998). I define the term “national security state” to mean the vast interconnected network of governmental 
institutions and private industries that encouraged increases in armaments, military personnel, and defens  
installations for private, public, and national gain.  
6 Robert Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2000); Ann Markusen, “Cold War Workers, Cold War Communities,” in Peter J. Kuznick and James Gilbert, 
editors, Rethinking Cold War Culture (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2001), pgs. 35-60. 
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military and the defense economy. 7  As “captives” of the military-industrial complex (and the 
international context of the Cold War that supported the defense economy), the livelihood of 
defense communities rose and fell with the undulations in the defense budget. These 
particularistic features led more Americans to support conservative Republicans—the largest 
proponents of substantial defense budgets after the 1960s— and were increasingly less inclined 
to favor a drawdown in federal defense spending or pr posals for defense conversion even after 
the Cold War ended. While some did, the number of these individuals was never large enough to 
facilitate alternative policies on U.S. national security. The integrated coalition of liberals and 
conservatives, Republicans and Democrats, who enlarged the Cold War state for the purposes of 
economic growth, military expansionism, and local boosterism, demonstrate that the politics of 
national security do not fall neatly along a “Red-Blue” divide.8  
 The relationship between local and international events is therefore at the analytical core 
of “For Right and Might.” The links between American foreign policy, the political economy 
(and culture) of the Cold War, and suburban defense communities provide insight to how 
“ordinary” Americans came to support militarization. While the defense economy influenced the 
economic makeup of the country throughout the Cold War, it was never static. Many defense 
contractors were publicly traded companies beholden to shareholders who sought increases to 
their quarterly dividends. Like other industries, defense contractors suffered from cycles of 
booms and busts, layoffs and hiring. But the defense economy was not subject to the same 
market factors that other business sectors faced. Dfense business during the Cold War was (and 
                                                
7 John Accordino, Captives of the Cold War Economy: The Struggle for Defense Conversion in American 
Communities (Westport: Praeger, 2000).  Cold War communities ar  therefore important and distinct sites of study 
to examine the connections between international events and local politics, or what some scholars have c ll d the 
“local Cold War.” Scholarship on the “local Cold War” is limited, but growing. See Jeffrey Engel, editor, Local 
Consequences of the Global Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008); Gretchen Heefner, The 
Missile Next Door: The Minuteman in the American Heartland (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2012). 
8 This term is borrowed from Matthew D. Lassiter, “Political History Beyond the Red-Blue Divide,” Journal of 
American History Vol. 98 No. 3 (December 2011), 760 
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remains) non-capitalist; defense companies often functioned outside the vagaries of the private 
market. Rather than compete for market share among private consumers, who often could not 
and did not purchase the products and commodities made by the Cold War economy, defense 
companies competed with each other over access to funds and programs provided by their 
exclusive consumer base: the federal government. Individual consumers therefore could not use 
their purchasing power to limit or expand the size of defense contractors, nor regulate the prices 
charged for the products they made; they operated beyond the purview of supply and demand. 
Furthermore, federal standards for determining which company in which area of the country 
received a particular defense contract produced a zero-sum game, where defense companies (and 
the communities where they were located) in disparate areas of the country competed with one 
another over federal contracts. Those communities that won individual contracts celebrated the 
job growth and economic development bestowed to them, while the losers faced plant closures 
and job layoffs without the offer of federal aid.9    
 The influence of the defense industry on local communities resulted from deliberate 
decisions made by politicians and policymakers on anational level. When federal dollars and tax 
subsidies classified under the category of “defense” were steered to communities, the effects 
altered American politics and society. Indeed, the ideological and cultural justifications that 
supported the Cold War state blurred the lines betwe n social welfare and defense spending. 
While viewed as a separate budgetary category from “s cial” spending, monies outlined for 
defense went to more than just building weapons. By embracing the Cold War’s purpose of 
fighting communism at home and abroad through a natio l security apparatus, policy makers 
ended up supporting greater spending on health care ben fits to veterans, housing subsidies and 
                                                
9 This history is discussed in Ann Markusen and JoelYudken, Dismantling the Cold War Economy (New York: 
Basic Books, 1992). 
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education grants for military families, and tax breaks for companies that invested in scientific 
research and development. Funds for national security went to building public works projects, 
the construction of airports and highway systems, and research projects in American universities, 
which also created an influx of labor to areas the United States government singled out as 
strategically important to confront the urgent and exigent threat of communism. Defense 
spending also created subsidiary non-defense business  local communities dependent upon the 
federal government. Small businesses that formed to meet the consumerist needs of federal 
defense workers (the proverbial coffee shop, pharmacy, or department store) were therefore just 
as reliant upon military spending as the defense contractor. Within the context of the Cold War, 
providing tax incentives and subsidies to private businesses in defense-rich localities had social 
value, and was at the same time a matter of national security.10 
 These economic conditions produced a distinctive political culture in the United States 
that led more Americans to support increased defens spending for reasons unrelated to the costs 
and consequences to America’s fiscal, political, or cultural health. Because of their unique 
association to the Cold War state, defense communities had the ability to place demands upon 
local, state, and national politicians to adopt policies that affected the trajectory of defense 
                                                
10 The social impact of defense spending is explored in Ann Markusen, et. al, The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military 
Remapping of Industrial America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Bruce Schulman, From Cotton Belt 
to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, & he Transformation of the South, 1938-1980 (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1994); Roger W. Lotchin, Fortress California, 1910-1961: From Warfare to Welfare (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Ann Markusen and Joel Yudken, Dismantling the Cold War Economy (New 
York: Basic Books, 1992);  Margaret Pugh O’Mara, Cities of Knowledge: Cold War Science and the Search for the 
Next Silicon Valley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); James Sparrow, Warfare State: Americans in the 
Age of Big-Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Kari Fred ickson, “The Cold War at the 
Grassroots: Militarization and Modernization in South Carolina,” in The Myth of Southern Exceptionalism, Matthew 
D. Lassiter and Joseph Crespino, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 190-209. This dissertation also 
breaks down the artificial divisions between “social” and “defense” spending in discussing the varied consequences 
of militarization. But most of the previous scholarship has focused on the role of defense spending in spurring 
economic development, modernization, and urbanization in the Sunbelt. Historians like James Sparrow have also 
explored how military spending led to state-building and public acceptance of “big-government” during World War 
II.  Most scholars, however, have overlooked how militar zation led to political realignment on both a local and 
national scale throughout the Cold War. 
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spending in the United States.  With defense spending at its highest during the Korean War, 
many Americans accepted the military economy as a di tinctive feature of modern politics. 
Rearmament during the Korean War gave an additional boost to the Sunbelt defense economy, 
while domestic mobilization for the war gave unemployed workers defense jobs that temporarily 
revitalized regions of the country affected by mechanization and capital flight, particularly in the 
Midwest.11 But when the United States began to drastically scale back military spending in the 
1960s—due to fears over the escalating arms race and financial inefficiency in the defense 
budget—it sent panic waves into defense communities. The Kennedy and Johnson 
administration’s attempts to reduce the size of the military budget inspired collaboration between 
constituents of the defense economy to reverse the proposed cuts. Defense production during the 
early years of the Vietnam War seemed to make these concerns fleeting, but the backlash against 
the war after 1968 led to defense cuts and layoffs that reignited fears among Cold War workers 
that their industry and occupations were inherently unstable.  
 In addition to defense cuts, rising inflation and unemployment rates, declining 
productivity, deindustrialization, capital flight, and the weakening of the American labor 
movement exacerbated competition for defense contracts among local communities in the late 
1960s and 1970s. The economic crisis of the 1970s que tioned the promise made by liberals to 
middle and working-class Americans that the federal st te could deliver economic growth and 
international stability through federally subsidized policies, giving way to the resurgence of the 
free-market as a panacea to global and domestic problems.12  As the structural edifice of the New 
                                                
11 On deindustrialization in the 1940s and 1950s, see Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and 
Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jefferson Cowie, Capital Moves: 
RCA’s Seventy-Year Quest for Cheap Labor (New York: The New Press, 2001). 
12 For works that focus on structural changes to American and international political economy in laying the 
groundwork for the post-New Deal era, rather than right-wing activism, see Jefferson Cowie, Stayin’ Alive: the 
1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class (New York: New Press, 2010); Judith Stein, Pivotal Decade: How 
the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the 1970s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010); Thomas 
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Deal state eroded in the 1970s due to these forces, higher defense spending and foreign policy 
unilateralism seemed attractive solutions to resolve international conflicts, as well as stimulate 
economic growth at home.  When recession threatened communities dependent upon the 
military, local politicians turned to the Department of Defense for help in lowering 
unemployment, raising tax revenue, and eliminating local and state budgetary deficits. Even in 
the 1980s, the defense economy often served as a proxy for development in areas affected by the 
economic downturn. In periods of austerity, officials in local, state, and national office sought 
defense contracts to relieve localities that were victims of deindustrialization and cuts to social 
programs, even while promoting such cuts.13 
 The reemergence of market values was therefore concurrent with the remilitarization of 
American foreign policy. The fall of Vietnam to communism in 1975, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979, and the subsequent collapse of uperpower détente between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, weakened the legitimacy of détente and the reduction in American 
defense budgets that coincided with the rapprochement toward communist powers. The 1970s 
were indeed the “pivotal decade” that remilitarized the American public to support a hard-line 
defense posture after years of diplomacy, internatio l treaties, and renewed relations with 
communist countries failed to achieve peace and prosperity for the United States. As the country 
began to question the size of the federal government, efforts to increase the size of the defense 
budget were used to justify cuts to social programs, li it government regulations on business, 
and reduce the size of the federal state that dealtwith issues unrelated to defense spending. 
                                                                                                                                                
Borstelmann, The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Equality (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2011); David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005). 
13 I thank Brent Cebul for his help and encouragement on making this point. 
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Militarization therefore served as a rhetorical weapon used to make policy arguments about the 
need to scale back social programs in order to spend more on defense and national security. 14  
 The role of the national security state in contributing to American political culture is 
well- recognized among historians. Scholars have not d that the Cold War state financed and 
furthered suburban sprawl, occupational mobility, and cross-regional migration, as militarization 
reorganized the spatial and demographic landscape of modern America to a degree 
unprecedented in the history of public policy.15 Previous scholars have also examined defense 
workers as agents and activists of the New Right.  According to many historians of modern 
conservatism, since the Cold War provided defense workers (particularly in the Sunbelt) with the 
means to purchase high-priced homes, send their children to good schools, and carry out the 
existence of a comfortable suburban lifestyle, they possessed a bellicose anti-communist 
worldview. The employees of defense companies comprised the traditional base of the modern 
Republican Party: white, wealthy, and male. When threatened by high taxes and the regulatory 
arm of the federal government, defense workers supported conservative candidates like Barry 
Goldwater who vowed to keep the concerns of suburban Americans sacrosanct. 16 
                                                
14 On the 1970s and international politics, see Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, and Daniel J. Sargent, 
editors., The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2010). On 
the interrelationship between domestic and internatio l affairs during the 1970s, see Campbell Craig and Fredrik 
Logevall, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity (Cambridge, M.A.: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2009). 
15 For a few examples see, Kenneth Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: the Origins of the New American Right 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Matthew Lassiter, The Silent Majority: Suburban Politics in the 
Sunbelt South (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Robert A. Beauregard, When America Became 
Suburban (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006); Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain 
Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism (New York, W.W. Norton, 2010). 
16 Lisa McGirr writes in her book on Orange County, California that the ideology of modern conservatism “made 
sense to many Orange Countians who worked in military- nstallations and defense-related industries or who directly 
benefited from the defense boom of the region.” McGirr, Suburban Warriors, 175. For more on defense workers and 
Southern California, see Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt; Michelle Nickerson, Mothers of Conservatism: 
Women and the Postwar Right (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 
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 This interpretation, however, underemphasizes the fact that the national security state was 
conceptualized, proposed, and implemented by New Deal mocrats, and was an outgrowth of 
New Deal policies. The defense industry seemed to offer a panacea to Democrats concerned 
about the challenges the United States faced in both the international and domestic arena. The 
Cold War state thwarted communist aggression, created jobs, ameliorated inflation, and kept 
American prosperity moving forward, which Democrats rgued was not only important for the 
economy, but to blunt Soviet critiques of the capitlis  West.17  Support for the national security 
state among the American public often went in hand with their defense of government-backed 
health care coverage, public works programs, and social welfare spending. Ultimately, however, 
the financial demands of maintaining the national security state, coupled with the irrational fear 
of communism within the United States, came to dominate and override the call for greater 
monies for domestic programs.18  
 Moreover, defense communities located outside the Sunbelt were not hotbeds of 
conservative activism. By drawing attention away from the Sunbelt and into the “Gunbelt”—the 
swath of defense-dependent cities and states stretching from suburban Long Island to Texas to 
the Pacific Northwest—this dissertation demonstrates that defense workers were not always 
equated with modern conservatism, but occupied whathistorian Matthew D. Lassiter has termed 
the “volatile center” of American politics.19 Suburban activism within defense communities 
during the Cold War is more messy and complex than previous historians have noted. Defense 
                                                
17Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998);  Douglas Stuart, Creating the National Security State: A History of 
the Law that Transformed America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008); Jason Scott Smith, Building New 
Deal Liberalism: The Political Economy of Public Works, 1933-1956 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
18 Jonathan Bell, The Liberal State on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004). 
19 Matthew D. Lassiter, “Suburban Strategies: The Volatile Center in Postwar American Politics,” in Meg Jacobs, 
William J. Novak, and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., The Democratic Experiment: New Directions in American Political 
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 327- 49. 
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workers in many parts of the Gunbelt defended the military-industrial complex, but opposed its 
role in perpetuating the Vietnam War; they argued for the federal government to mandate better 
wages and benefits in the defense workforce, but wan ed to reduce federal benefits provided to 
other Americans; they lobbied for more defense contracts to build ICBMs and nuclear warheads, 
but encouraged policymakers not to deploy them to res lve international crises. The policies that 
derived from this cognitive dissonance determined the local economies and political context of 
the Cold War. Indeed, few defense workers in the Northeast and Northwest wings of the Gunbelt 
were wedded to conservative causes—even fewer still were the foot soldiers for Barry 
Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign or right-wing organizations like the John Birch Society. 
While the converse might be true in areas such as Southern California—which comprised the 
nexus of the military-industrial complex during the Cold War—the “blue” states of the 
Northeast, principally New York and Connecticut, received a significant number of individual 
defense contracts, even more than the Pacific region of the country after 1966.20  
 What made the residents of Cold War communities switch to the Republican Party or 
favor conservative candidates or issues was less a product of their preexisting worldviews or 
political ideologies than the impact of foreign and domestic events on their lives. What mattered 
more to defense workers was that their jobs were safe from defense cuts; they stayed off the 
unemployment line, and the privileges that came with their identities as hard-working, taxpaying 
citizen-soldiers in the Cold War were recognized anprotected. In the 1940s and 1950s, Cold 
War liberalism safeguarded their collective interests, but after the mid-1960s, these workers 
turned to conservative ideologies and political figures because of the changes to the Cold War 
state following Vietnam. The politics of such “Cold War clients” fluctuated based upon 
                                                
20 For these figures, see Markusen and Yudken, Dismantling the Cold War Economy, 175. Markusen and Yudken 
calculate not the total amount of funds rewarded to each region of the Gunbelt, but the individual contracts per 
capita. The Sunbelt south remained the largest beneficiary of total defense funds during the Cold War. 
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particular region, political affectations, and the structural changes to the country from 1945 to 
1991, and ran concurrent to broader developments in American politics and foreign policy. It is 
therefore inaccurate and inappropriate to apply ideological labels to these actors. Expanding the 
focus on defense workers in the Gunbelt, rather than e Sunbelt, also illuminates how 
Americans, many of whom were detached from conservative ideology, promoted big-
government policies at the local level while increasingly supporting an anti-government agenda 
after the 1960s.21 
 The political context of defense communities was shaped by foreign events, but also by a 
collection of national actors whose relationship to the national security state transformed 
American political culture and public policy during the Cold War. The first of these groups 
consist of national security elites: members of Congress, White House policy makers, and 
diplomats. Also within this group are foreign policy intellectuals whose dedication to anti-
communism formed the basis of their support for inceased defense spending. This list includes 
such former Cold War Democrats as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Dorothy Fosdick, Paul Nitze, Paul 
Wolfowitz, and Richard Perle, each of whom had policy positions in the federal government 
during the Cold War, and had served as staff members to the hawkish Democratic Senator Henry 
“Scoop” Jackson. Conservative intellectuals such as National Review editor William F. Buckley, 
Jr. are also part of this group of elites. Many of the conservative hawks on defense spending 
                                                
21 I therefore avoid applying the terms “liberal” or “conservative” to defense workers in the Gunbelt, as many of 
them (but not all) were non-ideological and eschewed political activism altogether.  When Democrats became the 
primary proponents of defense cuts in the 1970s, residents of defense communities increasingly switched t ir 
political allegiances to Republicans who aimed to preserve their livelihoods in an age of austerity. Cold War 
workers were also attracted to the Republicans for thei positions on cultural issues during the 1970s.  Prior to this 
time, and afterward, many residents of defense communities had liberal leanings and voted for Democrati  
candidates. The goal of approaching the residents of defense communities in this fashion, is therefore, in the words 
of Matthew D. Lassiter, to understand “the large group of voters in the middle (and on the sidelines) of American 
politics, the ordinary people who are not committed activists, are not particularly ideological, and do not self-
identify as warriors on one side or the other of a national divide.” See Lassiter, “Political History Beyond the Red-
Blue Divide,” 763. 
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were also small-government ideologues. Conservative intellectuals had little influence on policy 
making in Washington, D.C., but were an advocacy group that policy makers and Presidents 
(such as Richard Nixon) found they had to ameliorate in order to appease their political base.  
Movement conservatives that rallied behind right-leaning politicians and activists also had an 
influence on the militarization of the Cold War. These individuals signed up for anti-communist 
“Cold War seminars,” attended rallies on behalf of men like General Edwin Walker, and 
supported Ronald Reagan in his run for the presidency in 1976. These movement conservatives 
were foreign policy hawks who pushed the moderate wing of the Republican Party to take a 
tougher stance on communism through a military and nuclear buildup.  
 But militarization also complicated the trajectory f the Democratic Party and the 
American left after the 1960s.  Indeed, massive defnse spending to confront the threat of 
communism was supported with expansive bi-partisanship at the outset of the Cold War, with 
Democrats being the largest proponents of militarization until the 1960s. The enlargement of the 
national defense budget to serve American interests abroad occurred under the stewardship of 
New Deal liberals like Henry Jackson, Hubert Humphrey, Stuart Symington, and John F. 
Kennedy, who believed the federal government could also be a force of justice for 
disenfranchised racial minorities and the poor. Indeed, the Cold War was a “Democratic” war as 
much as and even more than a conflict originated by conservatives.  
 The anti-Cold War left was thereby largely relegatd from the Democratic Party until the 
Vietnam War. The presidential candidacy of former Vice President Henry Wallace in 1948 was 
the first significant political challenge to Cold War liberalism. Wallace condemned massive 
defense spending in the name of anti-communism and feared American interventionism would 
lead to global instability. Remnants of the Cold War left after 1948 were found in the anti-
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nuclear movement in the 1950s, the critique of the Cold War by the New Left in the 1960s and 
1970s, and the nuclear freeze movement in the 1980s. But critics of defense spending were more 
numerous in the Democratic Party after 1968. When t war in Vietnam proved that military 
power could not defeat a well-disciplined communist in urgency, Democrats in power began to 
adopt anti-militarist positions, calling for cuts in defense spending and foreign policy 
retrenchment in the 1970s.  But congressional Democrats often had to sacrifice their anti-
militarism to the national security structure. The constituents that depended on the Cold War 
would not tolerate rhetoric and policies that eliminated the defense jobs that predated the post-
Vietnam reaction against the military establishment. Indeed, anti-militarist Democrats had few 
good answers to the problem of militarization. Economic conversion from defense to civilian 
work never gained traction among defense workers once the United States’ economy declined in 
the 1970s. When threatened by deindustrialization and demilitarization, defense jobs became 
more valuable and important to the communities who depended on them. With occupational 
options restrained for American defense workers during the later years of the Cold War, the 
possibilities for a significant drawdown on military spending drifted further from view.  
 Americans who self-identified as “conservative” during the Cold War faced a similar 
problem. The right’s support for larger defense budgets meant that their faith in the unfettered 
private market was often superseded by their politica  and ideological desire to militarize 
American foreign policy through massive defense increases, leading to a nuclear arms race and a 
markedly expansive military footprint for the United States. Throughout much of the postwar 
era, conservatives favored—or participated in—the alloc tion of federal funds to the Cold War 
economy in drastic numbers. The expansion of military bases in California and Washington, 
D.C., the installation of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile silos in the Midwest, and contracts for 
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defense companies who specialized in Cold War technology were just a few of the programs 
conservatives argued were necessary to defeat communis . Championing the militarization of 
foreign policy therefore meant that the American right looked to the state to enhance the power 
of the United States abroad in ways that departed fom U.S. tradition prior to 1940. This included 
support for the national security state.22  
 The interrelationship between the Cold War political economy, U.S. foreign policy, and 
domestic culture, therefore illustrate how the anti-government, anti-statist tendencies among the 
right are misleading, and defy modern conservatives’ p rceptions of the postwar federal state and 
their role in its alterations. Indeed, right-wing conservatives’ adopted a form of defense 
Keynesianism during the Cold War. While the right tried to avoid seeing the defense economy as 
a means to ensure full employment or increase consumers’ purchasing power (as Cold War 
liberals did), they did understand that foreign policy militarization could serve as a stimulant for 
economic growth, a resolution to high unemployment, a d efforts to modernize and improve 
infrastructure in states and localities—which in turn created more jobs. Few members of the right 
recognized or admitted to deliberately promoting defense Keynesianism, since it would belie 
their stated claims about the proper role of the federal state. But as conservatives participated in 
the building of the national security state, local towns and economies who relied on the Cold 
War as an engine of job creation and economic development lobbied these same individuals for 
more spending. Holding a variety of positions within the United States government including the 
United States military, Congress, and increasingly after the 1970s and 1980s, the Executive 
                                                
22 Historian Iwan Morgan has noted that the period frm President Richard Nixon to George W. Bush was an “age 
of deficits” for which both conservatives and liberals are to blame. In examining Ronald Reagan’s approach to 
deficits and deficit spending, Morgan concludes that Reagan refused to cut defense spending even when it came 
down to “a choice between defense and deficits.” Iwan Morgan, The Age of Deficits: Presidents and Unbalanced 
Budgets  from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 90.   
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Branch (specifically the State and Defense Departmen ), the right became willing and active 
architects of a federal state that contradicted their raditional suspicion of big-government. 23  
 By embracing the structure of the national security state, the right gained access to the 
halls of power and policy making in the postwar era. Government entities, particularly the State 
Department and the Department of Defense, steered fderal funds to right-leaning groups that 
favored a hard-line approach to U.S. foreign policy. Organizations such as the American Security 
Council, the National Security Information Center, the Committee on the Present Danger, and 
the Coalition on Peace through Strength worked alongside Congressmen, presidential cabinet 
appointees, military officers, and defense company executives. These organizations individually 
                                                
23 Historians have thus far neglected a discussion of how the Cold War placed limits on American conservatism, 
particularly conservatives’ policies toward reducing the federal government. This is because the most recent 
historiography on American conservatism has been proccupied with the process of coalition building among the 
competing interests of conservative actors and has discounted the limitations, tensions, and conflicts among the 
right. See McGirr, Suburban Warriors; Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the 
Conservative Counterrevolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009);  Kim Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: 
The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New D al to Reagan (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009); Kevin 
Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2005); Joseph E. Lowndes, From the New Deal to the New Right: Race and the Southern Origins of Modern 
Conservatism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Rick Perlst in, Before the Storm: Barry Goldwater and 
the Unmaking of the American Consensus (New York: Nation Books, 2009); Bruce Schulman andJulian Zelizer, 
Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2008). 
Historian Julian Zelizer has broached these concerns with a recent article in Reviews in American History on the 
state of the field of American conservatism. Zelizer noted that despite conservatives’ hard-fought efforts to eliminate 
the welfare state and New Deal liberalism in its entir ty, they have failed to do so. Zelizer clearly shows that 
liberalism is not dead. While New Deal and Great Society programs are faced with constant attacks and cuts from 
conservatives, they are at the same time well-liked an  supported by a vast number of Americans. Considering the 
continued presence of the liberal state in American politics (albeit weakened), new studies in conservatism should 
examine, as Zelizer argues, “how conservatism unfolded in dialectical tension with liberalism rather than as a 
replacement to liberalism.” Zelizer also asks scholars to consider the difficulties faced by conservatives in realizing 
their policy goals “before and after the 1970s.” Julian E. Zelizer, “Rethinking the History of American 
Conservatism,” Reviews in American History, 38:2 (June 2010), 367-392. Kim Phillips-Fein and Matthew D. 
Lassiter raise similar concerns. Phillips-Fein suggests that the flaws of the literature on conservatism rest partly with 
historians’ failure to explore the “embattled and fragmented” nature of American conservatism, while ke ping in 
mind the changes to the American political and economic system that “are not simply the result of the organizational 
victories of the Right.” Lassiter too laments the “whiggish” turn in the field, comparing the historiography of 
conservatism to a “pendulum that has swung too far in one direction” to the detriment of scholars’ attention to “the 
complex dynamics of political culture, political economy, and public policy.” Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A 
Roundtable”; Lassiter, “Political History Beyond the Red-Blue Divide.” For recent and important exceptions, see 
Meg Jacobs and Julian Zelizer, Conservatives in Power: The Reagan Years, 1981-1989; A Brief History with 
Documents (Boston: Bedford St. Martin, 2010); Joseph Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2012); Lily Geismer, “Don’t Blame Us: Grassroots Liberalism in Massachusetts, 1960-1990 (PhD diss., 
University of Michigan, 2010). 
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and collectively argued that the U.S. needed to increase its military spending to defeat the Soviet 
Union and its satellite states. Longstanding lobbying groups for American business such as the 
National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce also worked with 
government officials to keep defense spending high. Their actions guaranteed the profitability 
and perpetuity of defense companies during the ColdWar, particularly after the 1970s when the 
military establishment came under attack in response to the quagmire of the Vietnam War. The 
deep-rooted and interdependent connections between special interest groups, political action 
committees, federal money, and employees and benefactors of the Cold War state pressured, if 
not compelled policy makers to adopt measures that enl rged American military power. While 
these groups and individuals were not always determinative in making policy, they succeeded in 
providing a consistent advocate for higher defense i creases and military interventionism that 
gained the regular attention of elected officials (both Democrats and Republicans) and others 
responsible for the well-being of U.S. national security.24 
 As it did to their counterparts on the left, militar zation also proved disastrous to Cold 
War critics on the right. Neo-isolationists like Robert A. Taft and Kenneth Wherry worried that 
the United States’ entry into a global Cold War meant a garrison state at home, one that would 
                                                
24 The militarization of the Cold War therefore offered the right access to political power in ways previous historians 
have overlooked. In reassessing their ascendancy in the 1980s, conservative activists felt their viewpoints and 
perspectives on politics and policy went unheard until Ronald Reagan granted them safe haven within his 
administration after 1980. Unable to ensure Arizona Republican Barry Goldwater’s election in 1964, appeased by 
Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and ignored by Jimmy Carter, the American right created a narrative of 
marginalization and ostracism from the highest levels of American institutional power, a narrative some historians 
of conservatism have been too quick to adopt. This interpretation of modern conservatism, however self- rving, is a 
fictitious account of the right’s relationship to American politics and the federal state. Indeed, KimPhillips-Fein has 
aptly written that while conservatives experienced a “ eeply felt sense of themselves as outsiders on the defensive, 
they were never the excluded figures they believed th mselves to be.” Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A Round 
Table,” Journal of American History Vol. 98 No. 3 (December 2011), 723-743, p. 739. See William Rusher, The 
Rise of the Right (New York: William Morrow, 1984); Richard A. Vigueri , The New Right: We’re Ready to Lead 
(Falls Church: Viguerie Company, 1980). Such works that highlight the narrative of exclusion are Donald T. 
Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendency: How the G.O.P. Right Made Political History (Cambridge, M.A.: 
Harvard University Press, 2007); Laura Jane Gifford, The Center Cannot Hold: The 1960 Presidential Election and 
the Rise of Modern Conservatism (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009). 
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absorb the nation’s financial resources. Not only members of Congress, but right-wing activists 
like Dan Smoot, John T. Flynn, and Gerald L.K. Smith of the Christian Nationalist Crusade 
questioned the premises that justified Cold War defense spending. While vehemently anti-
communist, they argued that federal expenditures on large-scale foreign aid programs (through 
the Truman Doctrine or Marshall Plan, for example), d fense bureaucracies, and a standing 
military, defied the constitutional limits of American foreign policy. But isolationists were 
marginalized by the popular consensus and culture that supported the national security state. 
Right-wing critics of the Cold War persisted beyond the 1950s, but largely outside or at the 
fringes of the Republican Party. The libertarian wig of the anti-war movement in the 1960s, 
evangelicals’ support for the nuclear freeze movement, and the handful of Republicans who 
favored a reduction to the defense budget following the Cold War, reflected the long legacy of 
the pro-Taft wing within the Republican Party. Once th  opponents of the Cold War were 
marginalized, fissures among the American right on national defense policy were therefore not 
over whether the federal state should be enlarged to fight international communism, but to what 
dimensions, and for what purposes.25  
 The local and national forces that supported higher military spending during the Cold 
War thus formed a unique coalition that would come to influence politics in the postwar era. This 
coalition was neither completely conservative nor liberal; nor was it always successful in its 
outcomes. The defense hawks on the national stage set the tone for local developments in Cold 
War communities, but local politics were more determinative in pressuring national security 
                                                
25 This argument challenges the popular narrative of how the New Right came to support the Cold War natio l 
security state. Historian George Nash credited National Review editor-in-chief William F. Buckley with moving 
conservatism away from isolationism and toward “inter ationalism.” I argue that modern conservatives supported  
the militarization of American foreign policy indepndent of National Review and well before the publication of its 
first issue in 1955. Buckley, furthermore, was not the sole public figure in creating this shift.  See G orge H. Nash, 
The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America: Since 1945 (Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 
1998, 2nd edition). 
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elites to enact policies that were perhaps contrary o their intended interests. The symbiotic 
relationship between the local and national proponents of defense spending therefore made 
militarization a decisive feature in the process of tate-formation and policy making during the 
Cold War. The partnership between national policy makers and residents of Cold War 
communities was tenuous on issues outside of defens spending, but was unified in working to 
keep individuals in power that supported their agenda to increase American military might. 
Whatever reason they came to support militarization—personal, financial, ideological, or 
strategic—the various components of this “Cold War coalition” reinforced each other in their 
collective and universal effort for higher defense sp nding.                                                                                                                            
 Some clarification is necessary regarding the terms used to describe the political actors in 
this dissertation. The bipolar paradigms of left/right, liberal/conservative, Democrat/Republican 
seem inadequate to fully characterize the architects and proponents of militarization. Since the 
terms liberal and conservative are insufficient when discussing the backers of Cold War national 
defense policy, I have slightly modified them to account for their inconsistencies. In denoting a 
liberal or Democratic proponent of the Cold War, I have used the term “Cold War liberal” or 
“Cold War Democrat.” This term is given to figures such as Senators Hubert Humphrey and 
“Scoop” Jackson who were liberal-minded on social issues, including civil rights and labor 
rights, but were adamant that the United States must answer Soviet communism with military 
and nuclear superiority. The popularity of Cold War liberals was confined to a specific historical 
context from 1945 to the mid-1960s. Conceived in the Truman years, Cold War liberalism fell 
out of favor by the 1970s as the class of “New Democrats” or “Watergate Babies” came into 
office after 1974. I have termed these individuals “ nti-militarist” or “anti-militarist Democrats.” 
Like the term Cold War liberal, I use the term “anti-militarist” to apply to a specific period and 
22 
 
context.  I define an anti-militarist as an individual opposed to massive defense increases 
following the Vietnam War. This term was also used in the late 1960s to denote New Left 
activists and policy makers who sought a reduction in the defense budget. I have used the term 
for these reasons, rather than apply an original one that would be anachronistic.26 I also 
distinguish between the terms “Democrat” and “liberal.” Democrats did not have to be liberal, 
while liberals were not necessarily Democrats. The linguistic shuffling between the terms “Cold 
War liberal” and “anti-militarist Democrat” overcomes the vagueness of the term “liberal.” 
 The terms “conservative” or “conservatism” also need to be qualified, considering their 
multiple meanings and applications. For decades, historians have struggled to unite the various 
strains of conservative thought to explain how a conservative “movement” congealed after 1945. 
Most have acknowledged the theory of “fusionism” promulgated by journalist Frank Meyer and 
historian George H. Nash. Fusionism posits that after 1945, anti-communism among the right 
made allowances for the involvement of the state in matters of national security, even while 
conservatives continued to uphold free-market and anti-statist principles. Indeed, conservatives 
prioritized the private market over the public sector, but accepted that the federal government 
best handled national security policy.  The prewar and postwar right shared the belief that the 
state had a responsibility to ensure the security of he American people against external threats. 
The differences between the Old Right and the New Right were over the degree the state could 
intervene in Americans’ lives in order to defeat the reat of communism. 
 In applying the term conservative to certain groups and subjects in these pages, I have 
accepted the basic definition of fusionism. However, I do so noting that conservatives were 
willing to use the power of the state to confront economic and social issues, rather than market 
forces, if they were deemed necessary for the purposes f national defense. Few of the 
                                                
26 See “Antimilitarism Can Be Too Much of a Good Thing,” New York Times, October 19, 1969. 
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conservatives in this project were anti-government purists. Modern conservatives, with the 
exemption of a few libertarians, sought to reduce the proportions and influence of the state on 
Americans’ lives, but fell victim to the tensions between their anti-communism and anti-statism. 
While conservatives maintained coherence between anti-st tism and their support for an 
expansive military both philosophically and intellectually, when it came to making national 
defense policy, anti-communism often took precedent over anti-statism. The limits of anti-
statism in making policy during the Cold War prevented the postwar right from achieving their 
ultimate outcome: to reduce the size of the federal government.   
 The conservatives in this project were therefore not “traditionalists” who wanted to 
conserve or preserve institutions. Through state intervention, the modern right sought to promote 
policy changes that would reverse the gains made by the New Deal and Great Society during the 
twentieth century, but they also aimed to institute new political and cultural norms. As this 
project is more concerned with the right’s views on f reign policy and national defense, I 
consider this analysis when I use the term “conservative.” In a specific sense, many modern 
conservatives proposed policies that would lead to an even larger military than what much of the 
public envisioned after World War II. While Cold War Democrats expanded the size of the 
military and national defense regime to an unparalleled size, had conservatives taken control of 
both houses of Congress and the presidency during the Cold War, the size of the national 
security state would be broadened even further. Lastly, many of the individuals I label as 
conservative also self-described as “conservative” or members of a conservative movement, 
further preventing the use of improper labels to a person or group of people. 
 By explicating the interactions between the national security state, global affairs, and 
local politics, “For Right and Might” takes a historical approach toward explaining contemporary 
24 
 
problems.  The Cold War ended more than twenty years ago, but many of its economic and 
military structures remain. One of the central issues that this project illuminates is how the Cold 
War continues to remake American politics beyond its geopolitical lifetime. The United States 
still spends an exorbitant amount of federal dollars on defense, more than the next ten countries 
combined. While current U.S. defense spending as a portion of G.D.P. is low relative to years 
past, worldwide the United States is second only to Saudi Arabia in this figure. American 
military bases are stationed in all seven continents, the government regularly finances expensive 
Cold War era defense projects, and the 3,000,000 American military personnel is by far the 
largest number in the world.27 Indeed, the United States continues to spend money  a Cold 
War military despite its inapplicability to the problems the country faces in fighting the War on 
Terror. Even Secretary of Defense under President Gorge W. Bush, Donald Rumsfeld (who few 
would classify as a dove on defense), acknowledged this point and tried to streamline American 
military forces during his tenure. Rumsfeld, however, like many others before him, “failed to 
make corresponding cuts in weapons systems that are no longer justified.”28  This project offers 
insight into the confluence of political forces that ve kept the structure of the national security 
state intact after the Second World War. 
 The militarization of the Cold War also offers perspective into the disconnection between 
the rhetoric and the reality regarding Americans’ relationship to the federal government. In the 
age of Obama, Democrats and Republicans (albeit to much different degrees) have put forward 
ways to cut back on government programs in order to trim the size of the federal deficit. This is 
despite continuing bipartisan support for massive def nse budgets. At the same time, the public 
                                                
27 For these figures see, “Comparing Defense Budgets: Apples to Apples, Time, September 25, 2012, 
http://nation.time.com/2012/09/25/comparing-defense-budgets-apples-to-apples/. Total numbers of U.S. military 
personnel in relation to other countries are obtained from the Department of Defense website, “Total DoD-
December 31, 2012 (DMDC data), http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/miltop.htm 
28 “Decoding Rumsfeld’s Memo,” New York Times, October 24, 2003. 
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responds favorably to anti-government rhetoric, even while ninety-six percent of Americans 
receive aid or subsidies from the federal government. Some of the answers to this conundrum are 
found in the history of the Cold War. Defense spending uring the Cold War contributed to what 
political scientist Suzanne Mettler has called the “submerged state,” as it allowed Americans to 
experience the advantages of federal spending without attributing them to a welfare state. 
Militarization was seen as essential to the protection of the nation during the Cold War, and the 
benefits it distributed to Americans were viewed as e rned, even necessary, rather than given. 
Thus, the impact of defense spending on American political culture is yet another legacy of the 











                                                
29 Suzanne Mettler and John Sides, “We are the 96 Percent,” September 24, 2012, The New York Times, 
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Chapter One: The State and the Cold War Citizen 
 
  
 On October 9, 1951, in the depths of the Korean War, the head of the United Auto 
Workers (UAW), Walter Reuther, wrote to President Harry S. Truman urging him to ensure 
federal assistance to workers adversely affected by the transition to a wartime economy. In 
December 1950, Truman had launched the Office of Defens  Mobilization (ODM) to handle the 
militarization of the War at home by allocating defense contracts to businesses, hiring 
manpower, and streamlining production of necessary equipment. Reuther claimed that the rapid 
shift to defense urged by ODM had left civilian worke s unemployed. Grounding his arguments 
within the context of anti-communism, Reuther wrote that the “working people of America are 
prepared to make whatever sacrifices are necessary to defend freedom against the threat of 
communist tyranny.” For this reason, “defense work must be integrated in civilian plants to 
assure that the unused productive capacity” is utilized to employ more union workers. The 
solution to unemployment was more defense work.1   
 Reuther, a man of the political left who cut his teeth in socialist circles in the 1930s 
before helping found the Americans for Democratic Action in the 1940s, was not alone in 
looking to gain from the Cold War. Reuther’s opponents across the political aisle also sought 
more federal employment from defense spending. Republicans wanted the federal government to 
spend more funds on national defense to put Americans to work. Republican Representative 
from Michigan Gerald Ford, months before the Korean War broke out, urged the National 
Security Resources Board—the predecessor to the ODM—to declare Grand Haven, Michigan 
(located in his congressional district) “a critical area” in need of defense contracts in order to 
                                                
1 Telegram to Harry Truman from Walter Reuther, October 9, 1951, folder: Miscellaneous (1951) A to Z, OF 264, 
White House Central Files—Office Files, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri (HTL). 
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help “the labor market conditions” in the city. Other Republicans such as California senator 
William Knowland wanted greater defense contracts for the “shipbuilding or ship repair 
industry,” in California, citing the need to invoke Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 for the state, 
which gave areas with high unemployment priority to receive defense contracts. Months after 
writing his letter, however, and after he was elected Senate Majority Leader, Knowland led the 
campaign to repeal Defense Manpower Policy No. 4, most likely after he found it could not be 
applied to the ailing industry.2 
 This chapter explores the impact of militarization on American political culture during 
the early years of the Cold War. When militarization confronted “everyday life,” in the words of 
one historian, the construction of a new national security apparatus reconfigured the public’s 
relationship to the federal state. Americans’ lives at home were irrevocably affected by the 
United States’ global assault on communism.3 As the comments by individuals as diverse as 
Walter Reuther and Gerald Ford make clear, the public consistently sought access to the benefits 
the Cold War provided to local communities; Americans turned to the Cold War state for jobs 
and a multitude of other federal programs when economic recession threatened their pursuit of 
middle-class prosperity. In the absence of a broader social safety net, militarization provided 
federal benefits without the stain of social welfare. As the Cold War economy serviced the needs 
of the unemployed, a defense buildup was encouraged by Americans regardless of whether there 
was a strategic need for its products. 
                                                
2 Memorandum from John R. Steelman, September 2, 1949, folder: September 1949 (unemployment) [1 of 2, Sept. 
1-12], Box 30, Papers of John R. Steelman, HTL; Letter to Richard Nixon from John R. Steelman, May 14, 1952, 
folder: May 1952 (Office of Defense Mobilization) [1 of 2, May 1-14], Box 40, Papers of John R. Steelman, HTL. 
Knowland’s effort to repeal Defense Manpower No. 4 became a campaign issue in 1960, see “Remarks of Senator 
John F. Kennedy, Pottsville, P.A., October 28, 1960, Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961-1963, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=74269#axzz1u1exXiYd.   
3 Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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 The Cold War on the local level therefore reinforced politics at the national—and indeed 
international—level. Scholars have noted that a domestic culture of anti-communism pressured 
President Truman to increase the defense budget against his initial wishes, leaving his domestic 
agenda entitled the “Fair Deal” to languish behind the concerns of fighting communism.4 But 
Democrats during the early Cold War were dedicated nti-communists too. With Democrats’ 
plans toward full employment, national health insurance, and the enhancement of labor unions 
dashed by Republicans, militarization seemed the logical alternative to deal with social and 
international problems.  Democrats reasoned that the struggle against communism kept 
prosperity moving forward at a time when the country was concerned about falling into another 
Great Depression. Local communities rewarded those Democratic officials who brought 
employment and growth to their areas through military spending. As historian Darren Dochuk 
has shown, even defense-rich Southern California—the epicenter of American postwar 
conservatism—was a vibrant area for blue-collar labor-liberals during the early Cold War.5 
Outside of presidential elections, the South, which received a significant portion of funds from 
the Department of Defense, was still overwhelmingly Democratic in the 1940s, 1950s, and much 
of the 1960s. Southern Democrats supported militarization along with racial segregation. Not all 
Democrats, however, fell in line with the Cold War. P ogressive critics of American foreign 
policy such as Henry Wallace were ridiculed for their uneasiness with the growing confrontation 
with the Soviet Union. Wallace’s 1948 presidential c mpaign, and the left-wing Cold War critics 
he marshaled to his side, were a vocal minority that was overwhelmed by the proponents and 
                                                
4 Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Benjamin O. Fordham, Building the Cold War Consensus: The 
Political Economy of U.S. National Security Policy, 1949-1951 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998); 
Jonathan Bell, The Liberal State on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004). 
5 Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to Sunbelt: Plain Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical 
Conservatism (New York, W.W. Norton, 2010). 
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benefactors of the Cold War—and the anti-communist consensus within the Democratic Party. 
While a substantial number of Cold War critics remained in the federal government among the 
remnants of the New Deal left, conservative anti-communists who equated dissent with 
disloyalty silenced their skepticism toward the Cold War.6 
 Indeed, the domestic culture of anti-communism enhanced the strength of Republicans 
who used the Second Red Scare to build political power in the United States. For much of the 
New Deal period and World War II, Republicans were an embattled party. The early years of the 
Cold War, however, provided opportunities to Republicans to bolster their influence in the name 
of fighting communism. As David K. Johnson has shown with his examination of the “lavender 
scare,” where homosexuals in the State Department wre branded as communist traitors, 
Republican anti-communists broadened the structure of the national security state to pursue 
suspected enemies of the state.7 National security building among Republican elites had long-
term consequences for democratic politics during the Cold War. The prevailing scholarship has 
looked at the anti-statist tendencies of the Republican right during the immediate postwar years, 
but Republicans in the 1940s and early 1950s —within and without Washington, D.C.—were not 
as isolationist and anti-statist as historians have originally claimed them to be. 8 A nascent 
statism emerged among elements of the right that welcomed the expansion of the national 
defense bureaucracy, believing the militarization of the Cold War had great potential for 
                                                
6 Landon D. Y. Storrs, The Second Red Scare and the Unmaking of the New Deal Left (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2013). 
7 David K. Johnson, The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal 
Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 214. 
8 For a few examples, see Justus Doenecke, Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era (Bucknell 
University Press, 1979); James T. Patterson, Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A.Taft (New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1972); Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 
1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998);  Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America, 
Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987); 
Jonathan Bell, The Liberal State on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2004); Michael Bowen, The Roots of Modern Republicanism: Dewey, Taft, and the 




coalition building. The primary debate among the right, therefore, was not whether to increase or 
decrease the size the Cold War state, but how the stat  would function in a postwar context.  To 
maintain power, the right worked within the Cold War state to secure influence among the 
American people and positions of power in the federal government. The national security 
structure was not imposed upon the right, but was con tructed by their policies.  
 Republicans (and some Democrats) abandoned fiscal austerity on matters of national 
security by the 1950s because of the effects the Cold War had on local politics. Once the Cold 
War state took on significant dimensions, Republican appeals for reducing the size of 
government proved unattractive to many Americans who benefited from the Cold War economy. 
Even in trying to lessen the power of the federal government, conservatives from both parties 
ended up expanding it in important ways. By the outbreak of the Korean War, dedicated non-
interventionists like Robert Taft and Kenneth Wherry acquiesced, and at times embraced, the 
notion that the Cold War state was a structural necessity to defeat communism. Economic 
militarization marginalized anti-interventionism onthe left and the right after World War II, 
making the Cold War an entity that Americans at the local and national level were beholden to 
for the next fifty years.9   
 
World War II and the Private-Public Origins of Mili tarization 
 The success of the Allied powers in defeating fascist Germany and imperial Japan 
vindicated the capitalist system in the United States. American capitalism, it seemed, had saved 
the country from the Great Depression. It was not merely capitalism broadly, but the 
                                                
9 The terms Republican and conservative were not always synonymous in the early years of the Cold War. I have 
tried to be careful in this chapter of distinguishing the two. For a book that looks at the evolving conservatism within 
the GOP, and how that conservatism changed over tim, see Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendency: 
How the GOP Right Made Political History (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
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government-directed defense economy that brought prosperity to Americans after a decade of 
hardship. World War II fetishized the defense economy as massive employment through the 
warfare state won over an American public previously suspicious of big-government.10 The 
success of defense business in transforming the country made talk of war profiteers and criticism 
of big business during the 1920s and 1930s outdated, s the achievements of the public-private 
alliance between government and business forged a rnewed faith in the free-market to deliver 
America from the threat of fascism, rather than government intervention alone. Capitalism, like 
the war itself, proved regenerative to the American spirit.11  
 The warfare state that emerged out of World War II had its origins in the Great 
Depression. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his governmnt program for recovery, the 
New Deal, while giving relief to the thousands of unemployed Americans through jobs and 
social programs, fell short of bringing recovery to the American economy. After unemployment 
fell from 25 percent to 14 percent between 1933 and 1936, the 1937 recession sent 
unemployment rates skyrocketing once again to near 20 percent. FDR then began to flirt with 
ideas of government planning, convinced that American apitalism had reached its obsolescence. 
Roosevelt accepted the premise put forward by his cabinet members and advisors such as 
Thomas Corcoran that the government had to play a role in managing the economy. The 
government had to turn to overt “planning” to address the inherent problems of capitalism, 
Corcoran argued.12  
                                                
10 For more on this point, see James Sparrow, Warfare State: Americans in the Age of Big-Government (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
11 Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 
1995); Michael Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s; (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2000); Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twenti th-Century America (Tulsa: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1998). 
12 Robert McElvaine, The Great Depression: America, 1929-1941 (New York: Three Rivers Press, 1993), 298;  
Brinkley, The End of Reform, 5-6, Chapter 3. 
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 Roosevelt was convinced that the 1937 recession was partly a result of poor economic 
conditions in the South. The dragging Southern economy contributed to the absence of an 
economic recovery, Roosevelt concluded, and that the federal government should play a role in 
modernizing the region. The Southern economy was still largely agricultural and relied on tenant 
labor, which brought wealth to a few planters and low wages to an impoverished majority. 
Roosevelt aimed to change this, believing the industrialization of the South would bring 
increased wages to the region and economic recovery to the nation. Through the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA), the Works Progress Administra ion (WPA) and government funding 
for infrastructure projects, the Roosevelt administration succeeded in providing federal stimulus 
to the South. The New Deal’s presence overwhelmed th  region, much to the chagrin of 
Southern politicians who believed the federal government usurped states’ rights and the racial 
balance of the region.  
 When war came to the world with the invasion of Poland by Germany on September 1, 
1939, the Southern economy underwent even greater tr nsformation. Attracted by cheap land and 
even cheaper labor, the federal government and private military contractors invested in building 
defense plants in the South, making the region an emerging industrial force and the premier site 
for war production. The Southernization of the defense industry during World War II contributed 
mightily to the economic recovery of the United States. Consequently, the South—and primarily 
the Deep South—became the site of defense companies that employed previously out-of-work 
farmers and laborers to make products for the war effo t. As a result, employment in 
manufacturing in the South rose by 50 percent and wages by 40 percent. After 1945, the defense 
industry and the American military remained influential in restructuring the Southern economy 
to the point that the famous American author and southerner William Faulkner commented in 
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1956, “Our economy is the Federal Government.”13  According to historian Bruce Schulman, the 
defense industry “permeated nearly every town” in the Sunbelt as it would come to employ more 
workers in the South than in clothing manufacturing by 1973. The defense company Lockheed—
which only had 10 percent of its business in non-defense related matters—could claim on its 
payrolls workers who lived in one-third of Georgia’s counties during the 1960s and 1970s. 14  
 The defense industry was not simply a Southern pheom non, but stretched from the 
Northeast to Pacific Northwest. This region, which political scientist Ann Markusen and others 
have aptly entitled the “Gunbelt,” was due to both deliberate and fortuitous circumstances. 
Boeing Corporation, for instance, became a primary employer in Seattle as far back as World 
War I, simply because its founder, William Edward Boeing, was located in the region after his 
entrepreneurial engagements with the timber industry failed.15  World War I was also the genesis 
for major airplane manufacturers like Curtiss Corporati n and Dayton-Wright. Dayton-Wright 
became a significant local employer in Dayton, Ohio after the 1926 Air Corps Act gave federal 
funds to build the Wright-Patterson Airbase. Many defense companies during the World War I 
era were based in the Midwest, an area known for a c ncentration of industrial skill and output 
that the federal government heavily financed during the interwar years.16  
 World War II enhanced the power of Midwestern defense companies that mass produced 
war materiel for the federal government. Ford Motor C mpany was the third largest defense 
contractor during the war, as the company’s record of automation, efficiency, and mass 
                                                
13 Bruce Schulman, From Cotton Belt to Sunbelt: Federal Policy, Economic Development, & the Transformation of 
the South, 1938-1980 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994), 72 and 135.  
14 Ibid., 141. 
15 Ann Markusen, et al., The Rise of the Gunbelt: The Military Remapping of Industrial Politics (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), 3. The “gunbelt” is defined in geographical terms as the region that stretches from New 
England through the Sunbelt and up to the Northwest, and is the premier site of defense production in the United 
States. Areas in the gunbelt have disproportionately b nefited from defense spending, which has in turshaped and 
distinguished the political, cultural, and economic akeup of local communities. 
16 Ibid., 51-56. 
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production led to an unexpected 428 of the company’s Liberator airplanes being produced a 
month. Including Ford Motor Company, three of the top five defense contractors during the war 
were also based in the Midwest.  World War II also created new industries and in the South, 
East, and West. What was at one point a small part of the economy was now the central engine 
of job creation in many cities and regions. By the mid-1960s, government jobs in defense 
employed three percent of America’s workforce, over two million jobs. In Long Island, New 
York and Southern California, the availability of land and space proved pivotal in the 
development of the airplane industry, as defense manufacturers like Grumman, Fairchild, 
General Dynamics, and Rockwell would become the primary employers in these areas. Defense 
spending in such large numbers spurred suburbanization in the Gunbelt, increasing home 
ownership and the size of the American middle-class. The relationship between militarization 
and suburbanization, as historian Joshua B. Freeman has argued, were “two of the great social 
trends of the twentieth century.” Defense communities created by the Second World War were a 
reflection of America’s global prosperity and consumerist abundance. 17   
  Wanting to keep the “American Dream” alive in their districts and states, local and 
national politicians from defense communities subsidized the defense industry to serve their 
respective political agendas, thereby furthering the expansion of the warfare state. Republicans 
and Democrats rewrote the tax code during World WarII to allow defense companies tax write-
offs and lower marginal tax rates, believing such measures cut taxes, aided business, and reduced 
the size of the federal government in one fell swoop. Cheap land grants were given to the 
Pentagon by Southern Democrats to establish air and n val bases, military hospitals, and other 
                                                
17 For the history of Ford Motor Company during World War II, see Markusen, Rise of the Gunbelt, 64-65. For 
employment figures see, Markusen, Rise of the Gunbelt, 19-20;  Joshua B. Freeman, American Empire: The Rise of 
a Global Power, the Democratic Revolution at Home, 1945-2000 (New York: Viking, 2012), 127; Robert A. 
Beauregard, When America Became Suburban (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), chp. 7. 
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federal defense facilities in the South, citing the desire for more high-skilled jobs and industrial 
progress in the region. After the 1950s, concerns of a nuclear attack from the Soviets and access 
to federal funds convinced Cold War Democrats to finance the construction of missile silos in 
the South Dakota plains, leading the Air Force and Army Corps of Engineers to coerce farmers 
into selling their land to the federal government for the sake of nuclear deterrence. 18 In the East 
and West coast, Democrats and Republicans alike saw a need to keep federal defense spending 
flowing to their areas after the war subsided. Entreaties from defense and military workers 
employed Cold War rhetoric to urge politicians to keep defense installations open in their 
communities. In the latter half of the 1940s, residnts in Washington State urged their young 
Democratic Congressman named Henry Jackson to keep Sands Point Naval Base open, maintain 
a strong defense budget, and ensure retirement benefits for military personnel.19 Defense workers 
at Boeing’s headquarters viewed themselves as quintessential hard-working Americans who 
prospered because of the government’s commitment to the profitability of private defense 
contractors like Boeing. When the U.S. military threatened to relocate Boeing from Seattle to 
Wichita in 1949, Seattle residents rallied behind the company, arguing that Boeing “should 
remain in our community” so that its employees “will continue to enjoy the benefits of this 
magnificent payroll.”20 
 World War II provided the material justification for the national security state, but the 
ideology of policymakers in the postwar era ensured its perpetuation into the Cold War. In the 
                                                
18 Mark Wilson, “The Advantages of Obscurity: World War II Tax Carryback Provisions and the Normalization of 
Corporate Welfare,” in Kim Phillips-Fein and Julian E. Zelizer, eds., What’s Good For Business: Business and 
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Belt to Sunbelt, 146; Heefner, The Missile Next Door, 65-67. 
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immediate months following the surrender of the Japanese in the fall of 1945, the Truman 
administration extracted several lessons from the war’s experience. One of the most enduring 
lessons of the war was that the United States must prevent the recurrence of a surprise attack 
similar to Pearl Harbor. American leaders vowed to never again allow the United States to be 
caught unaware of impending threats to its national security by a foreign enemy. As the United 
States prepared to confront the threat of its former ally the Soviet Union (and more broadly, 
communism), the metaphor of Pearl Harbor became all the more profound. The lessons of World 
War II, in the minds of many policymakers, proved that diplomacy and negotiation produced 
only appeasement and eventually war. Negotiations culd not be conducted with dictators who 
have imperial ambitions; the outcome of the 1938 Munich Conference was proof that diplomacy 
was ineffective in dealing with totalitarian regimes. The only answer to thwarting German, and 
now Soviet belligerence, was military power. Indeed, the desire for American preparedness as a 
deterrent to communist aggression was echoed repeatedly by leading figures within the United 
States government, particularly the military establishment. Considering the losses the Soviet 
Union suffered fighting Germany, the nation posed no considerable military threat to the United 
States during the postwar years, but American policymakers feared the attractiveness of 
communist ideology to Western Europe and other strategic areas that had close economic and 
political ties to the United States. In the face of these threats, America’s military must remain 
prepared to wage another conflict if needed.21 
 The national security state also played an important role in the making of America’s 
postwar economy policy. The warfare state engendered conomic growth and social mobility in 
                                                
21 On the metaphor of Pearl Harbor, see Ernest R. May, Lessons of the Past: The Use and Misuse of History in 
American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975). On the reat of the Soviet Union, see 
Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992). 
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World War II and was therefore deemed fundamental to America’s economic might after 1945. 
President Truman often conflated economic and military power as justification for increases in 
the size of the military. In the early years of theCold War, Truman emphasized to Dean Acheson 
that “military strength is dependent upon a strong economic system and a strong industrial and 
productive capacity.”22 Officials within the Truman administration also believed economic 
instability was contributive to the success of communist movements. A strong economy meant a 
stronger role for the United States in the world; any wavering in the defense budget was a sign of 
weakness that the communists were sure to exploit. 
 The Cold War policy of containment also encouraged th  production and free exchange 
of goods to prevent the spread of communism to America’s trading partners. As Truman 
acknowledged in a speech on American economic policy to the American Legion, “world 
prosperity is necessary to our own prosperity in the United States.” For the United States to 
achieve economic growth, it also must be spread to the world.23 Throughout the Cold War, U.S. 
economic policy was directed at keeping European and J panese markets open to American 
commodities, and vice versa. The defense economy contributed to the economic fortunes of 
America’s allies as militarization fueled growth abroad to preserve the security of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Japanese steel was used in American weapons during the 
Korean War, while American requests for one thousand trucks a month during the war became 
“Toyota’s salvation.”24 As countries profited from the products made by the Cold War, the 
defense economy conveyed the superiority of American capitalism in both a domestic and 
                                                
22 Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense,  May 13, 1948, National Military Establishment—Miscellaneous 
folder, Box 11, papers of Clark M. Clifford, HTL. 
23 Robert Collins, More: The Politics of Economic Growth in Postwar America (New York: Oxford University 
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international context. The role of the United States in remaking the global political economy 
therefore entailed a regular and integral role for militarization during the Cold War.  
 The global war on communism made the national defens  structure an indelible feature of 
postwar politics in ways that would determine the rol  of the U.S. in the world. American 
military power also established new and diverse connections between the economics of the Cold 
War and the social affects they engendered in local communities, creating varied interests and 
dependents upon the defense economy. These interests nabled the growth of the national 
security state to fulfill the mission of the U.S. abroad and the promise of economic growth at 
home. The ideological justifications behind U.S. Cold War foreign policy furthered the 
underlying economic and social effects of defense spending, creating a reciprocal relationship 
between the military and the citizenry. The local effects of the Cold War in turn shaped the 
international dimensions of American foreign policy, as the public-private origins of 
militarization altered the role and function of the American political system and the structure of 
foreign policy making in Washington, D.C. 
 
Redefining American Politics within the Cold War State 
 President Truman initially wanted defense reductions during his early years in office, not 
defense increases. The onset of peacetime demanded  reorganization of budgetary priorities for 
the President. The defense budget was important, but not as significant as expanding domestic 
programs for middle-class and working-class Americans. From 1946-1949, Truman struggled to 
consolidate his “Fair Deal” for Americans, which would have broadened the New Deal through a 
program of national health insurance, new social security benefits, and civil rights reforms. 
Truman also wanted to prevent rising inflation rates, and like Roosevelt, embraced the need for a 
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balanced budget. Reducing defense spending would go a long way toward achieving these goals, 
Truman felt. But Truman’s domestic agenda was frustrated by his opponents who stymied his 
Fair Deal. 25 Some anti-Fair Dealers were Democrats like Maryland senator Millard Tydings. 
Tydings and Democrats like him were fiscal traditionalists who believed the New Deal destroyed 
the constitutional foundations of the country.26 
 Most of Truman’s opponents, however, came from the Republican right. Republicans too 
believed that the end of the war meant a new era for the federal state. But unlike Truman, the 
right wanted price controls lifted, tax rates slashed, collective bargaining rights of labor limited, 
and regulations on business eased. The 1946 midterms, which gave Republicans control of both 
houses of Congress, allowed them to achieve some of these goals. The vociferous anti-
communist fervor that pervaded the country after World War II stymied Truman’s domestic 
agenda, halting any further extension of the New Deal state. Congressional conservatives were 
able to pass anti-labor legislation such as the Taft-H rtley Act, and with the help of entrenched 
corporate interests and organizations such as the Am rican Medical Association (AMA), killed 
discussion of a national health insurance program. Republicans dangled the specter of 
communism over the head of Americans like a Damocles’ sword, warning Americans that an 
expansion of social welfare was a communist rouse to subvert American individualism and 
replace it with collectivism.27 
 But anti-statism among the right left congressional elites exposed to critiques that they 
were “soft” on communism—at least in their willingness to use state power to deal with the 
Soviet threat. As Georgia Democratic Representative Carl Vinson commented on his Republican 
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colleagues shortly after they expressed their opposition to the Truman Doctrine, “They don’t like 
Russia, they don’t like Communism, but they don’t want to do anything to stop it.”28 
Comparisons between communism and fascism among right-wing intellectuals exacerbated this 
problem. In his manifesto to the free-market, The Road to Serfdom (1944), Austrian economist 
F.A. Hayek implied that there was no difference between communism and fascism, as there 
existed “a relative ease with which a young communist could be converted into a Nazi or vice 
versa.”29 As historian Jennifer Burns points out, Soviet exile Ayn Rand spent her life and career 
arguing that American civilization—its system of free enterprise and individualism—were under 
constant threat by communists who were no different from fascists.30 The fascist/communist 
analogy employed by Rand and Hayek made credible Truman’s polices that expanded the size of 
the federal government for reasons of national defense. If communism was identical to National 
Socialism in form, purpose, and content, then logic led to the conclusion that the U.S. 
government was justified in obstructing the spread of Soviet communism with the same means it 
did to thwart fascist Germany. Within this dichotomy, anti-statism on national defense issues had 
less weight, as the anti-communist right was invariably trapped within the structural arrangement 
of the Cold War era. 
 This predicament contributed to a disconnection betwe n policy and principle among the 
right. Communism needed to be vanquished, according to Republicans, but defense monies were 
better spent on projects other than what Truman asked for from Congress. Aid to Europe through 
the Marshall Plan subsidized socialist countries with taxpayer dollars, compounding federal 
deficits and leading to increased inflation.  Members of the right believed the frontline in the war 
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between communism and the free world was not in Europe, but Asia. The Chinese Civil War 
between Chiang Kai-Shek’s nationalists and Mao Tse-ung’s communists was the most pressing 
issue to the right. Publisher of the Manchester-Union Leader William Loeb felt that General 
George Marshall’s withdrawal of American forces from China in 1947 was equivalent to 
“abandoning the Chinese to the Communists as we abandoned the Poles.”31 A powerful “China 
Lobby,” headed by John Birch Society member Alfred Kohlberg, and consisting of Loeb, Clare 
Booth Luce (wife of Time magazine publisher Henry Luce), and officials of the Chinese 
nationalist government, funneled money to a “propaganda campaign on behalf of Chiang Kai-
shek and the Nationalist Government” which lampooned diplomats and policymakers within the 
Truman Administration for the “loss of China,” after Mao came to power in January 1949. While 
the Truman administration could not decisively conclude just how “closely these extreme right-
wing, anti-Semitic groups and individuals are tied in with the central activities of prominent 
Chinese,” it was apparent that the China Lobby bankrolled Chinese advocates of the nationalist 
government who sought to influence American elections by financing like-minded political 
candidates, including enlisting men to “go through the South, at the expense of the Chinese 
News Service, urging a Republican-Dixiecrat coalition for 1952 on southern politicians.”32  
 In addition to a greater emphasis on Asia during the 1940s, Republican critics of Cold 
War containment wanted restraints on defense expenditures.  Congressional Republicans wanted 
a defense budget that was smaller and redesigned to accommodate their worldview on how to 
defeat communism. Rather than a muscular Army and Marines, congressional conservatives 
worked to reallocate defense funds to a stronger Navy and Air Force—which would be more cost 
efficient. While Senator Robert A. Taft complained that the defense budget figures requested 
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from the Truman administration were too high, he also said that more funds were needed to 
modernize the Air Force. According to historian Michael J. Hogan, Taft believed that because 
“the United States could not match the Red Army man for man, he thought it was better to 
counter Soviet strength on the ground with American strength in the air, particularly in air-
atomic power.”33 While he was opposed to the warfare state, this viewpoint made Taft among the 
individuals responsible for America’s overreliance on air power following World War II. When 
the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, it proved to Taft “above everything else 
the necessity of building up an all-powerful Air Force.”34  
 However, more bipartisanship existed on Truman’s Cold War policies than his domestic 
ones. Southern Democrats widely backed Truman’s measur s on Cold War spending, so much so 
that political scientist Ira Katznelson has argued that among “all the blocs in Congress that 
backed the Truman administration’s international polices, Southern Democrats were the most 
steadfast.”35 Programs defended under the rubric of national defense were also more likely to 
pass with Republicans. The Republican Party remained divided on Cold War strategy and the 
amount of federal dollars spent on defense, but a coalition of Republicans voted with Democrats 
to pass defense budgets even larger than requested by Truman. As the Cold War escalated in 
1948 due to the Berlin Blockade and the Soviet coup in Czechoslovakia, anti-communism led to 
greater consensus on national security policies. Appropriations for modernizing aircraft met the 
approval of Democrats and Republicans alike. Missouri representative Clarence Cannon, usually 
a fiscally prudent Democrat on military spending, complained that in the few years following 
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World War II, “every branch of our armed forces has deteriorated until our military might is but 
the shadow of its war peak strength.” More air power as needed to confront the Soviets, but the 
U.S. also “must be provided at all times with the latest military, air, and naval equipment fully 
abreast of the latest research findings.” Isolationist senator Kenneth Wherry said there must be “a 
strong air force capable of defending the national security of the United States of America, and 
that if cuts in expenditures are to be made they should be made in some other place, either in the 
other branches of the military or on the economic front.”36         
 Amid the international and domestic concerns over communism, both Democrats and 
Republicans cautioned the American public against returning to the old foreign policy order. The 
Truman administration aimed to motivate citizens’ vigilance against communism; political 
indifference eroded Americans’ spirit for victory in the Cold War. The President’s Committee on 
Religion and Warfare in the Armed Services, known better as the Weil Committee, aimed to 
rejuvenate civic patriotism in peacetime. The Weil committee would enhance the “moral welfare 
of our young men,” by helping transition military personnel to civilian status while seeing that 
the communities they returned home prepared for “their new responsibilities to the peacetime 
military establishment.37 In its report to the President, the Weil Committee warned the American 
public to avoid complacency if they wanted to win the Cold War. The committee expressed 
concern that American “civilians too often tend to be apathetic to the needs of our armed forces, 
and our apathy frequently breeds mutual misunderstanding and resentment. This traditional 
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peacetime apathy toward our military establishment is dangerous.”38 While members of the Weil 
Committee discouraged an exorbitant defense buildup to fight communism, they nevertheless 
accepted that communism was the premier enemy to the security of the United States, and 
military power was needed to defeat it. The Committee distrusted the “brass hats” within the 
military, but at the same time wrote that it was America’s armed forces that had best preserved 
“‘democratic values’ among the ranks of our servicemen and women, and the civilian 
community by and large has not.” 39 
 Republicans felt the same, believing the United States was a superpower, but its strength 
was precarious—it relied upon an attentive democracy.  Republican Congressman from 
Michigan, John B. Trevor, feared that because Americans were not sufficiently mindful of the 
communist threat, “Apathy and timidity are stifling patriotic action, so—Communism marches 
on!”40 Right-leaning patriotic organizations warned that Americans’ must recognize that the 
communist threat at home and abroad is severe enough t  deprive them of their well-preserved 
liberties at any moment. Apathy, inattention, and amorality, were the collective perennial threats 
to the nation’s security.  Groups like the American Legion warned against political inaction 
during the 1940s and 1950s, encouraging Americans to be culturally prepared to fight 
communism. A local chapter of the Legion in Uniontown, Pennsylvania launched a program of 
“Americanism” in 1955 that Legion member and former national commander Paul H. Griffith 
said was “a positive, dynamic demonstration of patriotism and devotion to America and its 
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institutions of freedom.”41 Indeed, the American Legion was revitalized as a cultural weapon 
against communism. The Legion’s supporters thought the organization “now confronts a greater 
responsibility than ever before in the life of the nation because it can furnish organized stability 
to a large sector of our public thinking” through its patriotic activities. The country was “going to 
sadly need this sort of rational Americanism.”42  
 The preservation of a moral America was therefore premised on widespread opposition to 
communist subversives at home and abroad. This anti-communist consensus between Democrats 
and Republicans led to agreement and collaboration on ational defense policy. While debates 
and differences would continue between the left and the right over the Cold War, significant 
portions of both parties agreed that a bigger natiol security state was needed to defeat 
America’s foreign foes. The differences between many Democrats and Republicans were in the 
technical details of where and how the money for defense was spent, not over whether (or if) the 
U.S. should have a large defense budget. Non-interventionist Republicans were against a large 
defense budget, but did not want a return to a prewa  military. While isolationist Republicans 
thought an expansive Air Force could replace a standing army and a permanent military footing, 
it only contributed to the larger structure of the military state. The enlargement of the Air Force 
was not cost efficient, and accompanied the growth of e entire defense structure during the 
early Cold War—one branch of the armed services did not outweigh another in the fight against 
communism. 43  
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 As the 1940s neared their end, however, a handful of Cold War critics on the left and 
right sought to reverse the tide of militarization. These individuals saw growing defense budgets 
as a break with America’s past, one that threatened to supplant the American republic with a 
military autocracy. Influenced by an isolationist, and at times, anti-imperialist political tradition 
in the United States, these individuals warned Americans that the structure of militarization made 
the United States an interventionist power that spelled catastrophe to the institutions of American 
democracy. A foreign policy without limits, these left-wing and right-wing critics said, made 
Americans more willing to find comfort in massive military power to protect the United States 
from external threats. 
 
The Importance of Regionalism  
 At the outset of the Cold War, a lingering strain of isolationism (or non-interventionism) 
dominated the regions of the Midwest. These isolatinists were progenies of Progressive Era 
activists who had opposed American intervention abro d. In the years between the Civil War and 
World War II, non-interventionist Republicans combined a Jeffersonian suspicion of foreign 
alliances with a Hamiltonian desire for a strong, free-market economy.  Neo-isolationists also 
invoked George Washington’s Farewell Address and his caveat that the United States should be 
cautious of engaging in alliances with other powers. Foreign entanglements that would make 
U.S. foreign policy beholden to the dictates of its allies were to be avoided. Non-interventionists 
also criticized America’s incursions into Cuba and the Philippines to secure the business interests 
of American corporations and take up the “white-man’s burden.” Isolationists were also opposed 
to a standing army. They were convinced that the militarization of the American economy would 
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bankrupt the United States. Prolonged conflicts drained revenues from the state, creating vast 
deficits that imperiled America’s economic might.44 Midwestern isolationists were also 
suspicious of governing institutions that centralized power, from the Federal Reserve to the 
League of Nations. As one conservative Senator misleadingly said about the League, “We are 
‘Americans’ and no international Banking syndicate can terrify or bulldoze us!”45  
  In the 1920s, non-interventionist Republicans in Washington continued to call for a more 
restrained global footprint.  The human destruction created by World War I, and the failure of the 
United States to join the League of Nations, spurred a demand for international peace among 
global powers. Isolationists Republicans in the 1920s embraced these events.  Non-
interventionist Republicans shared the concerns of Midwestern progressives over militarism 
creeping into the body politic. These Republicans were at the forefront of attacks on the 
“merchants of death”: those companies who profited from trading with the Central and Entente 
powers during World War I, and were accused of perpetuating the war for financial gain. 
Individuals such as Felix Morley, who would go on t contribute to the magazine Human Events, 
found themselves in company with liberal Republicans like North Dakota senator Gerald Nye, 
who laid the blame for the war at the feet of greedy business interests. 
 In the 1930s and 1940s, Midwestern isolationists merged hostility with New Deal 
economics and an interventionist foreign policy, believing they were symptomatic of the 
mistaken efforts by Democrats and their Republican sympathizers to use government power to 
regulate the outcomes of global and domestic affairs. One critic of Republican senator Arthur 
Vandenberg complained that because of his collaboration with Democrats on foreign policy 
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matters, the Senator had “gone over to the New Dealbody and soul.”46 One Michigan resident, 
Mrs. Grant Ballantine, in discussing her distaste for foreign aid to Greece under the Truman 
Doctrine, said that Republicans were more bedfellows than enemies to Democrats. She claimed 
to speak for “All true Republicans [who] are sick and tired of 15 years of FDR ism.” Despite the 
overwhelming majority of Republicans in Congress after 1946, the leading members of the 
G.O.P. are “just [Republican] in name only. That’s why we get no real change from New Deal 
ism. Our hopes are blasted.”47 George Sefcik told his congressional representative that he was 
tired of the U.S. “spending Billions of dollars in building up Europe and defending them from 
communism. You are taking from our people money thedon’t have to spend in Europe.”48 L.E. 
Osmer from Grand Rapids, Michigan felt likewise, wondering why “the American taxpayer” had 
to shell out their hard-earned money for a nation like “Turkey, a country who didn’t help us out 
in our hour of need during world war II.” Osmer argued that the U.S. was “good and big and 
generous but we are not good enough to bail out the rest of the world and, if countries like 
France want Communism and countries like England want Socialism, there isn’t a thing that you 
or anyone else in Washington can do about it.”49 Chicago resident and banker Ralph M. Shaw 
said that as “a strong, unwavering Republican and...patriotic American citizen,” he was appalled 
at the foreign aid to Greece and Turkey under the Truman Doctrine. Shaw said that the “best way 
to protect America is to discharge the unnecessary feeders at the public crib in Washington and 
elsewhere; decrease the taxes; pass much needed remial labor legislation,” and this can allow 
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the United States to “then make ourselves so strong fr m a naval, military, and atomic point of 
view that no nation would dare attack us.”50  
 During the early Cold War, Robert Taft was the leading Republican in Congress who 
feared America’s financial downfall would be due to high defense budgets and a bloated 
military. Taft led a group of non-interventionist Republicans against the national security state, 
including John Bricker from Ohio and Kenneth Wherry f om Nebraska.  Taft and his cohorts felt 
the threat to the country posed by the Soviets equal d the one posed by large military budgets. 
Taft believed that the constitutional purpose of the federal state was to protect the country from 
immediate external threats and little else—Republicans opposed the New Deal and social 
programs on these grounds. While conservative Republicans shared a limited role for the state on 
economic issues, a portion of the Republican right believed the threat of communism warranted 
the expansion of the state on national security. Taft disagreed with his Republican colleagues 
who argued the federal government could only protect Americans through exorbitant military 
power. To Taft, communism was a threat, but building a national security state placed limitations 
and restrictions on Americans that the Founders feared, sacrificing well-preserved freedoms in 
the process. Massive defense spending accompanied pric  controls, inflation, and government 
influence in the market, all that were anathema to the America Taft envisioned. The Soviet 
Union and its satellites were not urgent threats that demanded the U.S. “militarize our 
economy.”51  
 The Bricker Amendment was one of the more visible challenges to the new structure of 
American foreign policy. Sponsored by Republican John Bricker in 1953, the amendment was 
the isolationists’ answer to the United Nations. The Bricker Amendment circumscribed the 
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Executive’s authority in making international treati s that did not accord with the President’s 
powers as written in the Constitution. Since the Constitution did not envision a Cold War 
presidency, Congress would exercise greater power over the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, 
theoretically allowing Republican isolationists to prohibit the United States from entering into 
treaties with countries and governments they were disinclined to support. The Bricker 
Amendment, however, never made it passed committee hearings. Liberal Republicans and 
organizations such as the American Legion and the Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
(COCUSA) endorsed collective security and the United Nations, even claiming that an 
“international political organization is necessary for the purpose of maintaining peace and 
security among nations.” 52  
 These organizations were national, while the pro-Bricker Amendment forces were local 
in context. Vigilant Women for the Bricker Amendment, headed by Mrs. Winifred Barker of 
Chicago and Mrs. Ruth Murray of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, kept the campaign for the Bricker 
Amendment alive well into the mid-1950s, lobbying me bers of the Senate Judiciary committee 
to keep the “radical left [from] joining with the inter-nationalists” in defeating the amendment.53 
The Bricker Amendment was immensely popular in the Southwest as well. Fred W. Moore, a 
lawyer from, Houston, Texas argued to Truman official William L. Clayton that there was “a 
growing tendency of Left-Wing judges and lawyers to justify any socialization of industry under 
the treat-making power.” Another Texas lawyer, one pposed to the Bricker amendment, said he 
“went to a meeting of the Bar Association and I would say that a heavy majority of the lawyers, 
or at least the conservative ones, are for the Bricke  Amendment. Asking them why, I found they 
had never read the amendment (and I knew they had all voted for Eisenhower) and all they could 
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do was to mumble “Yalta.”  The Bricker Amendment was troublesome to him because “the 
campaign for it is extremely strong. Throughout Texas the so-called “conservatives” and 
Eisenhower voters—and Republicans—overwhelmingly favor the Bricker Amendment.”54  
Indeed, support for the Bricker amendment came from a conglomeration of right-wing 
isolationists. The backers of the amendment were predominantly the “extreme fundamentalist 
groups, violently cracked preachers and many others of great wealth.” Radio programs and 
commentators used the power of the airwaves to coordinate the diverse factions among the 
isolationist right. Willard H. Pope was one such radio commentator. Pope accused opponents of 
the Bricker Amendment of being communists in disguie and the “anti-Christ foretold by Jesus 
and Prophets, Revelation 6 through 18.” The U.N. was decried by Pope as “an octopus” that 
“controls our children” and will eventually “repeal the Taft-Hartley law.”  Pope claimed that 
those rallying to defeat the Bricker Amendment are few and “are the World Federalists with Pro-
Soviet” sympathies, while the “savers of the nation are the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the 
DAR.”55 
 Not all Midwesterners were opposed to an “internationalist” or interventionist foreign 
policy. Men like Republican senator from Michigan Arthur Vandenberg—who played an 
important part in shaping a supposed “bi-partisan” foreign policy during the Cold War— was the 
most popular Midwestern internationalist. Vandenberg offered a careful analysis of his 
internationalism in a speech made in 1925. Vandenberg argued that the right kind of 
“internationalism” is a mutually respected “justice” between sovereign “nationalities.” 
Vandenberg recognized the value of international alliances in the postwar world, but still lauded 
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American exceptionalism and the importance of natio-states. Whereas the “wrong kind of 
“internationalism” is an effort to submerge “nationalisms” beneath a political super-sovereignty 
which futilely attempts to rely upon international force instead of international conscience,” the 
“right kind of “internationalism” is a mutually respected “justice” between sovereign 
“nationalities.” Vandenberg also favored a “World Court” and alliances with countries that “do 
not have to become world vassals in order to deal justly with each other and to be scrupulous in 
their engagements.”  Distorting the lessons of American imperialism in Latin America, 
internationalism could not encompass the “Far Eastern brown races” as they would not be 
welcomed “into our own unrestricted citizenship.” But Vandenberg repudiated isolationism as a 
guiding force in American foreign policy. “Actual national isolation is a ridiculous anomaly in 
this day when pioneering genius has put the veritable wings of the morning upon world 
communication and world contacts. There is no such thing as isolation.”56 
 The policy platforms of the America First Party (AFP) demonstrated the problems that 
confronted right-wing non-interventionism after World War II. Created by right-wing activist 
and Minister Gerald L.K. Smith in 1943, the American First Party was an outgrowth of the 
American First Committee, the organizational home for isolationists during World War II. Now 
that the war was over, the AFP demanded deterrence against foreign threats through federal 
expansion of the state. America First said that the U.S. “must remain a strong nation. We must 
defend our outposts. We must maintain a great Navy and a strong Army.” Military strength can 
be assured through increased expenditures for military salaries, and “not be done by peacetime 
conscription. It should be done by making the pay of the soldier, the sailor, and the marines so 
attractive in peacetime that men whose temperaments l an toward the military will actually seek 
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the opportunity to serve with our armed forces.” Rather than loans financed by government debt, 
military personnel “must be paid with Constitutional money, guaranteed and underwritten by the 
productive capacity of our nation.” The AFP therefo called for a redistribution of federal 
resources away from foreign aid and toward veterans’ benefits. “If we cancel the Lend Lease 
debts of foreign nations to ourselves, it will mean a donation to foreigners of about $2,000 per 
American family.”  Instead of the forgiveness of foreign debt, “each mustered-out veteran should 
get 1,000 cash.”57The Christian Nationalist Crusade, also founded by Smith, blended evangelical 
Christianity, anti-Semitism, racism (particularly racist screeds over interracial sexual relations), 
with a hatred of foreigners, “internationalists,” bankers, and elites in general into an isolationist 
worldview on national defense. Through his news bulletin, the Nationalist News Service, Smith 
promoted this message to his followers, many of which were located in Midwestern states 
including Missouri, Indiana, Ohio, and Nebraska, as well as in the region of Southern 
California—which had many transplants from the Midwest. Subscribers to the Nationalist News 
Service flocked to Smith because of his vehement anti-communism and his call to enlarge the 
fight against the Soviet Union after the Second World War. Smith thought Stalin was an 
expansionist despot who cared little for national sovereignty and sought to run rampant over 
Asia. What would eventually be termed the “domino theory” was sure to be a reality if the 
United States did not stop communist aggression, Smith warned. Concerned about the threat of 
communism in China, Smith wrote that when “Stalin takes China he will take Japan, the 
Philippines, and cross the Bering Strait into Alaska. He, or whoever his successor may be, in 
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cooperation with the Communist Party in America will threaten the very future existence of our 
Christian nation.”58  
 Isolationist groups like the Allied Patriotic Society (APS) had difficulty reconciling their 
aversion to internationalism in the face of the Soviet threat. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, 
the APS wanted to take back their earlier opposition to American entry into the war. The APS 
now expressed its “[r]egrets on unpreparedness” as its members had “surprise and disgust for 
failure at Pearl Harbor and a strong feeling that we have not yet had all the Truth.” The war was 
necessary, and needed to be won by the allied powers, but this required more government monies 
for America’s military. Instead of continued social programs, APS members wanted federal 
dollars for defense. In one meeting, it was noted that here were “many complains on reckless 
spending for the idle instead of on work for defense.” The APS assumed that the federal 
government’s spending on domestic programs had cost the United States dearly in the early 
months of the war.  This presumption underlay their priorities for defense over all other federal 
responsibilities. 59   
 While there was a strong isolationist presence among the right, Iowan and former Vice 
President Henry Wallace personified the Midwestern anti-interventionist tradition on the left.  
Postwar progressives identified with Wallace who offered early criticism of what he called 
America’s “Get tough with Russia” policy. To Wallace, the Cold War drained resources from 
important domestic programs and led to an ominous standoff between the United States and the 
Soviet Union.  In an article written for the New Republic in 1946, Wallace presciently discussed 
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the coming arms race between the superpowers. If the United States continued its military 
buildup, Wallace argued, the results would be devastating in an age of atomic weapons. 
American belligerence toward the Soviet Union will mean the “Russians will redouble their 
efforts to manufacture bombs, and they also may decide to expand their “security zone” in a 
serious way.” To prevent nuclear Armageddon, the U.S. needed to empathize with the Soviets 
and engage them in diplomacy.60  
 As the nominee for the Progressive Party during the 1948 presidential campaign, Wallace 
amassed a number of supporters based on his assessment of the Cold War. Running to the left of 
Truman, Wallace offered an alternative to massive military spending in the name of anti-
communism. Much of Wallace’s support came from the socialist-leaning American Labor Party 
and radical members of labor unions and farm groups in the Midwest. A number of rank-and-file 
workers backed Wallace, causing rifts between pro-Wallace union members and the national 
leadership that endorsed Truman from unions such as t e Electrical Workers Union, the Fur and 
Leather Workers Union, and the Farm Equipment Workers. Indeed, the American Federation of 
Labor called Wallace a “front, spokesman, and apologist” for communism, while Walter Reuther 
readied his membership to take “on Wallace and his Joe Stalin associates.”61 In his speeches on 
foreign policy, Wallace pulled few punches in attacking the moneyed interests who he believed 
had much to gain from the Cold War. Wallace applied the attack on “merchants of death” in the 
1920s to the context of the Cold War, arguing that e “Wall Street war group” that profited 
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personally and financially from the Cold War ran the Truman administration62 The Cold War 
was a “crisis” created from “willful men with private interests [who] are dictating our foreign 
policy. Their interest is profits, not people.”63  Throughout his campaign, however, Wallace had 
difficulty obtaining endorsements from mainstream labor and Democratic officials. Red-baited 
by Truman, his supporters, and Republicans for his associations and connections with 
communists—which he later regretted—Wallace was painted as a patsy for the Soviet Union. 
Anti-communism tainted Wallace’s insurgence against the Cold War, preventing his Third Party 
candidacy from gaining momentum outside of radical circles.  
 Wallace was overly conspiratorial and simplistic in h s assessment of the economic 
origins of the Cold War, but he was correct in stating hat the national security state spawned 
assorted financial dependents. There was no cabal of nkers maliciously creating a new world 
order to further their profit margins, but militarization led to a hierarchy of actors wedded to the 
federal state in new ways.  Militarization hobbled together groups of people normally at odds 
with one another who felt the Cold War could rescue them in their time of economic need. 
Military officials, business executives, local politicians, labor leaders, and unemployed factory 
workers realized the defense economy’s resources could serve their respective ends.   
 The Korean War set in motion a role for the federal government that enabled 
militarization to act as a conduit for relief programs and unemployment after the demise of the 
New Deal, keeping large military spending an axiomatic characteristic of Cold War political 
culture. The war also ostracized opponents of militar zation, already weakened by the culture of 
anti-communism, the Cold War consensus in favor of internationalism, and the economic power 
of the national security state. As defense spending cl mbed to its highest during the Korean War, 
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it established a new precedent for militarization, e that more Americans were accustomed to 
accept. 
 
The Korean War and Military Keynesianism  
 The United States’ entry into the Korean War in September 1950 unleashed a patriotic 
fervor that suppressed and constrained previous critics of militarization. The surprise invasion of 
South Korea shocked the public and compelled Truman to send the United States to war a United 
Nations coalition. Korea also spurred accusations by Republicans that Truman ignored 
communist gains in Asia in order to focus on nonexistent threats to Western Europe. Even before 
U.S. troops landed in Inchon to stave off a South Korean defeat, Republicans attacked Truman 
for being “over-lenient to Communism,” which diplomat George Kennan noted in August 1950 
was a factor in prohibiting the administration from engaging in negotiations with the Soviet 
Union to end the war.64 Republican predictions on Asia appeared to come true: communism in 
Asia was the central locus of the Cold War. Conservative activist Phyllis Schlafly, who had 
isolationist tendencies prior to Korea, felt that the War was a conflict worth fighting, but that it 
should have been done through a congressional declaration of war, rather than a decision reached 
by the United Nations Security Council. Schlafly saw the Korean War as empirical proof of 
communism’s march to predominance: the proxy war in Korea was symptomatic of the 
persistent threat of the Soviet Union. As her biographer Donald T. Critchlow has noted, Schlafly 
justified increases to the defense budget not only to rollback communism in Korea, but also 
because a “strong defense was necessary to prevent war with the Soviet Union, the main enemy 
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that faced the nation.”65 Korea also led members of the right to support a military buildup. The 
Old Right isolationist Frank Chodorov, who ran the lib rtarian journal The Free man, argued that 
the U.S. government should reallocate spending on social welfare programs to add another two 
billion in defense spending for the war in Korea and place one million Americans “on the public 
payroll… [to] be put on the military assembly line.”66  
 The jump in defense budgets during the Korean War was justified by NSC-68, the report 
issued in 1950 that recommended massive increases in defense expenditures after the advent of 
communist China and the Soviet test of an atomic bomb.  The renewed threat of global 
communism provided the justification for passage of the 1950 Defense Production Act, which 
allowed the federal government to mobilize the economy for war through regulation of the 
private market. 67 A broad consensus of Democrats and Republicans voted in favor of the 
Defense Production Act. The bill passed the Senate by a vote of 85-3, and the House by 383-12. 
The “yea” votes for the Defense Production Act included the bloc of Senate Republicans 
normally critical of militarization, including Taft and Wherry. This was despite the fact that the 
DPA gave powers to the government to intervene in the economy in ways unseen since World 
War II. Under the act, the government could control p ices, build defense plants, regulate credit, 
and streamline resources and products for manufacturing, all of which meant a possible 
“nationalization of the economy,” according to one historian.68 While the pressure to appear 
patriotic supporters of the war was a factor in supporting the bill, Republicans also saw the 
potential benefit defense production had for their constituents.  The Illinois Democrat and Senate 
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Majority Leader Scott Lucas felt that lawmakers were “proposing amendments, trying to protect 
some particular commodity” within the legislation, to which Republican John Williams of 
Delaware responded that if such amendments had “been enforced during the last war, we would 
have saved the Government or the farmers of the Del-Mar Peninsula, along more than 
$10,0000,000.” Williams was just making sure that te DPA was going “to protect the farmer,” 
under his jurisdiction.69 
 The Defense Production Act remilitarized the American economy to levels unseen since 
World War II. In a report also issued by the National Security Resources Board (NSRB), the 
agency stated that one of the primary goals of the Def nse Production Act of 1950 was an 
“expansion of the economy as a desirable characteristic of the mobilization effort.” A 
memorandum to Stuart Symington from the NSRB relayed th  administration’s opinion “that 
current and contemplated national security programs will be of such magnitude as to require a 
measure of control upon the economy, but not of such magnitude as to prevent, concurrent with 
defense production, an expansion of the over-all economy.” In the rush to place its citizens and 
economy on a wartime footing, however, the United States “cannot lose sight, however, of the 
vital importance of maintaining the economy of this country on a stable and secure basis. If in 
allotting help to others [through humanitarian aid] we create weakness in our own economy, then 
all our aims and objectives will be lost; and such an occurrence here will act as a negative 
catalytic agent throughout the free world.” The United States must be cautious as “defense 
spending increases monetary purchasing power, while at the same time it fails to increase the 
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amount of goods available for sale to the public.” While the NSRB called for a “more Spartan 
existence,” it continued to encourage economic growth through militarization.70 
Additional federal mandates such Defense Manpower No. 4 and Defense Manpower No. 1, 
whose goal was “to bring defense work to the worker,” brought requests for defense contracts 
from multiple sources. Along with Representatives Nixon and Knowland, the American 
Federation of Labor worked to use the military-industrial complex to aid economically depressed 
areas. The AFL specifically hoped Defense Manpower No. 4 could resuscitate the textile 
industry in New England after companies moved to the South in search of cheaper land.71 
Business executives also wondered how they could receiv  defense contracts from the war effort. 
Corporate representatives from Merck & Co., for insta ce, asked Truman officials if there was 
anything “relative to the application of Defense Manpower Policy No. 4 to the drug and 
pharmaceutical industry.”72 
  The militarization of the economy during the Korean War, as it did during World War II, 
offered economic stimulus disguised as growth liberalism. The Truman administration urged the 
Council of Economic Advisors to view defense production in 1952 within the framework of 
other public works projects to provide federal relief and employment. Suggestions were made to 
the CEA to put forward a “work program” that would create “‘Development and Welfare 
Programs’ in the areas of natural resources (water, l nd) transportation infrastructure, health 
(hospitals, medical research centers), education (new schools, scholarships, teaching training) 
social security and welfare (“possible extensions of coverage to additional persons”) atomic 
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energy, housing, veterans programs (“housing credit, welfare, and transfer payments.)”  The 
CEA recommended that these types of “programs…are equally essential for defense and for 
nondefense purposes” as the organization should not operate with the presumption “that simply 
because budget categories separate defense from other expenditures, we are therefore barred 
from other approaches which recognize that most so-called nondefense development programs 
are vital to long-range security. A particular power dam, training program, public health item, or 
highway may, for example, be more necessary for defense than a particular military 
expenditure.”73  By couching domestic welfare programs within the context of militarization, it 
made federal involvement more acceptable to Americans’ suspicious of government spending in 
an era of heightened anti-communism. The defense economy appeared to operate independently 
from the structure of the welfare state. Even if defense expenditures created deficits, they did so 
to secure American national security interests, and were therefore indispensable to the war effort. 
 While using defense contracts to invigorate industrie  and workers, the Truman 
administration was careful to avoid the claim that t ey intentionally marginalized the private 
sector through a government-directed economy. Truman ensured government controls aligned 
with the needs of private business as American defens  policy in the Korean War revived the 
private-public alliances the government established during World War II without eroding the 
power of corporate capitalism.74 CEA head Leon Keyserling, known as a proponent of ational 
security economics, refuted charges in the months following the Korean War that he believed the 
defense economy was needed to keep the economy growin  and employment levels high. He 
told the now Senator Stuart Symington he did not believ  that “a tapering off of defense 
spending would necessarily bring hard times. Of course, you know that on grounds of national 
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security I favor an increase rather than a decrease in d fense spending, but I do not do this on the 
ground that a decrease would be inconsistent with a healthy economy. I believe that we can have 
a healthy economy either with a decrease or an increase in defense spending, and that the level of 
such spending should be decided on grounds of national security and world conditions.” 
Keyserling said he had “the profound conviction as a Democrat that there is high political 
desirability in reformulating and popularizing a very different approach to the relationship 
between Federal spending and economic prosperity from that traditionally voiced by or at least 
attributed to the New Deal and the Fair Deal.” Keyserling still self-identified as a New Deal 
Democrat “who does not deviate in the slightest from the objectives and general philosophy of 
the New Deal and the Fair Deal,” but he thought the Cold War was a new era where liberals 
“should learn from experience and adjust to the present and the future instead of living in the 
past.”75  
 Keyserling’s reservations about the defense economy aside, the public welcomed the 
employment opportunities the war created. When deindustrialization crept into the industrial 
landscape of Midwestern cities like Detroit during the 1950s due to capital flight, automation, 
and job losses, Americans searched for answers throug  economic militarization. As auto plants 
in the Midwest began to lay off workers, residents turned to the government for wages. John 
Sonnenberg from Michigan wrote to his Congressman Cl re Hoffman in 1954 for help in 
“alleviating the critical unemployment here” as a Kiser Motors plant in Detroit where he 
worked was scheduled to close within the following few months. Sonnenberg was sure that 
“[t]here MUST be a Defense contract which needs to be filled by experienced, capable men and, 
with your sympathetic understanding of our problem and what it means to the moral [sic] of 
Michigan, we are sure you will do whatever is necessary to correct this condition.” William Zizzi 
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also risked losing his job after over 20 years of employment with Packard Motor Car Co. located 
in Michigan. Zizzi’s company was responsible for building a variety of products for the 
government during wartime including motors for P.T. boats and a jet motor for Rolls Royce.  
Zizzi and his fellow “workers are proud of our past performance” and it was for this reason that 
“we urge you to do all in your power to see to it that our Gov’t executives provide us with some 
kind of defense work until such time that we can get back on our feet in the auto industry.  We 
pray that you face up to this enormous task.” Workers like Zizzi and Sonnenberg adopted the 
ethos of Fair Deal job creation through national security spending.76 
  Defense work during the Korean War was intended to be temporary by Truman 
administration officials, but the Americans that sought such work did not view it as 
impermanent, but a source of reliable income to support themselves and their families for the 
near future. The defeat of the Fair Deal—and its implications for an expanded social safety net 
for unemployed, aged, and infirm workers in the United States—combined with the success of 
the war economy in keeping domestic prosperity surging, made Americans turn to the national 
security state to for a source of income. Dayton’s Edward Wren was one of these Americans who 
looked to the defense industry for work. Wren was a victim of ageism and had difficulty finding 
a job; but Wren argued the federal government should provide him one, as it had done for other 
Americans in the recent past. Wren said he “never dr amed that such a cockeyed era would 
arrive in this country when our government would approve a pension plan that would compel 
industry to discriminate against men over forty years of age in securing a job, and this 
unquestionably effects [sic] the white collar [worke ] more than the skilled laborer. Billions of 
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dollars have been given and are still being given to help Europeans—billions to subsidize 
farmers, industries, etc., in fact just recently one hundred and twenty five million dollars” was 
provided to Argentina “who did everything in their power to help Germany during the last war. 
Not the slightest effort however is being made to assist in any way the downtrodden white collar 
man in securing a job and that’s what he wants and nothing more.” Wren asked what “this 
forgotten man” will do to earn an income before he can qualify for a pension.77  
J. Willard Washington from Baltimore made similar comments. Washington was upset 
over the large number of unemployed workers in Baltimore, which he said was close to 65,000 
residents. To resolve this crisis in local unemployment, Truman should “halt extravagant 
spending abroad and bring back the C.C.C.” John C. Wolf from Pennsylvania told the President 
that he felt the federal government discriminated against his state in awarding shipbuilding and 
other defense contracts. According to him, New York State and areas on the west coast were 
awarded more work by the federal government. Wolf said he wrote to Truman “in the interest of 
my fellow shipyard worker’s [sic] and in the interest of National Security.” Wolf then 
complained that a number of workers at Sun Shipbuilding Yard in Chester, Pennsylvania had 
been laid off in recent months, some with “16 to 18 year’s [sic] of Service.” This was despite the 
fact that the “shipyard worker’s [sic] were a great as-set [sic] to the Nation and to the World in 
World War 1 and 2.” Wolf concluded his letter by pleading with Truman to, “Please investigate 
as to why we don’t get Defense work or Ships to Build.”78 Denver M. Christy from Jasonville, 
Indiana sought work at the Crane Naval Ammunition Depot in Crane, Indiana during the Korean 
War. Christy was unable to work in the past, having been diagnosed with arthritis for twenty-
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four years, and had “a stiff hip which bars him from ccupational insurance.” But even though 
Christy now felt “perfectly healthy and has had no pain,” he still could not find work. The Crane 
Naval plant was his last hope since he did “not want relief.”79 John Williams from Brunswick, 
Georgia had lost a limb at the age of 15 and since then he “always had trouble in convincing 
employers he can hold a job.” Williams tried to obtain work “with the Atomic Plant at Aiken, 
S.C.,” but he was turned away after the “employment officer only answered him they did not 
employ one-armed men.” Williams asked Truman to help im “get a job at something as he has a 
family to support.”80 
 As pleas from the unemployed poured into the White House, rising defense production 
during the Korean War became an easy, but temporary means of adding Americans to payrolls.  
Defense capitalism gave Americans jobs, but it did not address the systemic problems that 
confronted the industrial economy after 1945. Without an alternative to the defense economy, 
Cold War communities became addicted to the ebb and flow of defense contracting. After 
localities fulfilled orders under a particular defens  contract, it made these areas go searching for 
another to replace the previous one. Moreover, those t wns and cities that were denied defense 
contracts created competition over scarce resources among localities that did obtain federal 
defense funds. These conditions placed pressure upon both Democrats and Republicans in 
Congress to bring defense work to local communities. In 1951, Matthew J. Connelly of 
Pennsylvania wrote to Representative Daniel Flood about the “acute unemployment” in the 
Wilkes-Barre—Hazleton area, part of Flood’s district. Flood prudently replied to Connelly, 
telling him, “I want you to know that the people and the leaders of the community are doing their 
share to alleviate the situation and are not simply sitting back and crying for Federal help. Every 
                                                
79 Letter to the President from Denver M. Christy, April 3, 1951, White House Official Files, White House C ntral 
Files, File 264, Box 1034, HTL.  
80 Letter to the President from John V. Williams, December 13, 1951, ibid. 
66 
 
possible effort is being made locally to do our bit to help solve this problem, but as you are 
aware, it is of such a nature and magnitude that it is physically impossible for the solution to be 
brought about by local effort alone.” A 1951 speech by Flood on the House floor cited the 
inadequacy of the defense economy in resolving chronic unemployment across the country. 
Flood said that “War plants, installations, and warcontracts of all descriptions are being 
channeled into congested, seriously congested, defens  areas where there is a need for 
manpower, but in my area there is not work. This is a deplorable economic waste. The most 
valuable asset of the Nation is its manpower, and here I cite you a case of where vital and 
essential and badly needed workers stand idle, yet eager for work and to participate in the 
defense effort.”81  
 As the fight against communism abroad was increasingly bound up in the personal 
fortunes of thousands of Americans at home, the anti-interventionist tradition amid both parties 
had less cache. The rise of the defense economy laid the seeds for the Midwestern isolationists’ 
demise among the right. As the Sunbelt began to receiv  more federal investment from defense 
spending, defense employment began leaving the Midwest.82 The diversion of federal resources 
to the South, Southwest and Western Coast, meant tht power within the Republican Party 
swung away from isolationist Midwesterners to Southern Republicans, many of whom were 
former Democrats. A 1952 advertisement from North Carolina Citizens for Eisenhower asked 
voters in the state to “Help the South Rise Above Political Tyranny” by repudiating the 
Democratic Party, since it was now controlled by “Northern City Bosses, Crooked Politicians 
and Radical College Professors.” The group warned workers in the South that if Democrat Adlai 
Stevenson was elected to the presidency in 1952, it would mean significant losses in employment 
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to the region, since Stevenson supposedly favored giving more defense contracts to the North to 
divert jobs and employment from the South, allowing the government to “take bread out of your 
child’s mouth and send it to the North.” With bold headlines such as “Negro Bosses in the Mill if 
Stevenson Elected” and “White Workers Beware of Democrat F.E.P.C. Plants,” the Republican 
organization circulated pamphlets that used racism to scare Southern whites into thinking blacks 
would take over their defense jobs. Once African Americans experienced economic gains from 
the war economy (giving them social and economic upward mobility through skilled jobs), 
Southern whites mounted resistance against efforts t  integrate defense work to ensure that the 
financial gains of federal employment went to whites. Southern whites increasingly viewed the 
Republican Party as the Party that would safeguard their racial and economic interests, as it 
would protect defense jobs for whites and “allow each state to work out its own solution to the 
Negro question.” 83   
 Indeed, the Korean War was a problem for the most famous Midwestern Republican 
isolationist in Congress, Robert Taft. Taft felt the pressure of an interventionist public during his 
remaining years in the Senate. Taft’s gravitation toward militarism was apparent during the 1952 
campaign, when he began to make statements like “I feel that Russia is far more of a threat to the 
security of the United States than Hitler in Germany ever was.” Taft also criticized Truman for 
his unwillingness to assist Chiang Kai-Shek. “I only i sist that we apply to Asia the same basic 
policy which we apply to Europe,” Taft stated. Taft ccused Truman of leaving Korea 
unprotected from communism aggression, as the President evacuated “all troops from Korea and 
announced that they would not undertake to defend Korea by the use of American soldiers.”  
This left Korea exposed to “complete domination of K rea by the Russian Communists” which 
now poses “a threat to the security of Japan.” Truman “failed to arm the South Koreans with 
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modern weapons” to defense themselves.84 Taft made these comments after Cold War 
Democrats, seeking to depose Taft of his Senate Seat in 1950, claimed, “Taft votes the 
Communist line on foreign policy matters. Yes sir, every time Congress was asked to shell out 
money to fight Communism, Taft was against it. You can take his votes against the Marshall 
Plan, the arms assistance program—and it fits exactly what the Daily Worker approves.”85 One 
confidant of Truman, Robert Holiday, said that Taft vacillated on national defense issues in 1952 
for “when Harry ordered the troops into Korea, he and McArthur agreed that it was the greatest 
thing that had been done in 100 years for peace, and now they want to jump Harry for it.”86 
 Considering the quasi hard-line stance taken by Taft as a presidential candidate, it is a 
misnomer to label him a strict isolationist in 1952. Opponents of an internationalist foreign 
policy like Taft did not target the fight against communism in its concept, but in its design. By 
the 1950s, Taft had moved away from his earlier skepticism of the Cold War. On the campaign 
trail, Taft was not wholly against an interventionist foreign policy and a large defense budget to 
support that foreign policy, but the scope of such a strategy. Taft proved reluctant to repudiate 
the national security state after Korea, telling a favorable audience in Dayton, Ohio in 1950 that 
“because of the Administration’s strong Communist sympathies, which apparently existed in the 
Administration before and about the time of the Yalta Conference, we have placed Russia in a 
commanding position in Europe from which they threaten the security of Western Europe, and a 
commanding position in China from which they threaten the security of the Far East.” The only 
way to deal with these circumstances is “to build up armed forces sufficient to make it absolutely 
certain that Russia cannot gain a position from which they might threaten the security of the 
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United States.”87 Indeed, when one considers Taft’s policy in Asia during the Korean War, Taft 
was more interventionist than Cold War Democrats. Taft now accepted elements of the domino 
theory, collective security, nuclear deterrence, and the policy of containment. Taft said in an 
article in 1952 that his “basic criticism of Administration policy today is that no one seems to 
have worked out a comprehensive plan for the application of this strategy [of containment], or 
any coordinated use of the many policies  necessary to carry it out. Furthermore, no one seems to 
have recognized that there are serious limits to our economic and manpower capacity, and that 
we must be selective and restrained in determining the extent to which we can carry out our basic 
strategy.”88 Taft liked to criticize Democrats for lacking a coherent and well-constructed foreign 
policy strategy, but he suffered the same flaw. Isolati nist Republicans like Taft wanted a 
restrained defense budget yet at the same time sought to extirpate communism from the globe; 
they requested tax cuts for defense corporations, but wanted further appropriations for military 
projects and America’s global empire.  
 The expansion of the warfare state through military Keynesianism during the Korean War 
thereby marginalized those voices who called for military restraint. Defense production in the 
1950s renewed Gunbelt Americans’ faiths in the Cold War to protect the country from 
communism and keep them financially secure, limiting he appeal of defense reductions after 
1953. Indeed, the Korean War emphatically reignited d pendence upon and approval of the 
military state. Through the allocation of war contracts, the state expanded its services to a 
broader set of Americans, thereby compelling Republican and Democrats in office to support the 
foreign and domestic policies that they created, an which their constituents now supported. The 
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magnitude of the Cold War state and its influence upon “ordinary” Americans’ lives thus 
squashed the popular vestiges of anti-interventionism within the left and the right. 
 
Conclusion 
 Isolationist libertarians clung to arguments that t e national security state was a waste of 
federal monies after the Korean War. Ex-New Dealer nd contributor to Human Events John T. 
Flynn wrote, “Of course America must be prepared to resist assaults on us by a foreign power. 
But we must never forget that there is an infinitely more dangerous enemy within our gates than 
Russia.” Flynn said that the preeminent threat to the United States was internal and came from 
“Communists, socialists, various editions of collectivists, One Worlders, plus a variety of 
economic and sectional groups interested for politica  or business reasons in measures that will 
break down and finally destroy our free society.” Flynn argued that “Russia as an enemy has 
become almost a necessity to our government. It is the bugaboo used to frighten our people into 
fantastic spending of taxes and borrowed money.” Making statements that would later come out 
of the mouths of the New Left, Flynn wrote, “The cration of millions of jobs in the armed forces 
and the munitions plants can be defended only when t  ation is confronted with the danger of 
war. Now, every man who studies this subject knows that there is no way we can get into war 
now without actually launching one ourselves. But this could never be defended before the 
American people. Hence some other excuse must be found t  continue the policy. The 
champions of this system have now proposed that the Unit d States set herself up as the 
policeman of the world.”89 Texas libertarian Dan Smoot was critical of the federal government’s 
effort to justify increased defense spending, stating that “practically every major spending 
                                                




program of the federal government has been sold to the public with the argument that the 
program was necessary as a party of our struggle against communism.” Americans were “quite 
willing to make sacrifices to fight communism,” but Smoot said that the sacrifice also meant 
higher rates of taxation, which he was unwilling to accept. “Americans are also almost 
unanimous in their belief that they are enduring a crushing burden of taxation,” Smoot wrote, but 
when the protest against higher tax rates “They are reminded that their money is being used to 
maintain our national defenses against communism.” This made Americans reluctant to speak 
out against foreign policy, creating a reverse McCarthyism since it “puts an ugly stigma on 
anyone who is against the President’s [defense] program.90   
 But Flynn and Smoot were a dying breed after the Korean War. Considering the 
significant structural transformations that occurred in the immediate postwar years, including 
changes to U.S. grand strategy toward the Soviet Union and the rise of an American economy 
whose prosperity hinged and thrived on building weapons the country supposedly needed to 
defeat communism, the isolationist right could not exist as a formidable presence in American 
politics. Furthermore, in seeking an alliance with Dixiecrats and Southern Democrats, 
Republicans brought themselves closer to statism and interventionism, making the Party more 
amenable to spending on defense without regard to deficits—as long as that spending benefited 
constituents of the Party. When in 1952, William F. Buckley told the right they must “accept Big 
Government for the duration” of the Cold War to vanquish the threat of communism, they 
already had.91 With isolationists at the wayside, the right looked to resolve the Cold War through 
levels of military spending and expansive defense bur aucracy that rivaled their previous 
suspicious about a militarized state. While there were evident continuities between the New 
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Right and Old Right prior to World War II, the Cold War was transformative in reconfiguring 
conservatives’ perspectives on national defense policy.92  
 The left faced its own dilemma after the Korean War. During the 1940s, the anti-
interventionist tradition within leftist politics battled for the soul of American democracy during 
the early Cold War, only to lose out to the culture of anti-communism. The failure of left-wing 
Cold War critics to attract a greater constituency meant that the Democratic Party became 
increasingly monolithic on national defense policy, onsistently outvoting the Republicans on 
military appropriations up until the late 1950s.93 Leftist opponents of the Cold War were 
thereafter found in social movements outside the party system. The anti-nuclear movement in the 
1950s and 1960s were the offspring of the Wallace wing of the Democratic Party, pressuring the 
Democratic Party to adopt measures that reduced American reliance on military power until 
Vietnam proved the folly of such policies. 
 By the end of the Korean War, the militarization of American foreign policy had taken on 
a life beyond its creators. Born out of the Great Depression, formed during World War II, and 
expanded during the Cold War, the national security state established a set of interests and 
expectations to Americans who viewed them as intractable to American political culture after the 
1950s. Trying to extricate the U.S. from a war economy meant breaking the social compact 
between the national security state and its range of d fenders, benefactors, and exponents, an 
increasingly difficult task as it grew larger. To fight communism, the Cold War created federal 
benefits that many Americans at the national and local level did not want to part with after 1945. 
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The connections that militarization established betwe n the citizenry and the state would 
ultimately be fateful in the realignment of American politics during the 1960s.
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Chapter Two:  The Politics of Nuclear Détente 
 
 In December 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara announced significant cuts to 
U.S. defense spending, a decision that led to the closing of military bases and thousands 
unemployed in defense plants across the Gunbelt. McNamara and President Lyndon Johnson had 
no designs for a large-scale reduction of U.S. military forces, as the defense cuts were “purely 
related to obtaining the maximum defense at the lowest possible cost, and had no relationship 
whatsoever to changing the strength of our defense forc s.” Instead, the Johnson administration 
sought to revamp and streamline the American military to restore efficiency to the defense 
budget. Democratic Senator from South Dakota, George McGovern, welcomed McNamara’s 
announcement, having proposed plans for defense conversion only months before.1 Opponents of 
the defense cuts, however, felt McNamara’s actions jeopardized U.S. national security, and were 
sure to result in the United States losing the Cold War. The Soviet Union and global communism 
were the primary threats to the United States, and military superiority was the only means to 
prevent a communist attack. Movement conservatives l k  Phyllis Schlafly, moreover, wondered 
whether McNamara desired universal disarmament of nuclear weapons. To Schlafly, the 
Secretary of Defense was the personification of liberalism run amok. In addition to cancelling 
needed defense installations without having “authorized or developed a single new strategic 
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weapon system,” McNamara accepted the notion that the arms race was obsolete, placing the 
United States on a dangerous precedent.2 
 This chapter examines the reaction to the Kennedy an  Johnson administrations’ attempts 
to achieve what I have called a nuclear détente. Movement conservatives, leaders of the 
American military, defense communities, and sectors of American business aligned to prevent 
defense reductions and restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons after the Cold War was 
transformed in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1962—and for the first significant time 
since the 1940s—American policymakers advocated a serious reduction in military forces and 
nuclear weapons. Democratic designs for reducing the size of the military establishment signaled 
a crisis for those dependent upon or supportive of the national security state. Moreover, 
congressional Republicans, who up until this time believed they could use Cold War military 
spending as an instrument to weaken the welfare stat , thought the shift in America’s defenses 
reflected a change in budget priorities that imperiled American security. Republicans such as 
Illinois Senator Everett Dirksen argued in 1961 that “with so many crises in faraway places, 
emphasis will have to be on guns” during the Cold War, and sought to find “ways the domestic 
budget and so-called welfare items can be trimmed in view of the delicate international 
situation.”3  When McNamara announced defense cuts and proposals f r disarmament in the 
early 1960s, he ignited fears among the right that federal monies would be directed exclusively 
to social programs at the expense of fighting communism.  
 Like the political right, defense companies also distrusted military cuts. Defense 
contractors expressed their hostility toward McNamara and Kennedy’s defense policies within 
organizations such as the pro-business group Southern States Industrial Council (SSIC), formed 
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in 1933. The SSIC and similar organizations offered a vehicle for financing activism and 
lobbying efforts among the defense industry without vertly exposing them as opponents of the 
federal government—for fear their overt criticism would impair their potential for future defense 
contracts. Defense executives also enlisted the help of activists and politicians to promote their 
cause, holding venues for speakers who supported a larger defense budget.  
 The interdependency between national security, economic, and foreign policy concerns 
stimulated hawkish sentiments among the defense workforce as well. While the defense budget 
had declined steadily since the Korean War, the defnse cuts enacted under the Kennedy 
administration were an abrupt departure in U.S. defense policy that jarred the attention and 
financial circumstances of defense communities.  While t e libertarian right and Democrats like 
McGovern welcomed the cuts, new precedents in American defense policy left Cold War 
workers anxious about the future of their job security and willing to vote for candidates on both 
sides of the political aisle who promised more spending on defense. Politicians like Republican 
presidential candidate Barry Goldwater for instance, noted Gunbelt residents’ concerns over 
America’s defense policy and courted residents of Cold War communities for their votes. But 
while some Gunbelt voters decided to support Goldwater, the Arizonian failed to attract 
widespread backing for his policies outside of the Sunbelt defense economy. 
 The revolt against a nuclear détente in the 1960s therefore had its origins in the political 
and economic structures that militarization created in the 1940s and 1950s. The Cold War 
established organizational networks in defense communities that allowed collaboration between 
diverse actors with a specific interest toward increasing the defense budget as a deterrent to 
communist aggression.  In proving this point, I focus on the creation of “Cold War seminars” (or 
national security seminars) organized and led by anti-communist activists to generate support for 
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U.S. foreign policy among ordinary Americans. Organizers of Cold War seminars blurred the 
lines between local and international politics. Financed by hidden connections between the 
Department of Defense, the United States military, nd private corporations, attendees of Cold 
War seminars embraced the position that it took not o ly a strong military to defeat communism, 
but communities of ordinary citizens willing to preserve the American “way of life.” To 
residents of the Sunbelt, where many of these seminars were held, this meant that the struggle 
against communism abroad also meant maintaining the class and racial boundaries of the 
suburbs.4 Indeed, the politics of place, space, and national security interacted in Sunbelt defense 
communities that facilitated a hawkish worldview among its residents.  
 The reaction to Kennedy’s (and Eisenhower’s) defense and foreign policies during this 
time also laid the foundation for collaboration betw en factions of a “Cold War coalition” 
headed into the latter half of the 1960s. National security seminars provided the organizational 
context for early challenges to the new era of defense after the Cuban Missile Crisis, but the 
campaign against a nuclear détente continued into the mid-1960s. The activism of the Cold War 
coalition led to an unusual merger between ideology and economic interests that unfolded in 
fights against the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), government spending on social programs 
(rather than on defense), and general efforts by the Kennedy and Johnson administration to 
reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in the United S ates and the Soviet Union. As the various 
strands of the national security state came together in the 1960s to counter Kennedy’s challenge 
to the Cold War status quo, it led to the creation of a coalition organized around safeguarding the 
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militarization of the Cold War, one that would come to remake American politics in the 
twentieth century. 
 
Cold War Seminars and the National Security State  
 Before the years of the Kennedy presidency, President Dwight Eisenhower took gradual 
steps to drawback the wartime economy that dominated American political culture during the 
Korean War. Eisenhower was never comfortable with runaway defense budgets, and steadily 
reduced them beginning around 1955.5  Defense spending was at a record high fifteen percent of 
G.D.P. when Eisenhower took office. By the time he left the presidency that number was down 
near ten percent. The National Association of Manufcturers (NAM) noted how the drop in the 
defense budget had constrained the opportunities for growth among defense contractors.  While 
“total defense spending appears to have leveled off at a fairly high plateau,” there remained 
“specific industries” that  have been hurt by the “extent of emphasis, and funds provided for 
aircraft, nuclear weapons, guided missiles, and related special items,” to the point that it has 
“brought about a significant increase in competition f r certain defense contracts.” Even then, 
there was little guarantee that the contracts would be profitable, considering the vast competition 
and the possibility that even the “least impact of unanticipated costs may well throw a modest 
profit into a loss.”6 
 While defense spending did decrease during Eisenhower’s presidency, the Cold War 
economy remained strong in many regions of the country. Suburban areas in Southern California 
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grew to be the prime centers for producing weapons. Lo  Angeles, in the words of political 
scientist Ann Markusen, became the “aerospace capital of he world” in the 1950s. Defense firms 
such as Boeing, Convair, Lockheed, and Northrop all saw production and profits skyrocket. 
Much of these gains were due to the Air Force’s demand for greater production of 
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), long-range missiles capable of carrying multiple 
nuclear warheads to targets. The increase in the number of ICBMs intensified the relationship 
between military, industry, and the growth of the postwar suburbs, as Americans flocked to 
California from the South and Midwest in search of high-paying, technically specialized jobs in 
defense plants.7 
 The growth of the Gunbelt during Eisenhower’s presid ncy continued to make 
Americans reliant on the defense economy. Eisenhower’s skepticism of the military-industrial 
complex was restrained by the jobs created by the def nse economy in local areas. In Long 
Island, 12,000 machinists rallied to oppose defense cuts enacted in the 1950s, asking local and 
national politicians to bring the defense budget back to Korean War levels. Staring at 
unemployment, the Long Island Conference of Machinists requested that Congress raise the debt 
ceiling in order to approve “further appropriations for defense needs,” and urged Eisenhower to 
“repair the damage already done to the national preparedness program and the well-being of the 
American people.”8 And while Eisenhower hoped to trim America’s reliance on defense 
spending through production of ICBMs rather than heavy weaponry, the missile program still 
made “the country tied to defense spending.9 The Soviet launch of the unmanned Sputnik 
satellite into the Earth’s atmosphere in 1957 further derailed reductions to defense, as the event 
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unnerved Americans who up until this point believed that the United States led the world in 
technological developments. Sputnik encouraged policy makers and the public to take further 
steps to increase defense expenditures for innovative projects that would outpace the gains the 
Soviets had made in space exploration. It also revived the demand for more military spending as 
the threat of Soviet Union appeared more urgent. Indeed, defense spending increased in 1958, 
fueling much welcomed growth in Cold War communities.10  
 In response to climate of the Cold War following Sputnik, John Kennedy ran for the 
presidency in 1960 as a Cold Warrior. On the campaign trail, Kennedy claimed that Eisenhower 
had allowed the formation of a “missile gap,” between the superpowers and accused the former 
World War II general of lacking diligence in the fight against communism. In order to close this 
missile gap, the United States needed to dig deeper into its pockets to pay for new weapons 
programs. Kennedy made sure he took this message to states where defense spending determined 
the futures of local communities. When Kennedy became President, he made good on his 
campaign promises and vastly increased military spending for innovative military weapons and 
furthered the space race between the Soviet Union. The American public’s demand to “catch up” 
to the Soviet Union in space technology aligned with Kennedy’s desire to increase spending for 
research and development (R&D) in aeronautics and defense. In announcing his plan to place an 
American on the moon by the end of the 1960s, Kennedy argued that if the United States was 
going to “win the battle that is now going on around the world between freedom and tyranny,” it 
must increase spending upwards to nine billion dollars over course of the decade. Kennedy 




called not only for vast amounts of federal monies for the space program, but also for the 
creation of new missiles such as the Rover rocket and communications and weather satellites.11 
 But Kennedy’s opponents worried he had not spent enough on defense to prevent 
communist expansion. Some of the opposition to Kennedy’s defense policies was political 
grandstanding, as Republicans criticized the defens policies of a Democratic president. But 
hawkish voices from both parties felt that Kennedy was simply ignorant of Soviet intentions 
toward the United States. These individuals feared that if Kennedy remained in office, 
Americans were in danger of losing interest in fighting the Cold War.  It was therefore up to 
them to educate the American public on the threat of global communism. Cold War hawks took 
advantage of policies enacted by the federal governm nt that encouraged public education 
programs as weapons against communism. In a memorandum in 1958, the National Security 
Council instructed military officials to launch efforts to educate the public about the evils of 
communism and the benefits of American democracy and c pitalism. The NSC directive 
suggested that high-ranking military officers communicate the message that each American was 
a one-person army in the fight against communism. Ja es S. Russell, Vice Chief of Naval 
Operations referred to the 1958 NSC document when he sent a memo to all personnel under his 
command requesting “ideas which the Navy could use in its day-by-day operations to further 
U.S. cold war efforts.” Russell was afraid that “since the cold war is the responsibility of all, it 
may, in fact, become the responsibility of none,” and thus sought to enlist naval personnel to 
“make a greater contribution toward the achievement of U.S. cold war objectives.” These 
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objectives included portraying a positive image of the United States “in our association of people 
of foreign lands” and making sure that even low-leve  members of the Navy convey “useful 
ideas” to their superiors on how best to fight the Cold War against the “Sino-Soviet bloc.”12 
 Federal policies that promoted public awareness of the global communist threat 
bankrolled the formation of “Cold War seminars” across the country. Led by members of the 
military, private business, and government, and financed by the Department of Defense and pro-
business groups such as the Chamber of Commerce, thes  seminars sought to inform seemingly 
apolitical Americans to the urgent threat of communism. The institutional structure of 
militarization provided the basis for Cold War seminars, as the Department of Defense paid for 
the speakers, venues, and organizational logistics to hold the conferences. Meeting organizers 
relied upon federal dollars to finance their Cold War activism, as the seminars aimed to mobilize 
grassroots efforts to convert Americans to the cause of anti-communism.  
 A number of these Cold War seminars were held in locales in the Sunbelt and in parts of 
the Midwest that relied on defense spending. In 1961, at least fourteen cities convened “National 
Security” seminars, including Orlando, Las Vegas, Vallejo, El Paso, and Casper, Wyoming. 
Jointly sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 
and local chapters of the Chamber of Commerce, the organizers could boast that since 1948, 224 
seminars were held in 126 cities; and consequently, approximately 24,800 certificates were given 
to civilians for completing the course. Cold War seminars were advertised to participants as a 
valuable resource for educating the average citizen on the global threat of communism. Like the 
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1958 NSC directive, the seminars emphasized that the Cold War was a household issue that one 
needed to confront on a daily basis. It was up to the average citizen, regardless of political 
affiliation, to inform themselves in the ways he or she could protect national security. Comparing 
appropriations for defense to buying insurance, seminar promoters complained that few 
Americans were knowledgeable about national defense issu s, but no one “would think of 
buying an insurance policy without reading its terms… yet today the American taxpayer pays 75 
cents out of every dollar for our national life insurance…the national security structure.” The 
promise of the postwar suburban American dream was dependent upon the international context 
of the Cold War. “How secure is your future…your family’s… your investments?...Think 
again!...It is only as secure as the position of the United States…and today our position is being 
challenged by the rapidly rising might of the Soviet Union and her allies and captive states,” read 
the press release for one seminar. Americans must realize that free-market capitalism is at stake 
as the “Soviet economic challenge is potentially more dangerous to the United States than the 
Russian military threat. They have declared a war to the finish between their system and the free 
enterprise system.” Attendees left seminars prepared to defend “the interrelationship of the 
economic factors with the political, scientific, psychological, and military factors” of the Cold 
War.13 
 The seminars also professed to be non-partisan, as the organizers and speakers were a 
mixture of Southern Democrats and Republican defens hawks. One typical Cold War seminar 
occurred in Little Rock, Arkansas, where the segregationist Governor Orval Faubus was the 
keynote speaker. Faubus’ key theme was the need for vigilance against internal communists 
seeking to subvert America’s Cold War battle against communism. Fearful that Faubus’ speech 
                                                
13 Sample Form—Initial Release in National Security Seminar Publicity Folder, GRR, Box 385, National Security 
Seminar Folder; Blank Form: National Security Seminar: Radio and TV Spot Announcements, GRR, Box 385, 
National Security Seminar Folder. 
84 
 
would be compared to the red-baiting tactics employed by Senator Joseph McCarthy years 
earlier, Colonel Williams Boaz—a scheduled speaker for a Cold War seminar in Vallejo—
claimed that the seminars were “not a scare program” and had the approval of President Kennedy 
and former President Eisenhower. Boaz said that the seminars were merely educational, and 
organized to highlight the “relationship between the national economy and the military power 
necessary to America’s security in the face of perilous world conditions.”14 
 The El Paso Chamber of Commerce also directed and financed its own “National 
Security Seminar” in 1961. The periodical El Paso Today—an organ of the city Chamber of 
Commerce—claimed that over 1,000 military and civilian personnel registered for the seminar 
that included in attendance “civic leaders, teachers, clergymen and women from El Paso.”  It was 
clear from the numbers of people present that “El Pasoans are smashing records in showing their 
interest in the important issues of the Cold War struggle between Freedom and Communism.” 
General Albert T. Wilson told the audience that the “search for security transcends all other aims 
in our national life. Security must be foremost in our minds until the threat of communism is 
contained.”  Following its conclusion, organizers paised the seminar as “the most effective and 
important single effort our government has undertaken to weld a strong and united military-
civilian team for national defense and survival.”15 
 Accounts of the seminars held in other cities echod those in El Paso and Vallejo. In 
Minneapolis, the Twin Cities Citizens Council for American Ideals held a Cold War workshop in 
April 1961 comprised of “businessmen, educators, clergymen, civic leaders, newsmen, students, 
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youth leaders, and law enforcement officers at the United States Naval air station, World-
Chamberlain Field.” The workshop featured speeches on fighting against emotions such as 
“internal demoralization, political apathy, [and] spiritual bankruptcy” that the organizers felt 
characterized the broader public’s outlook on the Cold War.  Walter Mooney, a design engineer 
from Chattanooga, said that the seminar he attended provided an invaluable service to him and 
his fellow participants as it was the only program of its kind were one could “obtain such a 
concise factual representation of the struggle to come between the free world and the masters of 
the Kremlin.” Local Minneapolis resident George Paluska said that the seminar explained “many 
of the problems and reasons” for conditions in Africa and the “riots on that continent.” He only 
wished that more civil servants were there, including educators and religious leaders, for those 
individuals had “the ability and chance to pass along this information to hundreds.”16 
 The popularity of Cold War seminars indicated the insidious ways militarization shaped 
the political culture of the United States following the Korean War. Cold War seminars 
reinforced the public’s relationship to American military power, encouraging “ordinary” 
Americans to participate in the making of foreign policy, but they also provided opportunities for 
collaboration among anti-communist activists and high-ranking members of the American 
military that shaped the public’s support for the national security state. The economic and 
political structures of the American defense apparatus erected public forums to solidify a cultural 
consensus in support of America’s Cold War objectivs, allowing military personnel to function 
as partisan mobilizers of public opinion. Moreover, business elites and members of the military 
enlisted the taxpayer-financed national security state o promote a specific worldview that 
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reduced the international conflict of the Cold War to a classic struggle between the forces of 
good and evil, one that could only be won by military superiority. The promotion of this 
worldview by participants of Cold War seminars consequently led more Americans to champion 
higher defense spending and a larger military presence abroad to eradicate global communism.  
 In addition to the Cold War seminars, right-wing activists held community events on 
military bases across the Sunbelt to organize themselve  against communist subversion. At these 
meetings, participants often conflated the fight against the Soviet Union with their hostility to 
liberalism. On February 15, 1961, Marion Miller and Paul Miller spoke on the communist threat 
at the Officers Wives Club luncheon at the Pacific M ssile Range in Point Mugu, California. 
Marion was regarded as a hero within right-wing circles after she infiltrated communist 
organizations as an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (F.B.I.). Point Mugu was 
under the authority of Rear Admiral J.P. Monroe, who once arranged a viewing at the missile 
range of the John Birch Society movie “Communism on the Map” to local audiences. Monroe 
said that the Office Wives Club in Point Mugu had invited the Millers to “help in our education 
about the Communist threat.” Organizers of the luncheon encouraged members of the Officers 
Wives Club to invite guests, and emphasized in patriarchal terms “HUSBANDS will be 
especially welcome.” When the local Ventura County Democratic Control Committee 
discovered Monroe’s involvement in spreading right-wing ideologies, Monroe agreed to stop 
showing “Communism on the Map” to non-military personnel, but said that the film would 
continue to be shown to members of the Navy under his command.17 
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 Such activism, financed in part by the federal government, went under the public radar 
until early 1961 when the Edwin Walker case captivated the nation’s attention. The Walker case 
shocked the American public into realizing the extent of the Cold War seminars. Major General 
Edwin A. Walker had gone from leading the 101st Airborne Division during the Little Rock crisis 
(a position he abhorred having been a lifelong segregationist) to the 24th Infantry in West 
Germany. It was in West Germany that Walker told men under his command that former 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson and President Harry S. Truman—among other Democrats— 
were in fact communists who wanted to Sovietize the fed ral government. Walker even tried to 
convince his soldiers not to vote for Kennedy in the 1960 election. After the allegations were 
reported in the media, Walker was investigated by the Department of Defense, which found him 
guilty of indoctrinating soldiers under his command with propaganda published by the John 
Birch Society. Walker resigned his post after the publication of the Defense Department’s report 
and turned the incident into a cause célèbre. His mo t outspoken supporters, including Senators 
Strom Thurmond and John Tower, William F. Buckley (and his wife), and the Reverend Billy 
James Hargis, claimed that Walker had been a victim of “military muzzling” by the Kennedy 
Administration and was simply speaking the truth about American liberals and their sponsorship 
of global communism.  Walker’s supporters also included thousands of Americans who wrote 
letters and attended rallies in his defense. One woman from Indiana stated that the Walker case 
added weight to her opinion “that what masquerades s liberalism and a New Frontier is [not] 
progression, but an effort to take us back into Medieval days.” 18 
 The Walker case encouraged media outlets to investigate the extent the American 
military and Department of Defense played in the Cold War workshops. In a series of articles 
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published in August 1961, the Washington Post reported on the role of military officials in the 
Cold War seminars. The paper argued that the true aim of the Cold War seminars was to portray 
Kennedy’s domestic policies and New Deal programs as essentially communist. The 
Minneapolis Morning Tribune ditorialized that the seminars purposely exaggerated the threat of 
communism in order to attack liberalism: “Under theguise of alerting the country to 
communism, some of the right radicals have taken advantage of military help to attack the 
income tax, social security, and the civil rights guaranteed by the first 10 amendments to the 
constitution.” The military’s involvement in the seminars was reprehensible, and action was 
needed by the federal government to stop further Cold War seminars from taking place.19 
 Much of the activities conducted in Cold War seminars in the wake of the Walker scandal 
were also detailed by Arkansas Democratic Senator William J. Fulbright in a 1961 memorandum 
to Secretary McNamara. The Fulbright memorandum, as it came to be known, elucidated the 
military’s efforts to disseminate right-wing propaganda to rank-and-file military men, and 
contributed to the Defense Department’s decision to forbid military involvement in Cold War 
workshops. Fulbright intended his memorandum to be confidential, but published the memo in 
the Congressional Record after Walker’s supporters targeted the Arkansas senator for General 
Walker’s public downfall. Fulbright made clear that the seminars were not presenting objective 
information or diverse viewpoints on national security issues, but that their “thesis of the nature 
of the Communist threat often is developed by equating social legislation with socialism, and the 
latter with communism.” This premise was used to portray a great deal “of the administration’s 
domestic legislative program, including continuation of the graduated income tax, expansion of 
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social security (particularly medical care under social security), Federal aid to education, etc…as 
steps toward communism.” Fulbright documented the rol  of the national security state in 
financing the organizers of Cold War seminars and their attempts to influence foreign policy. 
Citing a number of right-wing organizations and their connections to policy makers within 
Washington, D.C., Fulbright suggested that the “relationships between the Foreign Policy 
Research Institute, the Institute for American Strategy, the Richardson Foundation, the National 
War College, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be reexamined.” To counter the power of the 
military, and prevent further cases like Edwin Walker, the senator proposed the seminars be 
placed “under civilian control.”20  
 Fulbright’s memo drew national criticism from an array of people who lauded Walker as 
a modern day Cassandra unjustly persecuted for warning Americans about the lurking threat of 
communism. Support for Walker only increased after th  Fulbright memo. A Pennsylvania 
woman wrote to her local newspaper to say that Walker’s “only crime—one only—had been his 
open and realistic opposition to communism, expressed in an effort to teach the troops in his 
command the nature of the enemy we face. Make no mistake, if this could happen to General 
Walker, it could happen to us; to you and to me, our parents, and our children and our 
neighbors.” Republican Representative Edgar Hiestand, who represented the 21st congressional 
district in Southern California, rushed to defend Walker and the John Birch Society, asking, 
“Since when it is it wrong to advance the cause of Americanism?” Protests erupted in Hiestand’s 
district six months later organized by Dr. Fred Schwarz and his Anti-Communist Crusade, who 
used the Walker case to pillory liberalism and its de ign to “Substitute Surrender for Victory” in 
the Cold War. The Fulbright memo led to an acrimonious conflict between Thurmond and 
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Fulbright as Thurmond decided to hold Senate investigations into the “military muzzlings.” 
Fulbright was also personally derided by anti-communist conservatives as “the darling of the 
one-world-welfare state conspirators” and as “the red-wing Senator from Arkansas.” 21 
 Fulbright did not treat his critics on the far right with kid gloves. While he thought his 
opponents were outlandish and extreme, he was aware of th  effectiveness in which they used 
Walker and national security issues to arouse attention to right-wing causes. In August 1961, at 
the height of the controversy over the Fulbright memo, Fulbright forcibly responded to these 
critics at the National War College and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces—which had 
sponsored the Cold War seminars—where he denounced “radicals of the right,” for their 
cynicism toward the New Deal state and their simplistic outlook toward the conduct of U.S. 
foreign policy. Fulbright alluded to a contradiction among the anti-communist right: their 
persistent appeal to increase defense spending belied their argument that internal communists 
were subverting American democracy and were thus the premier enemy of the United States.  If 
this was so, Fulbright believed the United States “would be wasting billions of dollars on the 
armed forces themselves, funds which instead should be transferred to the FBI to fight internal 
subversion.” Anti-statists employed a slippery slope in believing that government spending on 
any significant scale would lead to a communist state. Social progress and federal programs such 
as “the creation of the TVA, or the Arkansas River d velopment program, is not, in my opinion, 
a step toward communism.”22   
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 Fulbright garnered a number of supporters from the public and private sector and sparked 
a national discussion about the proper role of the military in American society. The Fulbright 
memo also relaunched the discussion begun by Eisenhower several months earlier when the 
President warned Americans during his Farewell Address to guard against the “unwarranted 
influence” of the military-industrial complex. National commentators worried that the 
preponderance of American military officials “with extreme ‘right-wing,’ anti-democratic views” 
is enough “to make one wonder whether anything in a military career encourages this kind of 
divorce from socio-political reality.”23  Walker’s extremism, critics claimed, was symptomatic of 
a larger problem that derived from the presence of the postwar military establishment.  
 Concerns about the undue influence of the military in public life would temporarily 
subside after the Department of Defense announced it would not support future Cold War 
seminars. But the overwhelming criticism of the Cold War seminars after the Walker case did 
not prevent prospective ones from being organized and attended by anti-communist activists—
and being financed by federal institutions.  While th federal government renounced its 
involvement in the seminars, other private individuals and organizations with military credentials 
continued to organize Cold War seminars in a more inconspicuous fashion. In 1963, a four-day 
Cold War Education Conference was held in Tampa, Florida that was organized by groups such 
as the American Security Council,  the American Legion, the Cold War Council, the Institute for 
American Strategy, Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge, Office of Civil Defense, and Project 
Alert. The Governor of Florida, Ferris Bryant, was the leader of the conference that registered 
over 400 individuals including teachers, congressional representatives, “corporate 
representatives,” and “professional patriots.” An entir  day of the conference was even dedicated 
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to “the subject of class-room teaching of anti-communism.”24 Activists, corporate leaders, and 
military officials involved in the national security state stepped in to take control of the seminars 
in the absence of overt federal involvement. Cold War seminars continued to take place at 
federally funded institutions and were attended by paid military personnel, but without the 
notoriety and scrutiny they had received only months earlier. This enabled anti-communists to 
spread their message about the need for a tough defense posture without occupying newspaper 
headlines. As late as 1974, Frank Barnett, president of the National Strategy Information Center 
(NSIC), a group that had close ties to William Buckley, Jr. and other conservative intellectuals 
and activists, was organizing Cold War seminars at the National War College. Barnett even 
received a letter of appreciation from the Defense Department praising his recent presentation at 
the “Defense Strategy Seminar” and his “coverage of the principal issues involved in the 
mobilization of human and intellectual resources to upport our national security objectives.” 
The letter also thanked Barnett “for your contributons to the College over the years.”25 
 The private-public connections between business and the military, and the financial and 
institutional support from sectors of the federal government, provided anti-communist hawks 
with an advantage to influence both domestic and foreign policy headed into the mid-1960s. 
Furthermore, national security politics gave defense communities opportunities to use their 
connections to the military to campaign for greater d fense spending, as well as organize larger 
numbers of Americans to their side with the aid of federal dollars. The militarization of the Cold 
War provided the structure for organizing and mobilizing individuals who were opposed to the 
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very state that financed their activism.26 Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, cuts in the United 
States defense budget further indicated to these activists that the Soviet threat had become less of 
a concern to the public. To change these circumstances, Cold Warriors used the power and 
influence of the national security state to prevent a drawdown in the defense posture of the 
United States. 
 
The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War Thaw 
 Warnings about the threat of international communism by participants in national 
security seminars clashed with the normative consensus toward the Cold War after 1962. 
Changes to the Cold War environment were largely a result of heightened public concern over 
the use of nuclear weapons. Since the late 1950s, the looming threat of nuclear warfare and the 
acceleration of the arms race spurred activists on the left to work to ban the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) was formed in 1957 
wanting “a permanent end to nuclear tests” as well as “comprehensive arms control.” SANE was 
among a number of groups established during this time whose purpose was to eradicate nuclear 
weapons. The movement to abolish nuclear weapons was global in scope, as France, England, 
Australia, and West Germany all had significant anti-nuclear movements. Organizations such as 
the World Council of Peace were at the forefront of the international call for disarmament, 
helping to convene the World Congress for General Disarmament held in Moscow in 1962.  
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“Disarmament—general, complete and controlled, including the destruction of nuclear 
weapons—is the most urgent need of our time,” the Council claimed.27 
 The Cuban Missile Crisis legitimized the concerns expressed by anti-nuclear activists 
over the escalation of nuclear weapons. The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 offered the 
first significant challenge to the arms race and the viability of nuclear weapons to preserve what 
historian John Lewis Gaddis has entitled the “long peace.”28 After Soviet premier Nikita 
Khrushchev decided in 1962 to transport to Cuba missiles capable of launching nuclear weapons, 
it made very real the possibility that the two superpowers could kill a significant portion of the 
world’s population over miscommunication and hubris. Nuclear war was fatefully avoided when 
a secret deal was arranged between Kennedy and Khrushchev—Kennedy would remove 
American missiles in Turkey the following year if Khrushchev took Soviet missiles out of Cuba. 
After the crisis was resolved, the world breathed a collective sigh of relief as it stepped backed 
from the brink of nuclear war. 
 Many anti-communist activists were not satisfied with the Kennedy administration’s 
resolution of the crisis.  These activists criticized the Kennedy administration for what they saw 
as its willingness to capitulate to Soviet intimidat on. Groups such as The Committee for the 
Monroe Doctrine (CMD), headed by retired Captain Edward V. Rickenbacker, were formed 
weeks after the conclusion of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The organization derived its name from 
the belief that Kennedy had “invented a Monroe Doctrine in reverse” by bargaining with 
Khrushchev over the missiles. Rickenbacker, along with National Review editor William F. 
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Buckley, Jr., formed the Committee on the Monroe Doctrine to express their dissatisfaction with 
what they felt was Kennedy’s decision to abandon Cuba to the communists. CMD members 
believed the crisis was far from over, as did activists who circulated bumper stickers in 1962 
with the slogan, “Those Missiles are Still in Cuba,” to convey their suspicions that the missiles 
had not been removed from the island. The CMD also believed that communism would spread to 
other parts of Latin American after 1962. Charles Edison told fellow CMD members that the 
“tentacles of Communist subversion and sabotage havspread to every nation in Latin America” 
as communists have been “aided and abetted by all too many Americas—in government and 
out—who believe that the way to stop Communism in Latin America is through shoveling ten’s 
[sic] of millions of our taxpayer’s dollars into illusionary projects and schemes.”29   
 The Committee on the Monroe Doctrine waged a significant grassroots campaign to 
mobilize public opposition to the Kennedy administration’s foreign policy after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. Rickenbacker enlisted Richard Viguerie for his help in spreading the CMD’s 
views. Viguerie was at that point an upstart political fundraiser and direct-mail strategist whose 
skills with a computer would later prove valuable in contributing to Republican victories in the 
1978 midterm elections and Ronald Reagan’s presidential campaign in 1980. Viguerie and 
Rickenbacker launched a mass-mailing campaign to sway CMD members to obtain 
congressional support for its foreign policy ideology. Rickenbacker sent blank petition forms to 
CMD members urging them to “enlist the cooperation of your community to make this nation-
wide petition campaign a success.” John Franklin Hedon of Birmingham, Alabama sent one 
such petition to his Congressman, Homer Thornberry, after he collected over 50 signatures on 
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the form, many of which were from Birmingham, but others from Texas, Florida, and North 
Carolina. Members of the CMD claimed that one million signatures were sent to Congress by 
1963 because of their direct mail petitions. 30 
 Some individuals used the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis to argue that liberals had 
mismanaged foreign policy due to their preoccupation with civil rights and other domestic 
reforms. One woman from suburban Pennsylvania was furious that the United States, “while 
fanatically employing military force and violence” to carry out the “un-constitutional Supreme 
Court decision” in Brown v. Board of Education (1954), “ignored the Monroe doctrine, and 
allowed arms and ammunition to pour into Cuba from the Kremlin, in ships we ‘loaned’ them.” 
Young members of the group National Association of Americans for Goldwater viewed the 
Kennedy administration as a collection of “welfare whiz-kids” that were in office “peddling their 
frosted over fertilizer under the appealing title, “New Fronteer” [sic].31 These criticisms led to 
arguments that the Kennedy administration needed to spend more on defense rather than social 
programs. One member of the National Association of Manufacturers, Joseph Borda, said it was 
“becoming more apparent every day” to him that federal money for social reform programs were 
“to come from a gradual cutback on expenditures on defense and from a hoped-for increase in 
revenues from an expanded economy.”32  
 While often resorting to hyperbolic rhetoric to express their concerns over the resolution 
of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the CMD and its followers highlighted a very real problem faced by 
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American policymakers. During the last months of his life, President Kennedy and members of 
his national security team were alarmed by their inab lity to verify that the Soviets had removed 
the entire arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles shipped to Cuba under Operation Anadyr. 
Kennedy also worried about the remaining Soviet troops in Cuba, receiving only the vague 
assurance from Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that all Soviet personnel would be 
evacuated in due time.33 Despite their misgivings about the resolution of the Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the Kennedy administration sought to make sur  uch an event could not occur again. 
McNamara and Kennedy reached the conclusion after October 1962 that a foreign policy based 
on the deterrence of nuclear warfare was irrational a d unrealistic. Kennedy’s national security 
advisors operated on the presumption that nuclear wpons were irrelevant within the changing 
context of the Cold War. The only means to deter nuclear war was through international 
agreements that limited the proliferation of nuclear weapons. White House officials did not 
arrive at this decision easily, but they reasoned that there were few options. Even after 
communist China tested its first atomic bomb in 1964, McNamara and Lyndon Johnson insisted 
that nonproliferation and disarmament were the bestmeans to preserve peace.34 
 Policymakers like McNamara therefore decided that t e creation of new weapons 
programs in preparation for an all-out war against the Soviet Union would waste federal dollars. 
The U.S. and the Soviet Union had achieved nuclear parity, McNamara argued, and allocating 
more monies to build conventional military weapons was not going to change these 
circumstances. It did not matter if the Americans had the Nike-Zeus missile and the Soviets did 
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not. In the end, if war between the superpowers did come, it would surely come in the form of a 
nuclear war, and both countries would succumb to its consequences. Working from this premise, 
McNamara sought to drastically reduce defense expenditures and overhaul U.S. foreign policy 
by squashing plans to fund extraneous weapons programs.35 The Kennedy administration’s 
desire to trim down America’s nuclear arsenal had broad public support throughout the world by 
late 1962. Allies of the United States such as Great Britain responded to the Cuban Missile Crisis 
by trying to place pressure on Kennedy to push further for nuclear disarmament. Presidential 
speechwriter and Kennedy advisor Ted Sorensen claimed that Kennedy expressed “a desire to 
influence neutral and ‘world opinion’” on nuclear disarmament, and the international pressure on 
Kennedy made him propose concrete plans for nuclear nonproliferation.36 
 As the Kennedy administration made disarmament a serious proposition, national 
security activists in the Sunbelt South utilized the connections they made in the early 1960s 
within Cold War seminars to rollback attempts to achieve a nuclear détente. The federal 
government’s investment in defense had led to vast economic growth in the Sunbelt, and few 
Southerners wanted to return to a time when the region ranked last in per capita income, capital 
investment, and real estate values.37  The political economy of the Cold War ensured that e 
South would continue to experience rapid rates of industrial development for decades to come. 
The presence of the defense industry in strengthening the economic vitality of the Sunbelt also 
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helped conservatives explain away the role of factors such as white racism in swinging 
Southerners behind the G.O.P. It allowed Barry Goldwater as a presidential candidate to argue 
that his popularity in the South had nothing to do with his opposition to the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act. Southerners were growing increasingly conservative, Goldwater argued, because they “have 
roots in the new industrialization of a part of thecountry which from its earliest settlement has 
existed in an agricultural economy and society. They ar  related to the growing importance of 
business activity and concern for the interests of the business community.” Sunbelt conservatism 
was “primarily an economic conservatism stemming from the growth in business activity.” 
According to Goldwater, southerners had come to terms with “the fact that integration is coming 
and it is not an overriding issue with them.” As hitorian Bruce Schulman has argued, federal 
investment in the defense industry in the South also served its residents by “maintaining the 
separation between military spending, which it approved, and social spending, which it 
reviled.”38   
 Any talk of defense cuts therefore deeply disturbed Sunbelt politicians like Strom 
Thurmond. Known for his outspoken support for racial segregation in addition to greater military 
spending, Thurmond was not reticent to tell leaders of the defense industry that his state relied on 
the Cold War for its continued prosperity. “Defense business means better employment, bigger 
payrolls, and general economic improvement,” Thurmond said, and it was his political obligation 
to ensure that his constituents were “not discriminated against in the awards of government 
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contracts.” South Carolina’s reliance on the defense i dustry was therefore tied to Thurmond’s 
and other Southern politicians’ political futures. The economics of the Cold War also played a 
strong role in the development of postwar southern nationalism.  Sunbelt conservatives 
combined their opposition to liberalism with their ardent anti-communism when they railed 
against McNamara’s nuclear détente throughout the 1960s. Thurmond and other Republicans 
insisted that liberals failed to comprehend that the weapons their constituents built did not 
exacerbate tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, but averted communist 
aggression.39  
 Another oft-cited critique of Kennedy’s handling of f reign affairs and national defense 
after the Cuban Missile Crisis was that the federal government was not spending enough money 
on the right programs. Paul Heilman, a businessman and Cuban exile, told the Coconut Grove 
Rotary Club in Coconut Grove, Florida on May 29, 1963 about the need to be educated about the 
nature of communism because the greatest threat is “our own apathy” to the communist 
menace.” He went on to add that “unless the leaders of our nation develop a will to win, a 
resolute plan to defend to our interest against that International Communism, unless we take a 
stand, all other items in anyone’s plan fall flat.” Adding to America’s vulnerability, said 
Heilman, was the Kennedy administration’s willingness to run up deficits for aid to the United 
Nations and the Peace Corps, two organizations that he felt did not deter the spread of 
communism. The only way to defeat the communists wa to redirect federal expenditures away 
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from these programs and develop “a policy of strength and firmness” based on military 
preparedness.40   
 Defense companies had perhaps the most to lose from a decline in the defense budget. 
Groups such as the Southern States Industrial Council (SSIC) that were comprised of various 
southern manufacturers—many of which also received defense contracts—helped to finance 
efforts to expand American military forces and prevent defense cuts in the 1960s. Formed in the 
1930s as a reaction to Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, the SSIC billed itself as the “The 
Voice of the Conservative South” and argued for decreases in corporate tax rates, less 
government regulation, and a foreign policy that relied on military power. While the SSIC 
represented southern business, it also solicited fun s from corporate executives in the North. The 
leading contributor to the SSIC was Pierre S. du Pont III of the chemical manufacturer E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours Co. based in Wilmington, Delaware. Pi rre du Pont was the single largest 
donor to the SSIC. (Between 1958 and 1964, he gave the organization a total of $21,000.)  An 
earlier generation in the du Pont family had founded the American Liberty League, an 
organization created in 1934 to overturn Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal. Du Pont III’s 
father, along with his uncle Irénée and grandfather Lammont, spent thousands of dollars to 
promote free-market capitalism at the same time making millions through defense contracts 
during and after World War II.41 McNamara’s cuts to the defense budget would hurt companies 
like DuPont as well as Southern manufacturers. The SSIC also opposed reductions in defense on 
anti-communist grounds. In announcing their disfavor to the “recently established United States 
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency” the SSIC said that the organization, “will either prove 
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utterly futile and a waste of taxpayers’ money or it will impair in some degree this Nation’s 
security. In either contingency, this manifestation of governmental schizophrenia should be 
abolished.”42   
 Other pro-business groups, afraid of a decline in profits if McNamara’s plans for the 
military budget went forward, joined the chorus of forces opposing a drawdown of military 
forces. Organizations such as NAM and the Chamber of Commerce included members of the 
defense industry who feared a drawdown in the Cold War. Beginning in the 1960s, these defense 
executives collaborated with grassroots activists and former military officers (many of whom 
received jobs for defense companies following their r ti ement), to pursue efforts for more 
defense spending. These individuals converged in NAM and the Chamber of Commerce, as well 
as groups with names such as the American Security Council (ASC), the National Security 
Industrial Association (NSIA), the National Strategy Committee, and the National Strategy 
Information Center (NSIC). These organizations were l d by executives from companies that 
received numerous defense contracts including Motorola, Inc. and General Electric, Co. and 
recruited individuals like William F. Buckley, Jr. to attend conferences on the dangers of 
“relax[ing] our posture of readiness” for the sake of détente.43 
 Similar lobbying groups came out in force to oppose the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty 
that prohibited the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. Stanley Andrews, a former advisor to 
the Senate defense hawk and Ohio Democrat Frank Lausche, created the group Americans for 
National Security because he thought American taxpayer dollars were wasted on the Senate 
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Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. To Andrews, the agency was “being used as a tool of 
rash and fuzzy-brained pacifists in the State Department to unilaterally disarm the United 
States.” Andrews told the Senate in hearings over the Limited Test Ban Treaty that the treaty 
would “enhance the opportunities which the Kremlin is seeking to achieve its ultimate design for 
world domination.” By denying the passage of the LTBT, the Senate would “put a block in the 
way of communism’s supreme objective—world domination.” The euphemistic sounding 
Americans for National Security was an organizational offshoot of the Liberty Lobby, a 
notoriously racist organization that believed the federal government should stop financing 
federal education and civil rights reform and redirct its attention toward building a strong 
national defense. Other groups such as the Citizens Co gressional Committee, headed by its 
Legislative Secretary Charles W. Winegarner, tried to rally Democratic and Republican 
conservative members of Congress against the “Treason Treaty.” Winegarner stated in an issue 
of The Cross and the Flag—a magazine affiliated with the Christian Nationalist Crusade—that 
he had the support of over “50 Ambassadors or Legation representatives” for his anti-
disarmament agenda.  
 Cold War Democrats in Washington, D.C. also fought aggressively to defeat the treaty. 
Through their control of the Senate Preparedness Investigating Committee (PIS)—a committee 
organized with the purpose of increasing military spending—Democratic Senator John Stennis 
from Mississippi and Thurmond held hearings where men like the hawkish Gen. Curtis Lemay, 
who had close ties to the ASC, testified against the treaty. But the Limited Test Ban Treaty was 
approved in September 1963 by a Senate vote of 80-19, after being backed by considerable 
public support. The Limited Test Ban Treaty was unable to achieve a sustained détente between 
the Soviet Union and the United States during the 1960s, but it was a milestone in the Cold War. 
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The treaty was the first major accord between the two superpowers in the postwar era whose 
intent was to ameliorate the arms race. For these rasons, the treaty’s opponents viewed its 
ratification as the beginning of a process that would c lminate with a communist takeover of the 
United States.44 
As the new era in the Cold War altered the habits of defense spending in the United 
States, the local dependents of the Cold War economy feared the consequences to their bottom 
lines. Those Americans with economic connections to the Cold War felt anxiety over the thaw in 
tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, as they renewed political pressure for 
defense cuts. Clients of the military-industrial complex thought about the Cold War in parochial 
terms: a nuclear détente with the Soviets threatened their jobs and class status. While residents of 
defense communities welcomed the easing of nuclear tensions, when the environment of the 
Cold War compromised their economic status, they joined with other members of the Cold War 
coalition in opposition to the changes made by the Kennedy administration to America’s defense 
policy after the Cuban Missile Crisis. The collective concerns over international issues moved 
the political sympathies of defense workers and executives to support policies and politicians 
that ensured the United States’ reliance on militarization.   
 Indeed, the test ban and the settlement of the Cuban Missile Crisis were significant issues 
that recruited grassroots activists and members of the defense industry to Barry Goldwater’s 
                                                
44 United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 88th Congress, 1st 
session, August 12-27 1963,  p. 749; Sara Diamond, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political 
Power in the United States (New York: The Guilford Press, 1995), 152; Group Research Reports, Vol.2, No. 3, 
GRR, Box 425, Vol.2, No. 3, 2/12/63 folder; Robert David Johnson, Congress and the Cold War (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 90-91; Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace : The Making of the European 
Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 383-7;Vojtech Mastny, “The 1963 Limited 
Test Ban Treaty: A Missed Opportunity for Détente?,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 10:1 (Winter 2008), 3-25. The 
results of a Harris Poll conducted in September 1963 showed that 81 percent of those interviewed supported the 
Limited Test Ban Treaty. See Bernard J. Firestone, “K nnedy and the Test Ban: Presidential Leadership and Arms 
Control,” in Douglas Brinkley and Richard T. Griffiths, eds., John F. Kennedy and Europe (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1999), 91. 
105 
 
1964 presidential candidacy. The SSIC and other organizations that fought against the Limited 
Test Ban Treaty were part of the financial backbone f the Goldwater campaign.45 The 
conservative business consultant F. Clifton White, who advised many defense companies in the 
1950s through the Richardson Foundation, used the treaty as an issue to solicit donations to a 
redesigned Draft Goldwater committee. An executive at Weyerhaeuser Co, a company with ties 
to the defense industry, expressed interest in donating to the F. Clifton White committee because 
he felt liberals’ abandonment of the free market and states’ rights would have repercussions for 
American’s vulnerability in the world. If liberals remained in charge, their domestic policies 
“move us inevitably toward less and less freedom and make us vulnerable to the development of 
ignorance and stupidity among our people, thus further weakening our national alertness and 
discernment so that we shall become easy marks for dictatorship and will ultimately lose spirit 
and fight and become a defeatable [sic] nation.” While he did “not believe in a strong federal 
power, subsidizing weaker and weaker and less and less effective state governments,” the U.S. 
government must provide security to Americans through “a powerful well-organized military 
adequately backed with the best possible research and development activities and receptive to 
innovations which will keep them in a position of leadership.” Indeed, Goldwater’s supporters 
often reflected on the connections between local and international politics in backing the 
Republican’s foreign policy. One Goldwaterite implied that the 1964 Republican National 
Convention should be viewed as another conflict in the Cold War, as the winner of “The 1964 
Battle of San Francisco” would determine the course of international events for at least another 
four years.46   
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 Goldwater’s aggressive outlook on the role of the U.S. in the world also resonated with 
some defense workers in the Gunbelt. Areas such as Southern California, where the defense 
industry dominated the economy, were rife with electoral potential for the Goldwater campaign. 
The Orange County Industrial News maintained the position in 1961 that “that there will be no 
agreements on disarmament or on limitation of nuclear weapons.”  Southern California 
continued to benefit enormously from defense contracts in the early 1960s, but remained 
opposed to federal taxation and intervention in local race relations. Defense workers were 
present in the crowds at rallies held by figures such as Billy James Hargis of the Christian 
Crusade and General Walker. On their “Operation Midnight Ride” tour across the country, 
Hargis and Walker regularly lambasted plans of disarmament and the U.N.’s control of U.S. 
foreign policy.47 
 California residents were not alone in suffering from the consequences of defense 
cutbacks in the early 1960s. Boeing workers in Washington State were rumored to be supporting 
Goldwater as early as 1963 due to job losses from defense cuts. Time magazine argued that 
“Boeing’s loss of the TFX fighter-aircraft contract and the state’s loss of shipyard work to the 
East have irked both management and labor,” and the combination of these factors “could be just 
enough to tip the state to Goldwater.” Indeed, Goldwater sought access to traditional Democratic 
voters through the politics of the Cold War—as well as the politics of race and class. Democrats 
like Henry Jackson were on equal footing with Goldwater when he argued that the TFX was vital 
to U.S. national security and jobs in his home state of Washington. In the days leading up to the 
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election, Goldwater made an appearance in nearby Oregon to speak to Boeing workers where he 
praised their efforts in contributing to American air power in previous conflicts, and vowed they 
“will be doing so again,” pledging to allocate more federal dollars to building new bomber 
aircraft. 48  
 Defense cuts also imperiled the eastern coast of the Gunbelt. When cuts were 
implemented to the defense budget, Long Islanders turned to the federal government to bail out 
them out in times of trouble. In 1962, the Department of Defense eliminated production of the F-
105D fighter plane in favor of a more modern model. The F-105D was made by Republic 
Aviation Corp., one of the leading military contractors in the nation (before being bought out by 
Fairchild Industries) and a major employer in Nassau and Suffolk counties in New York. The 
editors of Newsday wrote an open letter to President Kennedy on February 8, 1962 complaining 
that the cancellation of this one plane would potentially result in layoffs to 13,000 Republic 
employees, roughly 72 percent of the company’s workforce, and 40 percent of people employed 
in the airline industry in Nassau and Suffolk counties. The editors argued that the federal 
government “has an obligation to provide Republic with other contracts” in order to prevent job 
losses at Republic plants. While the paper upheld “the doctrine that national security is more 
important than any local economy” it also noted that “even before World War II, the government 
has encouraged Republic and similar defense plants to expand to the point where all of them 
represent a crucially important source of employment.” The Cold War economy established a 
relationship between suburbanites and the state to the extent that defense communities like 
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Nassau County felt that the federal government “hasa responsibility to these people that extends 
beyond emergency help.”49 
 As the editorial from Newsday made clear, the business of the Cold War was bipartisan—
it touched everyone in communities that relied heavily on defense contracts from the federal 
government. When layoffs occurred, they not only affected those who worked at the plant, but 
restaurants, retail stores and small businesses that relied on these workers to patronize these 
establishments. Non-union defense workers suffered th  most from the layoffs. Because of the 
industry’s reliance on government contracts for profits, defense work was unpredictable and 
constantly subject to employment instability and fluctuations in profits. Unorganized workers 
therefore had no recourse when they lost their jobs. Several attempts by major unions such as the 
United Auto Workers (UAW) and the International Unio  of Operating Engineers (IUOE) to 
organize workers employed at Grumman in the 1960s failed as the company managed to prevent 
unionization through welfare capitalism. Companies such as Boeing also fed workers a steady 
diet of “right to work” propaganda to marginalize the power of unions. Corporations such as 
General Electric (the second largest defense contractor in the nation in the 1960s) and business 
groups such as NAM were also at the forefront of anti-u ion campaigns in the 1950s.50 
 Unable to organize to prevent job cuts, defense workers in the Gunbelt became 
disillusioned by the federal government’s inability to offer protections against layoffs. The anti-
labor rhetoric propounded by corporate executives and Republican politicians like Goldwater 
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since the 1950s created fissures among workers and their relationship to the New Deal state. 51 
The federal government, therefore, became the scapego t for the problems plaguing the defense 
industry. One Grumman Corporation employee complained that his “Senators and 
Representatives” failed to secure defense jobs to residents of Long Island.  This same employee 
did not blame the company for the layoffs but politicians in Washington, D.C. “I don’t think they 
are doing everything they can to bring defense work t  this area,” he exclaimed.52 While critical 
of defense corporations for committing layoffs, one Republic Aviation employee, after losing his 
job in 1964, suggested he was more likely to vote fr Goldwater.  The Democrats “better look 
out in November,” he warned. One resident of Seattl, M.C. (Chuck) Snyder, said that layoffs at 
the Boeing plant made him feel he could not rely on the federal government anymore. “We can't 
sit here and demand economy in the federal budget everywhere but in our own backyards,” 
Snyder said.53   
 Union leadership of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO), which represented defense workers, also stymied further defense cuts. 
The president of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, was a constant thorn in the side of the right for 
being an advocate of better wages and benefits for lab r, but he was also a dedicated Cold 
Warrior who saw eye-to-eye with Republicans on national defense. While Meany and the AFL-
CIO supported a policy of limited disarmament and the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the union 
lobbied for more defense contracts as well. The Washington Post noted Meany’s position on 
disarmament with surprise, as the leadership of the “AFL-CIO has been in the forefront of those 
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complaining that the Nation’s defense are inadequate, that increased military spending is of first 
priority.” Andrew J. Biemiller, director of the AFL-CIO Department of Legislation 
acknowledged that disarmament was a worthy goal, but disarmament without federal attention to 
the repercussions to labor would not be tolerated. Biemiller reaffirmed this position in testimony 
to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. While criti izing the arms race and its potential to 
place the world “on the brink of its own destruction” Biemiller said “that disarmament on a 
unilateral basis, or without fully effective controls, would amount to national suicide.” 54 The 
failure of the AFL-CIO’s leadership to endorse complete disarmament further inhibited support 
for a nuclear détente.55 
 In response to the restructuring of the Cold War economy during the Kennedy 
administration—and the anger defense cuts engendered from local defense communities and 
politicians—Congress attempted to redirect labor toward non-defense work during the 1960s. In 
1964, George McGovern proposed the establishment of the National Economic Conversion 
Commission to manage the impact the declining defens  budget would have on transitioning 
defense-based communities to non-military work. TheSenate Committee on Commerce chaired 
by Washington Senator Warren Magnuson held hearings o  the National Economic Conversion 
Commission at a time when the Civil Rights Act took up a majority of the Senate’s time and 
attention. Magnuson, like Senator Jackson, was an avid supporter of Boeing and defense 
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spending. His support for defense labor in Washingto  State made conversion more urgent, as 
the number of military contracts for his constituents had declined since 1961. In opening the 
Senate hearings on the NECC, Magnuson commented that “roughly 50 percent of the total 
Federal Budget and about 9 percent of our working force is directed toward the national defense 
effort” and its future was therefore of grave concer  to Americans.56 
 Efforts to reemploy jobless defense workers were of no avail as the NECC folded after 
initial hearings. The collapse of the NECC proved moot once Vietnam injected stimulus into the 
defense economy. But before the Americanization of the Vietnam War, President Johnson 
worked to reduce Cold War tensions by establishing the Gilpatric Committee: Johnson’s 
contribution to continue the efforts of Kennedy to achieve nuclear nonproliferation. Phyllis 
Schlafly and Chester Ward of the ASC mounted one of the most visible challenges to the 
Gilpatric committee. In books with such titles as The Betrayers and Strike From Space, Phyllis 
Schlafly and Chester Ward of the ASC argued that liberals had undermined the military 
superiority of the United States by seeking a reduction in nuclear arms. Schlafly and Ward 
argued that any form of détente with the Soviets spelled the end of the United States, because the 
Soviet Union would use détente to buildup its forces to carry out its long-term goal of destroying 
capitalism. Any reduction to America’s military arsenal would be ineffective as the only “two 
great guarantees of peace are the power of God and United States military strength.”  The 
“Gilpatric policy of refusing to engage in a military space race with Russia,” the two authors 
wrote, had left the United States behind the Soviets in space technology. Schlafly and Ward also 
criticized Johnson for letting “the big money and the huge national effort go to prestige projects” 
like sending a man to the moon, while merely “crumbs are left for military space programs 
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which could insure our survival and our freedom, as well as peace on earth.” Arizona banker and 
dedicated Goldwater supporter Frank Cullen Brophy echo d Schlafly and Ward, believing that 
sending a man to the moon was akin to putting “the American taxpayer” through a “long roll in 
the lunar porkbarrel.”  While National Review editor Frank S. Meyer was critical of Schlafly’s 
and Ward’s bombastic style and reductionist thinking, he nevertheless agreed “that what they are 
fundamentally getting at is frightening.”57  
 The varied supporters of the national security state therefore offered a barrier to 
disarmament and the rethinking of America’s defense priorities in the 1960s, but one that was 
inconsistent in its accomplishments. While unable to prevent defense cuts in their entirety, the 
relationship between ideology and interests in this Cold War coalition created a collective 
challenge to the new foreign policy order that ensured the unremitting presence of militarization 
in Americans’ lives. The overarching commonality betw en skilled labor unions, corporate 
executives, blue-collar defense workers, and right-wing activists in the 1960s was their 
connection to the national defense structure and the influence the defense apparatus had on 
molding their personal and public views toward the proper role of the federal state. Together, 
these elements of the national security state sought to pressure congressional officials and other 
figures in power to ensure the defense economy fulfilled their respective agendas and enhanced 
their overall welfare. Collaboration among national security activists in the 1960s thereby 
foreshadowed the challenges proponents of disarmament and defense cuts would face when 
trying to undo the advantages the national security state provided to individuals across the 
political landscape. 
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 The international consensus on nuclear weapons and the reorganization of America’s 
defense posture to meet the new context of global affairs, prevented national security activists 
from stopping McNamara and other officials from closing bases and cancelling defense projects. 
These factors also minimized the effectiveness of the Cold War coalition in making foreign 
policy in the first half of the 1960s. After President Johnson’s election, his critics predicted a 
bleak future for the United States. The SSIC anticipated increased government regulation, an 
expanded welfare state, and “support of the Negro Revolution.” In terms of foreign policy, the 
SSIC forecasted continued “accommodations with Russia and China” as well as “[u]nilateral 
disarmament and U.S. adherence to a world government,” which amounted to “Fabian 
socialism” coming to the country. Johnson’s War on Poverty and the Great Society were also of 
priority to Americans before 1965. But passage of Great Society legislation, Human Events 
exclaimed, distracted Americans from the Cold War. The magazine posited that “the Soviets 
have been making great strides forward” in military capabilities throughout the 1960s because 
the federal government “has been focusing on social welfare programs.”58  Even after 1965, 
Lyndon Johnson’s preoccupation with the Vietnam War failed to stymy the prospects of 
disarmament, as Johnson played a pivotal role in leading up to the ratification of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  
 Defense industry executives and members of the military who had allied with Sunbelt 
activists in opposition to the Kennedy administration were placated by the uptick in military 
spending generated by the war, and toned down their opposition to Johnson’s foreign policy.59 
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As opinion turned against the war in Vietnam, however, business executives were increasingly 
under attack by the New Left and congressional liberals who sought to weaken the power of the 
imperial presidency and the military-industrial complex. Defense companies in NAM were so 
frustrated by the public’s perception of the defense industry as warmongers that by 1969 they 
had concluded it was time to wage a public relations campaign against the left rather than just 
lobbying for more defense contracts.60  
 These setbacks did not sway national defense hawks from their opinions on military 
spending.  Often during the 1960s and 1970s, Republican policymakers would point to the 
aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis to legitimize th ir argument that the United States needed 
to spend more on defense. Robert McNamara and his efforts to reduce the defense budget offered 
up a straw man for military weakness.  Melvin Laird to Casper Weinberger, Secretaries of 
Defense under Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan respectively, claimed that the Cuban Missile 
Crisis and McNamara had put the United States on the path to ruin. McNamara’s reductions to 
military forces, they argued, established a dangerous precedent for the United States that led to 
military inferiority. Individuals from Anthony Harrigan of the ASC, to Phyllis Schlafly, to 
Chamber of Commerce President Arch Booth would also single out McNamara and the Cuban 
Missile Crisis as examples of U.S. perfidy to Soviet communism. 61 
 In the final analysis, the campaign against Kennedy’s national defense policies united 
grassroots activists, defense executives, Democratic and Republican hawks, and military 
personnel to form a powerful coalition in support of he national security state that was particular 
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to American politics. While this bloc of Cold Warrio s were not successful in achieving 
favorable results in the first half of the 1960s, they continued to realign the contours of American 
political culture with their quest for larger defense budgets.  The money and interests of the 
defense industry provided advocates of militarization with significant financial and 
organizational momentum to attack changes to the Cold War state after the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
Right-wing members of the Cold War coalition also hoped to divert the federal government away 
from domestic programs and toward military spending. I  making these arguments, politicians, 
corporate executives, and workers who depended uponthe defense economy incorporated anti-
communism into their material justification for a strong military, claiming the federal 




Chapter Three: Vietnam and the Culture of Anti-Mili tarism 
 
  
 In 1970, William R. Wilson, Vice-President of Public Relations for Lockheed Aircraft 
Corp., wrote an article in NAM Reports, the official magazine of the National Association of 
Manufacturers, where he conveyed his concerns over the status of American foreign policy and 
the reputation of the private defense industry. In the article, which he entitled “How to Get Rid 
of a Complex,” Wilson stated he had grown tired of what he felt were the thoughtless attacks 
against the defense industry by congressional liberals and the New Left. As a self-described 
“member of the industrial side of the military-industrial complex,” Wilson believed the defense 
industry’s image as war profiteers was misleading. The criticism levied on the national security 
state, Wilson argued, threatened the military strength of the United States and was therefore 
responsible for a decline in American military power that left the nation vulnerable to an 
onslaught by communist aggressors. Alluding to the Vietnam War, Wilson claimed that the 
liberal critics of the national security state wished that the United States could simply “point our 
magic wand at the…Communist turmoil in Southeast Asia,” and therefore be able to rid 
ourselves of the military-industrial complex. Wilson urged his colleagues to fight the “scorn 
form the new left activists” and defend the reputation of private industry for what he claimed was 
its important role in protecting the United States from communism.1 
 During the late 1960s, opposition to American involvement in Vietnam created a culture 
of anti-militarism in the United States that lasted until the mid-1970s. The lessons of Vietnam 
were palpable to the American people: U.S. Cold Warforeign policy produced an endless and 
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meaningless conflict that resulted in the deaths of th usands of Americans and Vietnamese. The 
U.S. overcommitted itself to the cause of fighting communism and needed to reexamine how it 
conducted the Cold War to better adhere to its democratic principles. Vietnam made Americans 
reluctant to use military force to resolve international conflicts and stimulated criticism of the 
military establishment and its deleterious effects on the conduct of domestic and foreign policy. 
Moreover, by 1971, the New Left and the broader anti-war movement succeeded in altering the 
structure and discourse of the Cold War. Congress rponded to this culture of anti-militarism 
with demands for defense cuts, military restraint, a d rhetoric that called for a rethinking of 
American foreign policy. Indeed, the failed war in Vietnam generated interest in slashing defense 
expenditures and drawing down America’s military to an extent unseen prior to World War II, as 
critics of the defense establishment, or anti-militarists, waged a collective struggle against the 
commanding power of the national security state.2   
 After the coordinated ambush on American military installations and major cities in 
South Vietnam by the Vietnamese insurgency during the Tet Offensive in January 1968, opinion 
polls showed that a near majority of Americans were opposed to the Vietnam War. A Gallup Poll 
conducted in March of 1968 claimed that 49 percent of Americans felt “the United States was 
wrong to become involved militarily in Vietnam.” This number only increased during the 1970s. 
By 1971, 61 percent of Americans agreed the war was a di astrous blunder, while polls also 
showed that Americans were less likely to classify themselves as “hawks” on the war, as forty 
                                                
2 Throughout this chapter, I refer to the group of individuals who sought to reduce or eliminate the natio l security 
state and defense expenditures as “anti-militarists.” I define this term in the introduction, but to reiterate, I apply the 
label of anti-militarist to a range of individuals. These include members of Congress as diverse as George S. 
McGovern, John Sherman Cooper, and Stuart Symington (after 1968). The term anti-militarists also denotes 
members of the New Left, peace activists, and the broader anti-war movement. While anti-militarists in Congress 
and the New Left cannot be compared in terms of tactics, strategy, and, political ideology, they shared a desire for 
reorganizing America’s military commitments abroad and cutting the defense budget. 
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two percent of the public saw themselves as “doves.”3 As the conduct of the American military 
abroad faced scrutiny by Congress and swaths of the Am rican electorate, so too did the role of 
the American government. For the first time since World War II, a majority of Americans raised 
concerns about how the United States’ role in the world affected their lives at home.  More 
Americans suggested in the 1970s that the United States must scale back its role in the world, 
and federal monies spent on defense should be shiftd to social welfare programs. Civil rights 
leaders such as Martin Luther King, Jr. and Stokely Carmichael highlighted the relationship 
between Vietnam and the decline of the Great Society in justifying their antiwar positions. In 
publicly announcing his opposition to the Vietnam War, King told an audience at Riverside 
Church in Harlem on April 4, 1967 that he “knew that America would never invest the necessary 
funds or energies in rehabilitation of its poor so long as adventures like Vietnam continued to 
draw men and skills and money like some demonic destructive suction tube. So, I was 
increasingly compelled to see the war as an enemy of the poor and to attack it as such.”4  
 To marginalize the New Left and the anti-militarists, defense hawks—within and outside 
of government— sought to exploit the entrenched institutions of the Cold War state to protect 
their ideological and economic interests. Defense company executives, local politicians, military 
hawks, and assorted national security activists continued their crusade to keep military spending 
high. But in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they did so under a more hostile political climate. 
This coalition of Cold Warriors found their previous strategies ineffective due to the public 
criticism of the Vietnam War and U.S. foreign policy. In response, they adopted new ones. 
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Defense companies, rather than functioning as the organizational backdrop for pro-Cold War 
activism, launched attempts to defend their industry to the public, castigating their infamous 
image as the “military-industrial complex.” The industry also actively courted defenders of 
militarization, including right-wing politicians and activists. As they had in their campaign 
against defense cuts and nuclear disarmament in the1960s, the right willingly joined forces with 
the national security state to promote a hawkish defense policy. The symbiotic relationship 
between the defense industry and its multiple defenders on the right lent both greater 
opportunities to spread their message to more sectors of the American public. 
 But while they found collaboration and agreement on C ld War foreign policy among 
business, labor, and national security elites, the pro-war right remained embattled during the 
Vietnam War. By 1968, movement conservatives were one of the last remaining political 
constituencies who unequivocally supported the war.They had quarreled with President Lyndon 
Johnson over his policy of gradual escalation, but believed that the war was a moral cause that 
the United States needed to fight and win. Despite the public consensus against Vietnam, the 
activist right continued their support for the war and for a more stringent policy toward the 
communist powers.  Even the election of a Republican president in 1968 proved unfavorable to 
the pro-war right. President Richard Nixon had little patience for right-wing activists, finding 
them a nuisance and a constraint in his efforts toward opening diplomatic and economic relations 
with China, ending the Vietnam War, and establishing arms agreements with the Soviet Union. 
Nixon and his National Security Advisor (and later Secretary of State) Henry Kissinger sought to 
cajole and prod the right in supporting the administrations’ foreign and domestic policy, but to 
no avail. After a number of activist conservatives su pended their support for Nixon in 1971, 
Nixon and Kissinger attempted to appease the right by meeting with leading figures like Ronald 
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Reagan and William F. Buckley on a regular basis. When Gerald Ford was appointed president 
after Nixon resigned in August 1974 due to the Watergate scandal, clashes among conservatives 
and the White House only intensified. The tensions between the activist right and the Republican 
establishment culminated in Ronald Reagan’s decision to challenge Ford for the Republican 
presidential nomination in 1976, further accentuating and expanding the split within the 
Republican Party between its conservative and moderate wings.5  
 Vietnam also raised dilemmas for Cold War Democrats. In defending the defense 
economy from cuts, the American mission in Vietnam, nd the greater fight against communism, 
conservatives found allies in Cold War Democrats like Senators Hubert Humphrey and Henry 
Jackson. Labor unions such as the AFL-CIO were in company with conservative Republicans on 
defense spending. The AFL-CIO and their right-wing adversaries agreed over the need to 
preserve defense jobs—albeit for much different reasons. On foreign policy issues, therefore, 
conservatives’ positions often echoed those of their liberal opponents. At odds with the anti-war 
and anti-defense positions of their party, Cold War Democrats contributed to the tensions among 
the left. Indeed, foreign policy played a significant role in the creation of organizations such as 
the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) and the Committee on the President Danger 
(CPD) that had both Republicans and Democrats as members. The CDM and the CPD found 
their genesis in Cold War Democrats’ disassociation with the anti-militarist wing of their party. 
The growing gulf between members of the Democratic Party stemmed from lingering tensions 
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over the direction of American foreign policy that would continue to affect the Party in the 
remainder of the twentieth century. 
 The backlash against the war in Vietnam offered the real possibility that the postwar state 
created to fight communism would be remade in ways that would benefit the social welfare of 
Americans. This did not happen. While the eradication of the military-industrial complex was 
difficult to conceive, the late 1960s were a critical time in postwar American politics that 
restricted the power of the military and defense corporations to an extent unseen prior to World 
War II. The collapse of the American economy in the early 1970s prevented efforts by the left to 
drawn down the national security state to any significance. Moreover, a number of structural 
forces aligned in the early 1970s that frustrated the agenda of anti-militarists. Declines in 
productivity and wages at the end of the “American e tury” strengthened arguments made by 
defense hawks that military spending was needed to supply Americans with jobs at a time when 
they appeared to be dwindling.   
 The Lockheed Loan crisis in 1971 exemplified how the fate of anti-militarism was 
ultimately determined by local politics.  After some poor investments in costly technological 
prototypes, Lockheed requested several hundred million dollars in federal loan guarantees to 
prevent the company from going bankrupt. The potential collapse of Lockheed led its workers 
(and the communities that depended on the defense contra tor) to petition and lobby their local, 
state, and national leaders to keep the company solvent. Companies had received bailouts and 
federal loan guarantees before, but the size of the loan and the reasons for Lockheed’s request 
ignited opposition among left-wing anti-militarists and right-wing deficit hawks who fought 
together to stop federal financing of the private corporation. When the debate over the Lockheed 
bailout was over, however, the aftermath revealed th  severe limitations anti-militarists 
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confronted when trying to undue the ways militarization affected the lives of Americans since 
the 1930s. 
 
Vietnam, the New Left, and the Rise of Anti-Militarism 
 In February 1965, President Lyndon Johnson made the fa eful decision to send American 
marines to Vietnam, thus expanding a protracted confli t whose origins lied as far back as World 
War II.  Johnson felt trapped by twenty years of American commitment toward Vietnam, but 
reasoned that if the United States did not confront c mmunism in the region, U.S. credibility 
around the world would be jeopardized. Johnson therefore made a series of decisions in 1964 
that made the escalation of the Vietnam War nearly a fait accompli. Even prior to the Gulf of 
Tonkin incident, the President was predisposed to fav r escalation rather than alternative courses 
of action. Once Johnson made the decision to Americanize the war, however, the President 
realized that escalation was not a panacea. Johnson predicted that American firepower, 
particularly the bombing campaign of Operation Rolling Thunder, would overwhelm the 
Vietnamese communists.  He was wrong. What Johnson hoped would be a quick war dragged on 
for weeks, then months, and eventually years. Even early on the war, Johnson sensed that a 
resolution to the conflict was far from his reach. “[T]here ain’t no daylight in Vietnam,” Johnson 
told his longtime friend and Senate colleague Richard Russell in March of 1965, “the more 
bombs you drop, the more nations you scare, the mor people you make mad.”6 
 When Johnson widened the war, a group of radicals dubbed the New Left gained 
attention as its most vocal opposition. Comprised of students, clergy, and social activists, the 
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origins of the New Left lied in the anti-nuclear movement, Beat culture, and the civil rights 
movement of the 1950s. The New Left rallied against the “corporate liberalism” of the 
Democratic Party and its inattention to those Americans left behind during the postwar economic 
boom. The New Left also criticized the direction American foreign policy had undertaken since 
World War II, arguing that American intervention abroad was imperialist in its design and 
outcomes.7 While the New Left remained fractured by a multiplicity of interests and ideas, its 
members were joined by the common desire to end the Cold War. Following the civil rights 
revolution, the New Left also sought to achieve social justice for minorities, women, and the 
poor. This goal, they believed, was impossible if the U.S. was entrenched in a Cold War with the 
Soviet Union.  
 The New Left and its critique of postwar American hegemony obtained greater attention 
by the media, policymakers, and the public after 1965. What started as a fringe movement 
gathered momentum in the second half of the 1960s as the Vietnam War dragged on and protests 
against the war grew. Antiwar demonstrations broke ut almost immediately after President 
Lyndon Johnson sent American marines to Vietnam.  College campuses erupted in protest as 
students energetically spoke out and demonstrated against the war. In addition to colleges and 
universities, the New Left and the antiwar movement took the fight against the war into the 
streets in major American cities. After 1967, the antiwar movement galvanized larger numbers of 
Americans upset over the rising troop levels in Vietnam, the persistence of the draft, and 
mounting casualties. In the spring of that year, antiwar activists under the banner of the National 
Mobilization Committee Against the War marched in New York and San Francisco to show 
support for an American withdrawal from Vietnam. Over 30,000 antiwar activists gathered on 
the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in the March on the Pentagon in October, hoping in the words 
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of antiwar activist Abbie Hoffman to “levitate” the Pentagon. Hoffman’s promise to raise the 
Pentagon was a stunt, but one that attracted considerable media attention.  
 The March on the Pentagon lent further momentum to the antiwar movement. Antiwar 
protesters obtained greater support from leading public figures such as Senator William Fulbright 
who conducted congressional hearings on the war from 1966 to 1971, some of which were 
televised. Antiwar South Dakota Senator George S. McGovern spoke at the National 
Mobilization march, despite objections by members of his staff.8 The antiwar movement also 
garnered assistance from leading intellectuals during the late 1960s. Throughout 1968, as young 
men of the group New England Resistance burned their draft cards in public in Boston, famed 
pediatrician Benjamin Spock, Martin Luther King, Jr., and MIT professor Noam Chomsky all 
signed the “Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority” as a sign of solidarity with indicted draft 
resisters. 9  
 Most Americans did not support the tactics of the antiwar left, but they did support its 
message after January 1968 when the Tet Offensive discre ited the claims of President Johnson 
and his advisors that the United States was winning the war. By the spring of 1968, the Vietnam 
War was lost in the eyes of the public.  Undersecretary of the Air Force Townshend Hoopes 
admitted to Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford that t e war was “eroding the moral fibre of the 
nation, demoralizing its politics, and paralyzing its foreign policy.” Once Americans saw footage 
of the Tet offensive broadcast into their homes, the war ended President Johnson’s political 
career, as he bowed out of the 1968 presidential race after barely defeating antiwar candidate and 
Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy in the New Hampshire primary. The popularity of 
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McCarthy’s anti-war platform sent the very clear message that Americans had enough of 
Vietnam.10 
 But the public turn against the war did not resolve the nation’s underlying compulsion 
toward imperialism, argued members of the New Left. Ending the war was not a final solution, 
as only a demilitarization of the Cold War insured the U.S. against future Vietnams. Vietnam 
could not be disaggregated from the broader context of the Cold War, as the conflict was a 
corollary of a “significantly militarized” society, wrote Tom Hayden of the Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS), one that resolved internatio l tensions through armed conflict. Since 
1945, the decision to go to war was “the property of the military and industrial arms race 
machine, with the politicians assuming a ratifying role instead of a determining one.” The Cold 
War was a noose around America’s neck that diverted resources for social reform toward 
American imperialism. Only by eliminating the arms race and the tensions between the two 
superpowers could the United States achieve racial, gender, and economic equality.11  
 In making their case against the militarized nature of the Cold War, the New Left 
appropriated the ideas and writings of thinkers like the sociologist C. Wright Mills. Before 
succumbing to a premature death in 1961, Mills authored works such as The Power Elite and The 
Causes of World War III in the 1950s that singled out a “military elite” as having a growing 
influence in the conduct of American politics. Mills envisaged the concept of the “military-
industrial complex” long before the term was spoken by Dwight Eisenhower in 1961.  Mills 
argued that a cadre of military figures and corporate elites threatened the sanctity and security of 
the American republic for their ability to undermine the wishes of the electorate through the 
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possession of unprecedented economic and political power. Mills posited that the Cold War gave 
birth to an intrinsic relationship between the military and the economy that leeched the United 
States of its financial resources and democratic values. Corporations came to rely upon military 
leadership for ensuring profits, and the military thereupon depended on corporations for 
employment.  “Without an industrial economy, the modern army, as in America, could not exist; 
it is an army of machines. Professional economists u ually consider military institutions as 
parasitic upon the means of production. Now, however, such institutions have come to shape 
much of the economic life of the United States.” 12 Mills’ writings took on greater salience after 
1968 as it seemed to many Americans that defense corporations were the primary benefactors of 
the Vietnam War. 
 This attack on corporate militarism was not simply conspiratorial posturing. Anti-
militarists had sufficient empirical evidence to base their argument that corporations had profited 
substantially from the war. During the early years of the Vietnam conflict, defense spending 
increased to 9 percent of GDP in 1966 from 7 percent in 1964, and private industry saw 
significant gains from this uptick in military expenditures. George Cline Smith, an economist 
based in the firm MacKay-Shields Economic Inc. told defense executives in September 1965 it 
was hard to believe that only months earlier, business was concerned that a steep recession 
loomed on the horizon. An economic downturn was improbable now as the Vietnam War had 
alleviated these worries. Cline stated that the prima y impact of the war “has been the sharp shift 
toward optimism over the business outlook.” Indeed, “the war in Vietnam has given the defense 
industries a badly needed stimulus,” economists at Nor heastern University concluded.  While 
                                                
12 C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (Oxford University Press, New York, 1956), 222. For more on Mills see, Daniel 
Geary, “‘Becoming International Again’: C. Wright Mills and the Emergence of a Global New Left,1956-192” 
Journal of American History Vol. 95, No. 3 (December 2008), 710-736; Michael Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The 
United States since the 1930s (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 141. 
127 
 
rising inflation and interest rates were long-term preoccupations, it was clear that the war had a 
“stimulative effect.”13 The increase in military spending due to the Vietnam War provided the 
national security state with what they had wanted for years.  Executives of defense companies 
had long complained that cuts to military spending since the Cuban Missile Crisis imperiled 
American interests abroad and at home and had wounded them financially.14 Vietnam seemed to 
offer a solution to their concerns as profits continued to rise for many defense companies in the 
1960s. The Grumman Corporation in Nassau County, Long Island attained substantial profits in 
its 9-month earnings balance sheets due to Vietnam. During the first year of the Vietnam War, 
Grumman employed 31,600 workers, only 3,400 shy of the 35,000 employees hired by the 
company during World War II.15 
 Antiwar groups therefore targeted leading defense contractors throughout the country as 
sites for protests. The organization Women’s Strike for Peace demonstrated outside the corporate 
headquarters of Dow Chemical, the maker of napalm. The labor union the United Electrical, 
Radio and Machine Workers (UE) protested at a General Electric plant because the corporation 
took a significant sum of money from the government for defense contracts. SDS members and 
student radicals “occupied” buildings of Columbia University demanding the school cease 
funding departments that conducted research for the military.16 
 As the New Left disparaged the “military-industrial complex,” the term resurfaced in 
American culture for the first time since the Edwin Walker scandal and the public controversy 
over the military’s involvement in Cold War seminars. Books on the subject of the military-
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industrial complex proliferated in the late 1960s and early 1970s. With titles such as The 
Economy of Death and The War Business, these books revivified debates over the relevance of 
the “military-industrial complex” in American life. The running theme in these works was that 
Vietnam was proof that Eisenhower’s warning against the power of a permanent military 
establishment went unheeded throughout the 1960s, and now that Americans have witnessed its 
dangers, they were prepared to eradicate it.  In a review of John Kenneth Galbraith’s 1969 book, 
How to Control the Military, the New York Times noted that the book sounded the alarm against 
the bloated largesse of the Pentagon, but that Galbraith’s work was premised on the belief that 
Americans “have escaped the cold-war psychosis; the Am rican people are ready to prune the 
military industrial complex.” In addition to the publication of books and number of newspaper 
articles, magazines such as The Atlantic and Time dedicated space to articles on the military-
industrial complex in 1969.17  
 Television stations also released programs on the subject. Of the most popular was the 
documentary The Selling of the Pentagon, which CBS aired in February 1971 to great 
controversy. The Selling of the Pentagon discussed the lengths military personnel had gone t  
promote the Vietnam War. The documentary revealed how employees of the Department of 
Defense, with taxpayer money, made speeches across the country equating patriotism with 
militarism to try to ramp up public support for the war. While groups such as the American 
Security Council (ASC), and policy makers such as Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird cited 
flaws with the film, The Selling of the Pentagon went on to win a number of awards, including 
                                                
17 Richard J. Barnet, The Economy of Death (New York: Atheneum, 1969); George Thayer, The War Business: The 
International Trade in Armaments (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969). See also, Seymour Melman, Pentagon 
Capitalism: The Political Economy of War (New York: McGraw Hill, 1970); Sidney Lens, The Military-Industrial 
Complex (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1970); Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, “The Military-Industrial Complex,” The 
New York Times, June 6, 1969; David Shoup, “The New American Militarism,” The Atlantic Monthly, April 1969; 
“What is the Military Industrial Complex?,” Time, April 9, 1969 
129 
 
an Emmy. Trying to lure ratings for its own network, ABC aired a documentary one year later 
entitled Arms and Security: How Much is Enough? t at centered on critics of defense spending 
who argued the military-industrial complex had perpetuated the arms race.18 
The international catastrophe of Vietnam generated  broad public questioning of the 
economics of war and its consequences for American society that was new to the postwar era. 
Challenges to the defense industry and the wider military-industrial complex expanded the 
antiwar movement’s critique of American military power beyond the campus and the streets and 
into the homes of Americans, as the heightened attention to the size and effects of the military 
state—and the corporate powers that gave it life—mobilized opposition against a culture of 
militarism in the United States. Vietnam therefore revived and popularized the critiques of the 
U.S. foreign policy made by the Cold War left since th  years of Henry Wallace. The public 
scrutiny of the military-industrial complex eventually forced policy makers to rethink and 
reevaluate the need for new weapons programs and more defense spending during the latter half 
of the Vietnam War. 
 Indeed, the culture of anti-militarism and the critique of the military-industrial complex 
pervaded the halls of Congress as well. Congress took new measures to limit the imperial 
presidency by defunding expensive military projects. The main target of anti-militarists in 
Congress was the anti-ballistic missile defense system (ABM) proposed by President Richard 
Nixon in 1969.  Plans to build an ABM were not new. The project to construct a missile defense 
shield dated to the 1950s and went through several forms and name changes.  But up until Nixon, 
an ABM system was never more than an item on the wish list of defense hawks. Many in 
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Congress viewed the ABM project as overwrought with problems, including its potential 
expense and technological feasibility. Nixon himself was unenthusiastic about his ABM program 
entitled Safeguard. From the ABM’s inception, Nixon expressed worries over whether it was 
even possible to create such a missile defense shield.  In the end, however, these concerns were 
irrelevant to the President. Nixon believed that the ABM was useful in negotiations with the 
Soviets—whether it could be built or not. The ABM could be used as leverage to cajole the 
Soviets into accepting the demands of the U.S. when both countries met at the bargaining table 
over the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I). The ABM also offered the Nixon 
administration an opportunity to neutralize right-wing objections that it was too soft on 
communism. 19  
 Congress once more reacted negatively to proposals for an ABM. Much of the criticism 
of the ABM was contextualized within the outcome of the Vietnam War. The policy of gradual 
escalation that characterized the Vietnam War was employed as a metaphor in viewing the 
potential cost of the ABM. As William Miller, an assi tant to the anti-war Republican and 
Kentucky Senator John Sherman Cooper, wrote, “the Vietnam experience shows that a 
‘commitment’ to a massive ABM system will involve a further draining of energy both 
intellectual as physical.”20 Anti-militarists in Congress had suspicions about the costs and the 
strategic necessity of the ABM. The ABM was seen as an offspring of the military-industrial 
complex that had led the country into war. Anti-nuclear activists also contributed in pressuring 
Congress to kill the ABM. Groups like SANE opposed the ABM for fear that it would intensify 
the arms race. The anti-ABM campaign was both natiol and local, as residents in Grenville, 
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Illinois passed a resolution stating their oppositin to the presence of any ABM sites in their 
town.21  
 Whereas Democrats and moderate Republicans had at least some criticism of the ABM, 
the missile defense system had sweeping support among C ld War hawks. The nation must put 
cost aside in order to protect American lives from Soviet aggression, supporters of the ABM 
argued in the late 1960s and early 1970s, as they claimed the Soviet Union had overtaken the 
U.S. in military superiority and a missile defense shield was the country’s last line of defense. 
The ASC came out in force to support the ABM. Comprised of current and former members of 
the military-industrial complex who lobbied Congress and the White House for further defense 
spending since World War II, the ASC warned Americans that the Soviet Union maintained the 
upper hand in the arms race because of its planned economy. The ASC was consistent in 
believing that U.S. was perpetually behind the Soviet Union in the arms race, and that Congress 
and the President needed to authorize the production of a missile shield to deter a nuclear war. 
Nixon’s announcement of the ABM gave the ASC an opportunity to push for increased defense 
spending. In a 1969 report entitled “The ABM and the Changed Strategic Military Balance” and 
published in booklet form, the ASC argued that it was indisputable “that the Soviet’s military 
objective is strategic superiority because they have passed ‘parity’ and are still building” up their 
nuclear arsenal. Using various graphs and charts tha  indicated that the U.S. was behind the 
Soviet Union in numbers of bombers, civil defense, and military expenditures, the ASC argued 
that the Soviet threat continued to loom large, and thus the ABM provided “the American people 
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a seamless garment of security in an age of acute danger.”  The ABM was far from perfect, but it 
was “a method of deterrence which will save lives.”22   
 The right-wing media stood steadfast behind Nixon’s plan for an ABM as well. Human 
Events and National Review, the two main literary organs of the right, published several 
favorable articles on the ABM.  National Review even felt that the ABM did not go far enough in 
its capability to protect the U.S. from the Soviets. Editors of the magazine worried that the ABM 
could “be overwhelmed by a sufficiently large number of warheads and/or decoys arriving in a 
short enough time interval.”23 Despite the shortcomings of the program, the magazine agreed the 
ABM was “a practical system for shooting down hostile H-bombs.”24  
 The ABM also received support from longtime Cold Warriors such as Paul Nitze, the co-
author of NSC-68. As Deputy Secretary of Defense under President Johnson, Nitze defended 
American policy in Vietnam and lobbied Johnson to increase defense spending. Now in May 
1969, Nitze helped form the Committee to Maintain a Prudent Defense Policy (CMPDP) to 
counteract attempts to defeat the ABM.  The CMPDP recruited members from the public and the 
private sector, including leaders within the defense industry. General Electric executive Daniel J. 
Fink wrote to former Secretary of State Dean Acheson (also a member of CMPDP and Nitze’s 
former employer in the State Department)  wanting to join the Committee to Maintain a Prudent 
Defense Policy and fight for the ABM. Fink claimed that his pro-ABM stance had nothing to 
with him being an employee for the third largest defense contractor in the nation that had a 
financial stake in the ABM. Indeed, Fink was concered that his support for the ABM would be 
ineffective since he was part of the “self-serving element of the “military industrial complex.” 
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His concerns did not prevent him, however, from writing to Senator John Stennis his opinion that 
the ABM was necessary to deter Soviet capabilities n the event of a nuclear strike.25  
 Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, staffers for Senator Henry Jackson, wrote policy 
papers on behalf of the CMPDP to push the ABM through Congress. They faulted Democratic 
senators like Maine’s Edmund Muskie for relying on anti-ABM scientists to justify their 
positions that Safeguard will not work, that it was superfluous, and it would renew the arms race 
with the Soviet Union. Pearle and Wolfowitz rejected Muskie’s contention that the U.S. “ought 
to convince the Soviets that we are interested in stabilizing the arms race.” This can only be 
achieved through the ABM because it “acts to insure tability” by strengthening U.S. capabilities 
to strike first during a nuclear war.26 
 Much to the chagrin of its backers, however, the ABM never saw the light of day in 
Congress. Missouri Democratic Senator Stuart Symington, a once vociferous Cold Warrior 
turned skeptic of greater military spending, led the campaign in the Senate against the ABM. 
Symington and anti-militarists in Congress were not persuaded by claims that the ABM was vital 
to national security. The Cooper-Hart amendment, spon ored by Senators John Sherman Cooper 
and Philip Hart in 1968, aimed to stop the ABM in its tracks. The amendment polarized 
Congress into two warring camps, ones that did not necessarily break down along party lines. 
The anti-ABM coalition contained anti-militarist, antiwar members of Congress, but also some 
budget hawks who were against spending for costly defense and technological projects. The 
proceeding fight over Cooper-Hart between proponents a d critics of the ABM was 
unprecedented, and the sizeable opposition to the ABM generally stunned its backers. ABM 
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supporter Henry Jackson resorted to threatening his colleagues who failed to fall in line with the 
ABM, going so far as to warn Senator Mike Gravel that “[i]f you vote against the ABM, it’s 
going to cause you problems around here.”27  While the anti-militarists lost the first significant 
battle over the ABM in a 51-49 vote against the ratific tion of the Cooper-Hart amendment, as a 
significant minority, they prevented the ABM from going forward. 
 Additional Pentagon projects such as the Supersonic Transport Plane (SST) and the C5-A 
met the same fate as the ABM. SST proponents hailed the plane as a vital contribution to 
American economic and military power. The plane promised to break the sound barrier, cutting 
travel time from Paris to New York down to a few hours. The SST was far superior to the Soviet 
equivalent of the supersonic plane, the Tupolev Tu-144, making the SST an important 
contribution to U.S. supremacy in the fields of technology and weapons development. The SST 
was also billed as a solution to joblessness in the def nse industry. Corporate backers of the SST 
promised that a majority of the expenditures for the plane would be spent in areas whose 
percentage of unemployment exceeded the national rate. Representatives from Boeing (who 
won the contract to build the plane) claimed “that the minor economic stimulus of the SST 
prototype program would be preferable to the cost of temporary, avoidable dislocations and the 
resulting lack of stability” for defense workers. Furthermore, at a time when issues regarding 
balance of payments dominated discussions over American economic policy and relations with 
Japan and Europe, sales of possible SSTs would reverse the deficits.28 A memorandum to George 
S. Moore, a Boeing executive, argued that the SST would generate jobs, dominate world aviation 
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markets, and lead to more efficient air travel. More importantly, it would provide an additional 
50,000 jobs to skilled white-collar workers who were presently unemployed.29 
 Anti-militarists, however, were alarmed by the prospective cost of the SST, passenger 
safety, and the negative atmospheric impact the plane would have upon the environment. 
Individuals opposed to the SST represented a diverse group of men and women, including 
environmentalists, consumer advocates, and scientists. In December 1970, with a final roll call 
vote of 52-51, the United States Senate voted against dditional appropriations for the SST. The 
death knell to the SST came in March 1971 when the House finally voted to terminate all 
funding for the project. The House vote made certain that the SST would not be flying in 
American skies. After the SST was rejected, Barry Goldwater criticized the vote as a victory for 
the antiwar left. Rather than blame nonpartisan scientif c experts and government officials who 
felt the SST was cost prohibitive and detrimental to the environment, Goldwater impugned 
liberal Democrats who he felt were on a crusade to weaken American might. Goldwater argued 
that the “same people who found it easy to understand he reaction of the liberal doves to the 
War in Vietnam found their attitude on the SST.”30  
 The C5-A plane was felled by the rising surge of anti-militarism in the United States as 
well. The C5-A was designed in the mid-1950s by the Lockheed Corporation to transport planes 
and other large equipment to battlegrounds like Vietnam, but was plagued by cost overruns and 
poor construction. When it rolled off assembly lines, the C5-A proved to be a symbol of that war.  
With a 223-foot wingspan and a six-story tail wing, the C5-A could only be contained in a space 
about the size of a football stadium. The plane’s grandiose size did not equate to functionality. 
After several dozen planes proved deficient due to cracks in their wings—and anti-spending 
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hawks in Congress such as Wisconsin Democrat William Proxmire protested—future production 
of the plane was cancelled. The C5-A also had a fair number of proponents from both sides of 
the aisle. Democrats and Republicans defended the C5-Ato preserve the jobs that depended upon 
production of the plane. Senators Herman Talmadge from Georgia and Alan Cranston from 
California, Democrats at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, were outraged that the 
federal government was willing to put thousands out of work in their states that relied upon the 
C5-A for employment.31  
 The jobs argument, however, did not succeed in saving expensive military projects like 
the C5-A plane or the SST. By 1971, anti-militarists had gained the upper hand in Congress and 
looked to be presiding over a new era in the Cold War. The Vietnam War tainted the 
respectability of the defense establishment to the ext nt that a new consensus on U.S. foreign 
policy began to take shape, one that rebuked the pervasive presence of the Cold War military in 
American political culture. Defense programs once de med vital to the health of national security 
were now attacked as expensive, anachronistic, and un ecessary. Marred by disrepute and 
financial setbacks, the defense industry went on the offensive in the late 1960s to repair its image 
and grow their profit margins.   
 
The Defense Lobby Fights Back 
 When Richard Nixon won election over Democratic challenger Hubert Humphrey in 
November 1968, he did so at a time of uncertainty ad unrest over Vietnam. Discussion of 
Vietnam had radically changed since the previous pre idential campaign. The debate was no 
longer over what course of action the U.S. would take in Southeast Asia, but how the country 
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would extricate itself from the conflict. The war was the primary issue on voters’ minds during 
the election, as a Gallup poll taken in August claimed that 52 percent of Americans believed it 
was the overriding issue in the campaign.32 Ever the consummate politician, Nixon realized that
voters wanted a definitive conclusion to the Vietnam War, and told the American public that he 
had a “secret plan” to end the conflict he would reveal once elected. 
 In articulating his views on the Vietnam War, Nixon transformed his reputation from 
Cold Warrior to peacemaker during the campaign. Prior to his second run for the presidency, 
Nixon had credentials as an ardent anti-communist. As a California representative in the 1950s, 
Nixon investigated and targeted suspected communists like Alger Hiss. When he was Vice 
President under Dwight Eisenhower, Nixon was arguably best known for his “Kitchen debate” 
with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, where 
Nixon proudly touted the virtues of capitalism over communism. Nixon was also a hawk during 
the early years of the conflict in Vietnam, having ur ed President Johnson to adopt a tougher 
approach to prosecuting the war. Indeed, in December 1965, Nixon wrote in Reader’s Digest that 
the United States must be resolute in winning the war and there should be no attempt at 
negotiation with the North Vietnamese. “There can be no substitute for victory when the 
objective is the defeat of communist aggression,” Nixon wrote.33  In 1968, however, Nixon shed 
his hawkish past and portrayed himself as the man who ould bring “peace with honor” in 
Vietnam. Nixon waged a presidential campaign that united suburbanites in the Sunbelt and 
moderate, Rockefeller Republicans in the Northeast on his claim that he would end the war in 
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Vietnam and restore “law and order” in the United States, a coded message that appealed to 
opponents of the civil rights movement.34   
 When Nixon took office in January 1969, Americans were hopeful that he would uphold 
his campaign promise to end the war and achieving a lasting peace. Antiwar liberals in Congress 
even withheld criticism of Nixon in early 1969, waiting for the President to stay true to his word 
that he would bring American troops back home. The armistice between Nixon and Congress 
was short lived, however, as the President expanded the war into Cambodia in March 1969 
through Operation Menu, a secret aerial campaign intended to disrupt communist supply routes 
from North to South Vietnam. When Operation Menu failed, Nixon then sent ground troops into 
the country, an event that Nixon made public on a televised address to the nation in May 1970. 
The announcement of the Cambodia operation propelled antiwar activists out into the streets 
again, with deadly consequences. Four students were killed and eight were wounded at Kent 
State University on May 3rd after the Ohio National Guard opened fire on peaceful student 
protesters. The shock of Kent State led to further antiwar demonstrations, as the Cambodia 
operation revitalized calls for an immediate evacuation of American troops from Southeast Asia. 
 The American intervention in Cambodia provoked furthe  criticism of the national 
security state. The Nixon administration was all too aware of the negative public perception of 
the military and defense apparatus in the early 1970s. Henry Kissinger wrote in his memoirs that 
he and the President felt confronted by an anti-defense climate that (to him) indicated the revival 
of American isolationism. Faced with the crisis of Vietnam, one that upended the Cold War 
consensus, Kissinger concluded that Americans in the early 1970s aimed to retreat from 
international affairs and divest the country of its re ponsibilities as leader of the free world. 
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Demands for defense reductions and foreign policy retrenchment were “symptomatic of the bitter 
and destructive mood of the period and of the substantial breakdown of national consensus,” 
according to Kissinger.35 “The passionate critique of the war in Vietnam spread to an attack of 
the defense establishment as a whole,” Kissinger wrote, as more Americans believed the Cold 
War military apparatus should be dismantled to pay for social programs. Intellectuals too had 
embraced the idea that the “military-industrial complex” had finally succeeded in capturing a 
“disproportionate influence on American life.” 36  
 As critiques of the military-industrial complex reached their apex in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, the defense lobby sought to wage a campaign to dispel the negative image of their 
industry and its role in perpetuating the Vietnam War. After the 1967 protest against Dow 
Chemical, the defense industry was compelled to change its image as militaristic warmongers. 
While they did not expect to convince the “Weathermn of SDS” of their viewpoint, defense 
contractors hoped to engage critics who claimed the def nse industry was an inherently 
destructive force in American life, and that “society is in the grips of the Military Industrial 
Complex.”37 In 1969, the National Defense Committee of the Nation l Association of 
Manufacturers launched a public relations campaign to overturn Americans’ negative 
perceptions of the defense industry. In a pamphlet enti led “What Eisenhower Really Said about 
the Military-Industrial Complex,” NAM argued that Eisenhower was misquoted in his 1961 
Farewell Address where he warned Americans about the threat the military-industrial complex 
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posed to American democracy.38 NAM felt that it was “ironic” that liberals and the New Left 
referenced Eisenhower in making their case against Vietnam and for spending on expensive 
weapons systems such as the ABM. While Eisenhower did warn the country about the military-
industrial complex, NAM argued that he made more statements supporting the need for a strong 
defense against the threat of communism.39  
 The makeshift public relations effort organized by the defense industry indicated just how 
ill-prepared the national security state was in facing such extensive negative criticism. During the 
early 1960s, as was the case for much of the Cold War, defense contractors focused on winning 
contracts and maintaining a close relationship with Congress and the Department of Defense. 
Executives did not think long term in their financial projections, working from contract to 
contract without applying proper attention to the politics surrounding their business.40 Defense 
companies had no coordinated infrastructure for lobbying, and in fact, prided itself on not having 
one. Up until the late 1950s, the industry saw the Pentagon and Congress on its side, and there 
existed little need to engage in hostilities with eit r the executive or the legislative branch.  
Open insubordination to the acting presidential administration and Congress would be 
consequential for contract procurement. The industry relied on the presumption that it could 
maintain seamless connections with the federal governm nt without complication 
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 The main organization that represented the defense industry in the early 1960s was the 
Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA). Formed in 1965, CODSIA was 
dedicated solely to matters of procurement. The membership of CODSIA was a list of who’s 
who in the defense business as the organization included United Aircraft, General Electric, 
Lockheed, and Texas Instruments among others. It also included organizations such as NAM and 
the National Security Industrial Association (NSIA), which contained representatives from 
defense companies throughout the country who were ardent proponents of greater military 
spending. The role of CODSIA changed, however, after th  Vietnam War. Several defense 
corporations broke with CODSIA in the late 1960s for its unwillingness to confront critics of the 
national security state, once the industry’s focus began to shift from procurement to public 
relations. Both NAM and the NSIA resigned from CODSIA in 1969 with an eye toward 
changing “the current climate of public opinion regarding national defense affairs” after 
CODSIA refused to do so. Some members of CODSIA were concerned that dropping out of the 
organization would be counterproductive. Apprehensio  about resigning from CODSIA 
stemmed from the fear that NAM would sacrifice a close relationship with the White House and 
their allies in Congress to go after anti-militarist lawmakers. These hesitations, however, were 
dismissed as insignificant to CODSIA’s defectors.41  
 Utilizing its vast financial resources, and the support of organizations like NAM and 
NSIA, the defense industry tried to sway policy makers to their side. Defense contractors 
targeted Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Defense David Packard, Assistant Secretary 
of Defense James Schlesinger, and Admiral of the Navy Elmo Zumwalt. Each one of these men 
had voiced concern over the culture of anti-militarism among the public and in Congress.  Laird 
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garnered particular attention because of his position and influence on Capitol Hill. A former 
representative from Wisconsin, Laird had close connections to many in Congress and used them 
to great advantage. Laird obtained much of what he wanted in the defense budget, but continued 
to request more. Vast sums were needed to restore American superiority, Laird argued, which he 
believed had been squandered because of the Vietnam War.42 During the early 1970s, NAM sent 
Laird letters praising his call for an increase in the defense budget to fight Soviet communism. 
Daniel Z. Henkin, an aide to Laird, even spoke at a NAM conference, flippantly claiming to 
represent the “Commander in Chief of the Military Industrial Complex.” At the conference, 
Henkin called for a federal program that would silenc  “critics aiming for the front pages of 
major newspapers,” rehabilitate the image of the military, and stress the vital contribution 
enrolled service members were making to the safety of the American people. Laird himself gave 
speeches to defense contractors keeping them abreast of administration policies. In 1970, Laird 
told executives of the electronics industry that his demand for $80 billion dollars in defense was 
an “austere, rockbottom, barebones budget.” Even so, critics assailed his defense budget. Laird 
then called for greater coordination between defense companies and the government in ensuring 
American prosperity in the face of lean times and urelenting criticism.43  
 The defense industry also looked for allies among conservative Republicans in Congress. 
In a speech delivered before defense industry executiv s at NAM’s 75th annual Congress of 
American Industry meeting, Arizona Senator and 1964 Republican candidate Barry Goldwater 
told those present at the meeting that the overwhelming condemnation of American military 
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power was “carefully timed by the critics of American defense to coincide with an 
understandable disenchantment and irritation on the part of the American public with the long, 
dirty, frustrating war in Indochina.” Goldwater said he did “not have to explain to this group the 
nature of the liberal assault which has been made over the past two years against the portions of 
American industry which contribute so materially to the American defense establishment.” He 
warned those in attendance that “the tremendous hue and cry about the so-called Military-
Industrial Complex” has further contributed to American capitulation in the face of a Soviet 
military resurgence.44 Goldwater’s colleague, South Carolina Republican Strom Thurmond 
spoke at a 1967 NAM meeting for its National Defense Committee, where was warmly 
announced as a strong supporter of the Vietnam War and “military preparedness.” NAM 
members said Thurmond had also played an important role in the 1960s denouncing the 
“muzzling of military officers in their anti-communist statements,” and was instrumental in 
“troop education programs and cold-war seminars for reservists and the public.”45  
 Denigration of the New Left and the anti-war movement also came from right-wing 
activists who had ties to the defense industry. Representing the National Security Industrial 
Conference (NSIC), Frank Barnett, warned the University of South Carolina graduating class of 
1970 about the New Left and its call for an immediate American withdrawal from Vietnam. 
Along with the internal threat of the New Left, the greatest external threat remained global 
communism. Barnett critiqued the direction of American foreign policy in the 1960s, stating that 
the United States had allocated its resources to “social inventions that range from Head Start to 
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the Peace Corps,” and had not been attentive to the Soviets, which he claimed outmatched the 
U.S. in “strategic weapons, and, by 1972, may even be ahead.”46  
 In addition to working with White House officials, conservative politicians, and 
grassroots activists, defense industry executives also took it upon themselves to change popular 
opinion through public speeches and newspaper articles. Defense executives denounced critics of 
American defense policy in the early 1970s. Edward G. Uhl, president of Fairchild Industries and 
chairman of NAM’s National Defense Committee, echoed conservative sentiments when he 
commented that the “Soviet buildup” of its military arsenal “has been completely over-balanced 
by the unpopularity of the war in South Vietnam.” The war was merely the excuse liberal doves 
needed to implement their long-term goal of reducing the size of the military, Uhl argued, as he 
was sure the left would reduce the military status of the United States to that of “a second or 
third rate nation.”47  
 Defense executives also tried to distance themselve  from involvement in the Vietnam 
War. These executives argued that the failed war in Vietnam adversely affected the prestige of 
American military power and had made the United States  weaker nation. Charles B. McCoy, 
president of the chemical manufacturer Du Pont, gave an address to the annual business meeting 
of the Manufacturing Chemists Association in 1970 were he said that the “Vietnam war is 
tearing at the whole fabric of our social and political and economic life.” After anti-war 
demonstrations increased throughout college campuses following the invasion of Cambodia, 
McCoy said he realized the extent to which Vietnam had polarized the nation. McCoy went on to 
say that the war had not only led to numerous American deaths, but endangered the health of the 
American republic. It was “hard to see how we can apply adequate resources to domestic needs, 
                                                
46 Frank L. Barnett, Commencement Address at University of South Carolina, June 6, 1970, box 66, folder 3, 
William Rusher Papers, Library of Congress, Washingto , D.C., (hereinafter cited as WRP). 
47 “An Interview with NAM’s Defense Chairman,” Series IV, Box 36, National Defense Folder, NAM papers. 
145 
 
and restore a feeling of national unity and confidence, until we reach a settlement of this conflict 
in Southeast Asia,” McCoy said. Quotes from McCoy’s address appeared in editorials in 
newspapers such as The Hartford Times and Press-Gazette of Green Bay that likewise favored 
withdrawal from Vietnam. The Daily News Record, however, noted McCoy’s address with 
disbelief, a reaction that elicited a letter from DuPont executive Samuel Lenher. Lenher 
criticized the paper for acting as if McCoy’s comments on peace in Vietnam “were surprising, 
presumably because Du Pont is thought to benefit from war-related sales.” Lenher added that his 
company would “prosper only as the country prospers, and the waste of war with its terrible 
social and economic effects is extremely costly to us, as a Company and as individuals.”48 
 Whether disavowing their image as warmongers, denouncing their left-wing critics, or 
wrapping themselves in patriotic statements, the def ns  lobby had difficulty convincing the 
public that they were a virtuous economic enterprise. Defense executives gained allies in power 
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, but not enough to overturn the culture of anti-militarism in the 
United States. As long as the conflict raged in Vietnam, defense companies had a hard time 
convincing a skeptical public they did not profit from war.  Vietnam was a cancer that ate away 
at public confidence in the military and defense structure, making the pro-war factions within the 
defense industry a besieged minority. Where the defnse industry failed in their lobbying 
campaign, other elements of the Cold War coalition c ducted their own efforts to convince 
policymakers (and the public) that the United States must maintain its overwhelming military 
power as long as the Cold War existed. 
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 “Defense is the key issue” 
 With the military—and its corporate connections—in d srepute, as well as the reigning 
foundations of Cold War foreign policy, the Nixon administration was pressured to rethink how 
the United States fought the Cold War. The antiwar movement and the New Left placed 
limitations and constraints on the actions of policymakers following Vietnam. Once in office, the 
Nixon administration operated under the perception that the American people had revolted 
against the Cold War order and longed for a new foreign policy strategy. 49 Nixon’s solution to 
dealing with these post-Vietnam constraints was through détente with the Soviet Union and 
China. As a grand strategy, détente accepted the limits placed on U.S. foreign policy due to the 
conflict in Southeast Asia, and the reality that it was impossible for the Cold War to carry on as it 
had been since the late 1940s. The main architect of détente, Henry Kissinger, avoided assigning 
value judgments to foreign regimes, as he preferred not to conduct relations with countries based 
on their internal characteristics. What mattered to Kissinger was whether countries had the best 
interests of the United States in mind, not their governing ideology, no matter who repressive or 
undemocratic. Nixon and Kissinger avoided direct intervention in the developing world, 
preferring to offer indirect assistance through arms sales and economic aid to allied countries in 
Africa and Asia.50 The increase in arms sales helped keep the defense industry in business during 
the Nixon years and circumvented the “military-industrial complex” argument prevalent in New 
Left circles, as they funded internal rather than external conflicts. Détente served domestic ends 
as well.  Détente would mute those voices on the Left who had called for a reduction in the arms 
race and better diplomatic relations with the Soviets. The goals of détente were therefore 
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threefold: to silence domestic critiques of foreign policy, impose order on the chaotic 
environment of global politics, and preserve America’s status as a superpower.51 
 The Nixon administration foresaw diplomacy with theSoviet Union and China as 
providing the basis for détente. Triangular diplomacy, the White House predicted, would widen 
the Sino-Soviet split that had its origins in the mid-1950s following the death of Joseph Stalin. 
Nixon hoped that a friendlier relationship with China and the Soviet Union would cause both 
countries to compete for aid and attention from the United States. Détente was also a possible 
path to peace in Vietnam, as Nixon and Kissinger felt it could force the communist superpowers 
to place pressure on the North Vietnamese to end the war. To achieve this, in 1969, Nixon began 
making plans to be the first President to visit the People’s Republic of China, and thereby “open” 
the country to a better economic and diplomatic relationship with the U.S. At the same time, 
Kissinger created a secret backchannel to Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to conduct 
negotiations for reducing nuclear weapons.52 These policies, the Nixon administration hoped, 
would allow the U.S. to pursue the policy of contaiment under different terms.  
 It was to no surprise of Nixon that when his grand strategy of détente was made public, it 
angered the conservative element within the Republican Party. Negotiations with the Soviet 
Union and China were anathema to conservatives’ receiv d wisdom about the reasons for the 
Cold War. The New Right failed to see the subtleties of superpower détente, and saw only 
incongruities. National Review writer James Burnham could not understand why Nixon and 
Kissinger still perceived the Soviet Union to be an enemy, but pursued negotiations with the 
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country nonetheless. To Burnham, the Nixon administration seemed schizophrenic in its 
relations with the Soviet Union. On one hand, Nixon encouraged reductions in intercontinental 
ballistics missiles (ICBMs) through SALT I, arguing that Mutual Assured Destruction (M.A.D.) 
was antiquated, and nuclear escalation and brinkmanship must come to an end. But on the other, 
the administration campaigned for an ABM whose logic was situated on the basis that the Soviet 
Union had sufficient and credible nuclear power that deterrence was still needed. Furthermore, 
Kissinger’s willingness to separate communist ideology from state behavior was evidence of 
cognitive dissonance.  Conservatives still believed that foreign policy decisions made by the 
Kremlin emanated from the doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, and Vietnam had not changed this. 
The same was true of any communist power. The Soviets w re still an expansionist empire and 
the only way to deal with them was through a show of force.53 
 But movement conservatives failed to see their views toward the Soviet Union and 
communist countries represented in the decisions of White House policy makers. Their 
disagreement with Nixon over the need for a stronger defense budget contributed to their gradual 
falling out with the President. Discontent among movement conservatives (at least among the 
leadership) toward the administration, finally came to a head in the summer of 1971. The 
President’s planned trip to China was the breaking point for conservatives. On August 10, 
National Review announced it was suspending support for Nixon, citing as causes increased 
government spending, higher inflation rates, and unchecked Soviet expansionism. Published as 
“A Declaration,” the statement singled out national defense as the issue that that pushed 
conservatives to public dissent. “And above all,” the document’s authors wrote, Nixon’s “failure 
to call public attention to the deteriorated American military position, in conventional and 
strategic arms, which deterioration, in the absence of immediate and heroic countermeasures, can 
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lead to the loss of our deterrent capability, the sat llization of friendly governments near and far, 
and all that this implies.”54 A week earlier, William Buckley published an op-ed in the New York 
Times to coincide with the National Review declaration.  Buckley’s article began by posing the 
question to fellow conservatives whether Nixon was “one of us,” a question which Buckley 
answered with typical verbosity and sanctimoniousnes . Buckley wrote that Nixon was never a 
true conservative, but a pragmatic politician who failed to possess the willingness or capability to 
repeal New Deal programs and “dismantle the welfare state.” Buckley was more critical, 
however, of Nixon’s foreign policy. Buckley warned Nixon that he was on precarious ground 
with conservatives because of his China policy. Nixon had time to prove to Buckley that he had 
not accepted the premise that the communist powers re interested in world peace. But if Nixon 
did embrace this proposition, as Buckley implied many of his fellow conservatives already 
believed, the activist right would bow out of the 1972 election.55  
 Nixon knew the suspension of conservative support for his administration was coming. In 
a meeting with Kissinger and his Chief of Staff H.R. Halderman, on July 28th, Halderman noted 
that the President was ruffled because “Bill Buckley and his troops, plus the other Human Events 
types met on Monday and decided to issue a statemen of nonsupport of the P.”56 Nixon was 
stunned that Buckley and his cohorts would go so far as to repudiate his administration.   With an 
eye toward re-election in 1972, Nixon would rest easi r if he knew he had conservatives’ 
support, realizing it played a role in his election n 1968. Nixon said this much to Buckley in 
1967 as Nixon prepared to run again for the Presidency. Referring to his loss to Pat Brown for 
governor of California, Nixon privately told Buckley, “I found out in 1962 that you can’t win an 
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election without the right wing.”57 Nixon cared enough about pressure from the right in 1971 that 
he ordered Henry Kissinger to play the role of unofficial ambassador to the activist right. Indeed, 
Kissinger often met with leading conservatives to assu ge their concerns after the August 
declaration.    
 Two days after the National Review statement was released, Kissinger personally met 
with some of its signers. Present at the meeting were Allan Ryskind and William Rusher, editors 
of Human Events and National Review respectively, and representatives from the ASC, Young 
Americans for Freedom (Y.A.F.), and the American Conservative Union (ACU). New York 
State was well-represented in the meeting, as Dan Mhoney from the New York Conservative 
Party and Bill Schneider, a defense expert and a staff member of New York's Conservative 
Senator James Buckley also attended the meeting. Kissinger wanted the meeting to remain off 
the record because he had “never spoken with this degree of candor before” and therefore 
insisted that “none of these matters can appear either directly or indirectly in print.” Kissinger 
began by reiterating what he felt were the obstacles th  administration faced. Kissinger told the 
men in the room that “this Administration came to office at the end of a period of substantial 
collapse of foreign policy theory” which resulted in “vicious isolationism” and an “extreme 
attack on general principles of authority, and in particular, on the Defense establishment—the 
military.” The Cuban Missile Crisis, Kissinger said, led to the cancellation of new weapons 
programs and a subsequent deterioration in military superiority, an argument that Kissinger knew 
would appeal to the right. “This erosion of power was compounded by a domestic crisis arising 
from the existence of the Vietnam War,” and Kissinger urged the men in the room to have 
sympathy for the President. The National Security Advisor defended SALT, played up Nixon’s 
support of the ABM, and portrayed the Congress as the real enemies of defense spending, not the 
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White House. The President has “implemented the maxi um Defense budget possible, without 
raising taxes in a[n] election year.” Nixon had toomany enemies on the left, and he could not 
afford them on the right. “This administration, gentl men, is the loneliest administration 
imaginable,” said Kissinger.58 
 But Kissinger’s passionate defense of the Administration did not win over his guests. 
“Defense is the key issue here,” said Bill Schneider. The President had to make a concerted 
effort to convince the American people that military superiority “was the sina [sic] qua non” 
issue in American politics.  If the President was willing to do this he “would chase Senator 
Proxmire up the road.” Dan Mahoney told Kissinger that Nixon was a deep disappointment, and 
was disturbed that “in the current intellectual and political context that the White House can see 
itself clear to take the minimum now on the Defense is ue.” The sole means of reversing course 
and “to turn the Establishment and the nation is with Presidential leadership,” and the President 
had thoroughly failed in this task. Stan Evans acknowledged Kissinger’s candor, but said that his 
“prior opinion still holds,” regarding Nixon’s foreign policy. Exasperated, Kissinger replied that 
conservatives were far too critical of Nixon. Kissinger concluded the meeting saying, “I just 
hope you will stop yelling at us, and start yelling at our enemies.”59 
 Unable to make headway among this group of activists, the Nixon administration courted 
more favorable right-wing Republicans. In 1971, Kissinger and Nixon zeroed in on Governor of 
California Ronald Reagan as a leading conservative they needed to win over. Nixon realized 
Reagan had substantial influence among the right, as the Governor’s name was tossed around as 
                                                
58 Memorandum of Conversation, August 12, 1971, Box 1025, Folder 32, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Richard M. 
Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, California, (hereinafter cited as RMNPL). 
59 Ibid. Despite exclusively blaming Congress for defense cuts, Nixon did take some measures to reduce the defense 
budget, but in the words of H.R. Halderman, “in theright ways.” In a meeting between Nixon, Henry Kissinger, and 
Halderman on July 23, 1971, Nixon lobbed “violent blasts at officers’ clubs, Air Force excesses, and so forth,”  and 
urged Kissinger  to “really shake the trees” of the military because “never has a country spent more fr less on 
defense than does America.” Nixon went on to say he wanted a 5 percent cut in the defense budget and a 25 percent 
cut in the intelligence budget for the coming fiscal year. See Halderman, Halderman Diaries, 330. 
152 
 
a possible presidential nominee in 1968. Reagan was an unlikely candidate to many mainstream 
Republicans in 1968, his lack of experience being his primary weakness, but Nixon knew that 
Reagan could sway the hearts and minds of dedicated onservatives. Reagan kept an amenable 
relationship with Nixon, keeping the President update  on the “conservative rebellion” toward 
his administration because of national defense.60 To further coax Reagan’s support, Nixon sent 
Reagan on diplomatic tours of Europe and Southeast Asia, knowing that the Governor wanted to 
expand his knowledge of foreign affairs. Kissinger also made Reagan privy to classified reports 
that showed progress in Vietnam and sent Reagan regula  briefings on foreign policy matters. 
Reagan’s inclusion in the memos helped Nixon keep Ragan in line as well. Rumors circulated 
in the spring of 1971 that YAF was interested in launching a Draft Reagan campaign to 
challenge Nixon for the 1972 Republican primary. When Reagan heard of the effort, he 
immediately requested YAF to stop such activities. Upset over Nixon’s policy toward Vietnam, 
YAF hoped Reagan would offer an alternative to withdrawal and Vietnamization. But Reagan 
wanted no part of this. Reagan told the National Chairman of YAF Ron Docksai, that it was his 
“privilege as a Governor to receive in-depth briefings on the war and the international situation. 
As a result, I’m in full support of the President’s Vietnamization policy.” Vietnam was handled 
ably by Nixon, Reagan said, who realized that Vietnam “fits into the gigantic chess game called 
the cold war” and had “all the facts necessary” to make informative and high-stakes decisions. If 
Docksai persisted with a Draft Reagan effort it would “only divide and destroy our chance to go 
forward.” “We cannot afford division,” warned Reagan.61   
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 Despite the attention he paid to conservative leaders, Nixon seemed to brush them off as 
inconsequential to the success of his presidency. At the July 28th meeting, Nixon expressed 
agitation but not extensive worry over the defection of conservative intellectuals. “The P is not 
too concerned” about the National Review declaration, noted Halderman at the time. Halderman 
wrote that Nixon wanted “answers communicated to [conservatives], but he makes the point that 
we don’t need to worry too much about the right-wing nuts on this.” Indeed, the Chief of Staff 
told his boss that there was no “conservative revolt” t  his administration with the exception of 
“about 300 people.”62 Nixon barked at Halderman to tell Henry Kissinger to “get off his ass” and 
speak to William F. Buckley, Jr. about the Declaration, but Buckley was the only conservative 
that mattered to Nixon, as all others were simply “doctrinaire rightists.”63 And while Nixon sent 
Reagan around to foreign countries as a spokesperson for his foreign policy, the President did not 
think highly of him. Nixon thought Reagan was “a man of limited mental capacity [who] simply 
doesn’t know what the Christ is going on in the foreign arena.” Kissinger too thought Reagan 
was “a decent guy,” but “his brains, are negligible.” The former Hollywood star was more style 
than substance as he had “an actor’s approach to foreign policy,” Kissinger told the President.64 
Nixon and Kissinger’s negative perception of Reagan m de the White House carefully regulate 
their dealings with him. Reagan’s diplomatic voyages were meticulously orchestrated by 
Kissinger who designed “a list of countries where a Reagan visit would do no harm.”65 The 
reports Reagan issued from his trips abroad were scrutinized not for their policy suggestions, but 
for their errors. Indeed, much of Reagan’s advice on foreign affairs was ignored. When Reagan 
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requested to speak to the National Press Club about being “mad as hell about the expulsion of 
Taiwan,” from the United Nations after returning from Asia in the fall of 1971, his request was 
denied. A Reagan speech on Taiwan was “not helpful in anyway,” Alexander Haig told Gordon 
Strachan of the NSC. When Reagan called Nixon to suggest that the United States remove itself 
from the U.N. as an act of protest, Nixon nervously laughed at his suggestion, called the U.N. 
vote on Taiwan regrettable, and humored Reagan by telling him he would “give some thought to 
the whole thing.”66 But when Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers r fused to cancel 
U.S. contributions to the U.N., Reagan grew incensed. Nixon decided to let U.N. ambassador 
George H.W. Bush abstains from U.N. activities for a few days, but this was merely a gesture to 
show discontent, as Nixon wanted the whole episode t  blow over as soon as possible. 
Halderman noted that Kissinger sought to calm Reagan down, and “keep [him] from jumping off 
the reservation,” as the National Security Adviser called Reagan the next day to “try to get him 
straightened out.”67 In the end, Reagan relented in his positions on the U.N. in order to maintain 
his connections to the administration. 
 The revolt against Nixon was counterproductive, as it divided rather than unified the 
political right. Not all Republicans disavowed Nixon and his policies. Right-wing senators like 
Barry Goldwater and James Buckley saw no political gain in retreating from Nixon. Goldwater 
had reservations about much of détente, including SALT, but decided to back Nixon’s trip to 
China after meeting with Kissinger, telling his supporters that “this is not 1960; it is 1972,” and  
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there was no longer a unified communist bloc.68 James Buckley had “the highest respect for the 
leaders of the conservative movement” that felt aggrieved by the Nixon administration, but said 
he was “not prepared to join them in a declaration of onsupport.” Buckley was loyal to Nixon, 
and since becoming a Senator, he claimed he “occupied a position from which I have been able 
to gain a better appreciation of the political constraints within which the President is required to 
operate.”69 Moreover, right-wing activists’ disenchantment with Nixon did not derail détente. 
After Taiwan was rejected from the United Nations, William Rusher called Nixon’s Special 
Assistant Pat Buchanan to say he had abandoned Nixon. “I am just phoning to say goodbye,” 
Rusher said. But Buchanan was not fazed. “Yeah? Where’re we going?,” Buchanan replied.70   
 What bothered Nixon more than the right’s opinion of his presidency were the political 
attitudes of the American worker. Indeed, the activist right, like the defense lobby, made little 
headway in changing the culture of anti-militarism. The “silent majority,” as Nixon dubbed 
working Americans in 1969, had more sway in the perceptions and decisions of Nixon’s political 
thinking than right-wing intellectuals. Nixon saw the future of his reelection prospects—and the 
Republican Party—in those suburban Americans disenchanted with New Deal liberalism and the 
cultural left.71 A combination of defense cuts and poor economic conditions in the 1970s gave 
Nixon the ability to reach out to Cold War workers at a time when many felt that the Democratic 
Party had abandoned their interests in their shift to anti-militarism. When the news surfaced in 
the spring of 1971 that the Lockheed Corporation verged on the precipice of bankruptcy, Nixon 
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worked to win over its workforce by offering federal protection to the company’s loans. When 
the controversy over the Lockheed loan crisis subsided, the resolution to the crisis would 
demonstrate the problems national anti-militarists confronted in trying to eliminate benefits the 
defense economy provided to local areas. 
 
Cold War Bailout 
 By 1971, the popularity of the defense establishment had suffered immensely due to the 
culture of anti-militarism. The winding down of the Vietnam War and the scrutiny of the 
military-industrial complex meant that the defense budget declined from ten percent of G.D.P. to 
seven percent. The public relations campaign by the def nse industry had failed to make 
significant inroads into the public’s and Congress’ opposition to militarism and support for 
détente. Cuts to the defense budget, however, also meant job losses to employees in the defense 
industry, as those in the industry worried that the end of the Vietnam conflict “contributed to a 
slowing of the economy.”  Since 1968, 2.3 million overall jobs were cut in the defense industries, 
with the private workforce in defense declining from 3.6 million to 2.3 million in three years.72 
In addition to the drop in employment due to the end of the Vietnam War, corporations had 
begun to outsource defense jobs in the late 1960s, hastening the process of deindustrialization in 
the United States. While Massachusetts Democratic senator Ted Kennedy led efforts in Congress 
to pass legislation to aid out-of-work engineers and scientists employed in the technology fields, 
many feared it would only provide short-term assistance. Officials in Washington, D.C. knew 
that the elimination of defense programs such as the SST affected the political allegiances of “so 
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many scientists and engineers out of work in key elctoral states like California, Florida and 
Texas,” which would then influence the coming election year.73  
 One of the states hit hardest by the drop in the def nse budget was California. Governor 
Ronald Reagan was desperate for the federal government to maintain the solvency of the 
aerospace industry in the area, which had remade the region after World War II by spurring high-
paying jobs, upper-class suburbs, and a significant b se of tax revenue for the state. While 
Reagan professed to be committed to the free-market, his anti-statist ideology was qualified by 
his larger need to keep defense jobs in his state. Nixon advisor Harry Dent noted that Reagan in 
1970 had “a very strong desire to personally talk to the President about his interest in another Air 
Force contract for California,” and had tried repeatedly to contact the President over “getting the 
Freedom-Fighter contract for Northrop Aviation in California.”74 Reagan also hoped to get the 
B-1 bomber contract—even while an organization entitl d the National Campaign to Stop the B-
1 Bomber mounted a campaign to squash it.  When entreaties to Nixon did not make sufficient 
headway, Reagan wrote to Kissinger in June reiteratng his plea for additional defense contracts. 
Without the contract for Northrop Aviation, Reagan feared cuts to businesses and job losses, 
including his own as governor. “Without this ‘building block’ seven plants in the L.A.-Long 
Beach area will close,” Reagan warned, as Southern California contained “35% of the states [sic] 
manufacturing and our unemployment is already far above the national average.” Reagan 
emphasized that “the socio-economic elements (and for that matter the political) weigh heavily 
in Californias [sic] favor.” Referring to the self-immolation of Buddhist monks in protest of the 
Vietnam War, Reagan crudely joked that if California d d not receive a fresh infusion of money 
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from the Pentagon, “it isn’t that important—but I have a yellow Monks robe and a can of 
gasoline if it doesn’t go through.”75 
  Unemployment in the defense industry provided a backdrop to the heated debates over 
the proposal to bailout the Lockheed Corporation in 1971. Founded in 1912 and based in 
Burbank, California, Lockheed had been a major employer and industrial force in Southern 
California since World War II. In the 1960s, however, Lockheed had mismanaged government 
funds and overspent on expensive and unwarranted def nse projects. Among these programs 
were the C5-A plane and the L-1011 Tri-Star airline, a civilian aircraft whose costs per plane 
engine had doubled. Lockheed had partnered with the British company Rolls-Royce in building 
the L-1011 engine, but Rolls Royce went bankrupt in February 1971, leaving Lockheed holding 
the deficit for the engines. In response, the company l id off 9,200 employees working on the L-
1011. By May 1971, the banks reeling from the fallout f Lockheed’s bad investments promised 
they would not allocate additional credit to the company if the federal government did not 
guarantee the funds. If the government refused to back illions in loans that Lockheed wanted to 
keep production of the L-1011 (and the company) goin , it was expected that Lockheed would 
default, declare bankruptcy, and liquidate its operations, leaving its 90,000 workers across the 
country unemployed.76 
 Few were more concerned with the future of Lockheed than Richard Nixon. Unlike the 
controversy over the SST, the C5-A, or the ABM, the discussion over the Lockheed loan 
guarantee was not about whether to fund a potentially unnecessary project, but to save a large 
corporation that employed tens of thousands. The debate over the Lockheed bailout centered on 
whether to save preexisting jobs, not creating new ones—a far more heated topic. At a time when 
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the United States had witnessed the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, was experiencing 
increased competition from overseas markets, and rising nflation and unemployment rates, the 
Nixon administration believed it could not afford to allow an additional economic catastrophe, 
and rushed to save Lockheed.77 Lockheed was not any ordinary company, Nixon said, but one of 
the largest employers in the defense industry, and “o e of the Nation’s great companies.” 
Lockheed offered “an enormous employment lift to this part of the country,” and Nixon was 
determined  “to see to it that southern California—after taking the disappointment of not getting 
the SST, which would, of course, have brought many, many jobs to this part of the country—that 
California does not have the additional jolt of losing Lockheed.”78 
 The chief proponent of the bailout in the House of Representatives was California 
Representative Barry Goldwater Jr., the son of the conservative icon. Goldwater, Jr. was an 
unequivocal supporter of the loan guarantees, as Lockheed’s headquarters was in his district. In 
the Senate, the conservative Republican from Texas John Tower emerged as the main advocate 
of the bailout. In the abstract, both Tower and Goldwater, Jr. were free-market, anti-regulation 
conservatives who normally fumed at the prospect of government intervention in the economy. 
But the Cold War defense economy did not enter into their concept of the free-market. In the 
minds of Goldwater and Tower, Lockheed and similar companies were exceptions to the laissez-
faire rule. 
 While the supporters of the bailout were numerable, th  anti-loan guarantee forces were 
just as large, and thought to be insurmountable. Anti-militarists in Congress, New Left activists, 
and Lockheed’s competitors were staunchly opposed to the loan guarantees, even while noting 
that the employment situation in the defense industry was a difficult one. Senator William 
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Proxmire resumed the role he maintained in the SST and C5-A battle as chief deficit hawk in the 
Senate. Joining Proxmire and the Democrats were conservative senators like James Buckley and 
Barry Goldwater, Sr., who stood stalwart against the Lockheed bailout citing what they believed 
was its unconstitutional interference in the free market. Also in the anti-bailout mix were 
representatives from Rockwell, Boeing, and General Electric. All three lobbied to defeat the loan 
guarantees knowing it would hurt a strong competitor in the aerospace industry. Indeed, the 
Nixon administration had difficulty finding another aerospace company to support the loan 
guarantees during the summer of 1971.79 
 Once the legislation was put forward, California residents engaged in a massive media 
effort to convince Congress to pass it. As Time magazine noted, white-collar and blue-collar 
employees of the aerospace industry served “as amateur lobbyists” in pressing for the legislation, 
some of whom had been out of work because of the SST vote. Defense workers published ads in 
newspapers and urged Americans to boycott Wisconsin beer and cheese as an affront to 
Proxmire. Members of the International Association of Machinists (IAM) launched a lobbying 
campaign that would see over 500,000 letters written to members of Congress and eventually 
spend $55,000 to support the bailout.80  
 Grassroots supporters of the Lockheed bailout also cited national security and the Cold 
War as the reasons for the federal government to step in and rescue the company.  The city of 
Campbell, California also adopted a resolution on behalf of the proposed loan guarantees. 
Campbell was “one of fifteen incorporated cities in Santa Clara County which is the home of 
Lockheed,” and the company should be saved as the “concentration of development skill, 
technology and scientific talent…must be considered of fundamental importance to both this 
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nation and to the entire Free World.” Keeping Lockheed afloat meant not only saving jobs, local 
tax revenues, and a suburban community whose future rest d on the company’s success, but 
maintaining the security of the United States and its allies.81 The Marietta Daily Journal likewise 
urged citizens of Cobb County, Georgia to support the proposed federal loan guarantee prevent 
the Lockheed Corporation from going bankrupt. The article requested that residents “come into 
any of the three Cobb Federal offices…and sign the resolution to tell Congress and the nation 
Cobb County is behind Lockheed.” County members were also encouraged to write letters to 
their congressional representatives and to relevant committee members to convince them that 
Lockheed needed to stay in business because “Lockheed-G orgia has been a business citizen of 
Cobb County for 20 years, contributing substantially to our economy.” Not only was Lockheed 
vital to keeping skilled, middle-class jobs in suburban Georgia, but the company served the 
interests of American foreign policy in keeping thenation safe from communism. Indeed, the 
loss of Lockheed would mean “irreparable harm” to the state of U.S. “National security.”82   
 Facing pressure from their constituents, Governor Ronald Reagan and his Lieutenant 
governor Ed Reinecke were concerned that the loan gu rantee would not make it through 
Congress. When the loan guarantee was up for debate in th  House, Reinecke asked for a 
meeting with Nixon over the layoffs in the aerospace industry and the possible “re-employment 
of California engineers and scientists.” Nixon refused to meet with Reinecke, offering the excuse 
that his schedule did not accommodate his request, but Chapin reassured Reinecke that Nixon 
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shared his concerns over aerospace unemployment in the state.83 Ever the political opportunist, 
Nixon sought to use the Lockheed crisis to gain favor from the company’s workers and the labor 
unions that represented them. Deputy Assistant to the President Dwight L. Chapin wrote to 
Halderman that because “the Administration is on the line regarding this loan, we might as well 
milk it for what it is worth in Southern California.” Hoping to add additional members to 
Nixon’s Republican “New Majority,” Chapin proposed that the President, “drive up to Los 
Angeles via the Freeway and stop at one of the Aerospace plants.” Nixon should then engage in 
conversation with the workers and “assure them that he was going to see that they keep their jobs 
and that their friends are rehired.”84 
 The fight over the Lockheed bailout ensued over th course of the summer and pitted 
members of Congress against one another. Congress heard testimony by Lockheed CEO Daniel 
Haughton that the loan guarantees were needed to employ the over 30,000 workers “in 35 states” 
working on the L-1011, figures which included the various subcontractors working on the plane. 
Democrat Alan Cranston, like he did over the C5-A controversy, defended Lockheed for 
responding to the “call to arms to help equip the nation for national defense,” saying that the 
United States relied on the weapons Lockheed built d ring the Cold War, “for national defense 
and security.” Cranston’s anti-militarist colleagues argued that monies were better spent on 
public infrastructure projects, and that by passing the bailout legislation, the government would 
be funding Lockheed’s irresponsibility. The pro and anti-bailout factions continued to war with 
                                                
83 Letter to Edward Reinecke from Dwight L. Chapin, July 15, 1971,White House Central Files—Subject Files—
Business/Economics, Box 36 Ex B E 4-1 Aerospace [1971-1974], RMNPL; Memorandum for Dwight Chapin from 
Stephen Bull, July 12, 1971, White House Central Files—Subject Files—Business/Economics, Box 36 Ex B E 4-1 
Aerospace [1971-1974], RMNPL. 
84 Memorandum for H.R. Halderman from Dwight L. Chapin, July 7, 1971, White House Central Files—Subject  
Files—Business/Economics, Box 36 Ex B E 4-1 Aerospace [1971-1974], RNL. For Nixon’s “southern strategy” and 
efforts toward building a New Majority see, Kevin Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle: 
Arlington House, 1969). 
163 
 
one another throughout June. By the end of July, there was still no clear sign that the legislation 
would pass.85  
 After heated debate and compromise, the House passd the legislation on the bailout, 
after the amount of the loan guarantees was reduced to $250 million dollars. The Senate then 
finally agreed to vote on the legislation on August 2, 1971. Nixon dedicated hours of his day 
before the Senate vote to obtain last minute support for the loan guarantee, telling potential 
converts that the legislation was crucial to his presidency. Nixon called Republicans Barry 
Goldwater, Sr., Caleb Boggs, Carl Curtis, and Georg Aiken to see if he could sway them to his 
side, claiming he had spoke to Reagan who was anxious for Congress to approve the bailout, and 
that if it were defeated, Republicans’ chances in California the following presidential election 
were imperiled. Nixon recited this argument to the four senators, stating that only the 
unemployment number in Washington rivaled the figure of 9 percent unemployment in 
California, and with “the SST being knocked out,” a failure to pass the loan guarantees would 
adversely affect “the situation of ’72.” Nixon had limited success in convincing the 
Congressmen. Goldwater refused to budge, saying the issu  was a “matter of principle.” If the 
federal government guaranteed loans “for Lockheed, w ’re going to have to do it for everybody,” 
Goldwater said. Aiken and Curtis were noncommittal. Curtis said he would “see what [he] can 
do” for Lockheed, while Aiken said there was “hardly anyone up our way in the Northeast...that 
wants it,” and would receive federal help from the legislation. If it was not discriminatory and 
encompassed the entire defense industry, Aiken would support it, but not if it benefited 
Lockheed alone. “I’ve got five G.E. plants within a stone’s throw of me,” which Aiken implied 
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would also like to receive federal assistance. Hoping it would seal Aiken’s vote, Nixon told the 
Senator to “let me know whenever we can do something” for those plants in his state.86  
 Aiken balked in supporting the bill, but his vote was not needed. The legislation passed in 
the Senate by one vote and Lockheed received the $250 million in loans backed by the federal 
government. Both its liberal and conservative opponents were wounded, as Proxmire told James 
Buckley that the “loan guarantee loss was a heartbreaker,” but thought “the razor-thin margin of 
one vote makes it clear that this should be no easy, quick precedent in the future.”87 But the 
Lockheed bailout did set a precedent in the defense communities it affected. The passage of the 
loan guarantees saved Lockheed but hurt its workers. L ss than half of Lockheed’s workforce 
affected by the layoffs in February returned to work. The same unemployed workers who sided 
with Lockheed in support of the bailout legislation therefore still found themselves without a job. 
Indeed, unemployment continued to plague Southern California and much of the Gunbelt. After 
the Senate vote, the Nixon administration still wondered how “to absorb the 2 million people that 
we’ve released from the defense industries.”88  
 Seven months after the loan guarantees were approved, Goldwater Jr. wrote to Nixon 
advisor Clark Macgregor that residents of southern California continued to express unease “with 
the status of the aerospace/defense industry employent situation.” Goldwater Jr. acknowledged 
that Nixon had helped defense workers in his district in the past, but he now said that it was 
simply not enough and his help was not received well by voters. “My constituents see their taxes 
rise, and at the same time, watch the mounting unemploy ent problem among their families and 
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friends. The President’s efforts on the Lockheed loan guarantee are not forgotten, but more needs 
to be done,” Goldwater wrote.89 Ted Antonich, a photography studio owner from Canoga Park, 
California, wrote to Goldwater saying this much. Antonich was not a conservative ideologue. 
Antonich favored a more stringent clamp down on crime and drug use in California, but 
supported Nixon’s China visit and sought the governme t’s help in limiting inflation through 
wage and price controls. But the most important local issue to him was national defense and 
federal spending in the aerospace industry. “What tis valley and state needs are Aerospace and 
National defense contracts which will put people to work,” Antonich wrote. The high 
unemployment levels in the defense industry, which affected the entire region of Southern 
California, translated to a loss of revenue for Antonich’s business. “In fact if something doesn’t 
happen soon to boost the employment situation I’ll either have to go bankrupt or go on welfare, 
neither of which I want to do,” Antonich said. “There must be some way to put people to work 
so that we can hold our heads up again and look the landlord in the eye as well as our other 
creditors, which I can’t do now.” Antonich concluded his letter demanding Goldwater to “get 
your ass in gear and do something about it.”90 
 In hindsight, the loan guarantees were a short-term r sponse that disproportionately 
benefited company executives. Donald Douglas, Sr., chairman of McDonnell Douglas deviated 
from the bloc of defense companies against the bailout to offer his full support to Lockheed. To 
Douglas, Lockheed deserved the federal government’s help because he felt the company faced 
hard times due to the “unreasonable wage demands from labor unions that have forced and are 
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forcing aerospace companies out of business.” 91 The resolution of the Lockheed crisis gave 
Douglas and his colleagues the opportunity to limit the power of labor, which they felt was the 
real problem, not careless spending. In January 1972, Phase II of Nixon’s New Economic 
Program, part of the President’s response to rising inflation rates, allowed the appointed federal 
Pay Board to cap wage increases in the aerospace industry at 8.3 percent, the figure executives 
had wanted, rather than the 12 percent that labor wrestled out of the early negotiations with 
employers. Lockheed employee Robert Englander, who ran the company’s research laboratory, 
best summed up the feelings of the company’s workers when he said, “The Nixon Pay Board has 
hurt my pocketbook. First they cut my wages 17 cents from last year’s raise and now they are 
dragging their feet in approving our raises for this year. Meanwhile prices keep going up and 
interest rates remain sky high.”92 These reductions in workers’ pay came at the same time 
Lockheed executives enriched themselves with pension increases. To some Americans, it 
appeared that the largest beneficiaries of the loan guarantees were Lockheed executives and the 
bankers who financed the corporation’s malfeasance. Hal Troeger from Grand Marais, Michigan 
complained to the Chicago Tribune about “the parade of bankers now pleading the Lockheed 
cause before congressional committees,” as he pondered “if their concern is jobs for aircraft 
workers or jobs for bankers.”93  
 The government’s decision to back Lockheed’s loans ultimately angered Americans who 
believed the federal state was operating against their interests. Indeed, the Lockheed bailout 
created fissures within the electorate later exploited by Republican political candidates. Defense 
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communities in Long Island, New York and Seattle, Washington, who had also felt the financial 
pinch of post-Vietnam cutbacks, felt the loan guarantees were unfair to exclude other defense 
workers. In Farmingdale, N.Y., the home of Grumman, the impact was felt the hardest. Daniel J. 
D’Addario, a Farmingdale subcontractor that depended on business from Grumman, believed the 
economic downturn in his community was a consequence of the federal government turning its 
back on the Cold War. Long Islanders like D’Addario concluded that anti-Vietnam liberals were 
the reason why the American dream promised to suburbanites was evaporating in the early 
1970s, not Nixon’s policies. “The elected officials have chosen to be expedient, hacking at the 
defense budget—not welfare where there are 14-million votes,” he said. D’Addario saw both his 
output and workforce cut in half. In Seattle, home of Boeing, unemployment climbed to 15 
percent, while Nixon denied the city additional federal funds for anti-poverty programs, forcing 
residents to rely on local charities and foreign aid for feeding the hungry. After Japan shipped 
one thousand pounds of rice and other foodstuffs to eed unemployed aerospace workers in the 
city, Democratic Senator Warren Magnuson—who had supported aid to Lockheed in June before 
voting against the loan guarantees in August—exclaimed, “This administration can see great 
humanity in providing a $250 million loan for a hungry Lockheed Corp., but can’t see spending 
another dime on hungry human beings.”94  
 Even with sizeable criticism of the military-industrial complex in the early 1970s, the 
Lockheed Loan crisis exposed the lasting grip the Cold War economy still had on Americans 
who derived economic benefits from the national security state. Lobbying by the defense 
industry and right-wing activism on behalf of greater defense spending defused but did not 
obstruct the political climate hostile to the military-industrial complex. It took a broader set of 
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interests and actors to bring anti-militarism in Congress to a grinding halt. The bailout provoked 
the full weight of the Cold War coalition as executives from Lockheed, their workers, labor 
unions, community activists, and political representatives from California and other states where 
Lockheed plants and headquarters were located, collectively pressured Congress to back the 
loans. The battle over the bailout was divisive, but interests ultimately trumped principles.  
Ideological opposition to anti-militarism had limits; the political economy of the Cold War 
revealed this in very stark terms.  Indeed, the outcome of the Lockheed bailout indicated the 
persistence of the national security state—and its economic connections—in the face of its 
strongest challenge to date. 
 
Conclusion 
 Despite the failure of the Lockheed bailout to achieve its intended results—and 
unemployment, deindustrialization, and globalization eroding the fortunes of labor in the early 
1970s—Nixon did not receive much blame. Nixon and the Republican Party emerged from the 
Lockheed crisis relatively unscathed. Time magazine stated that Nixon had “brought joy to 
Burbank California” through the loan guarantee legislat on, and that so far, the lagging economy 
did not reflect poorly on Nixon’s reelection bid. Taking the pulse of the nation in 1971, political 
editor Norton Kay wrote that in terms of how the public discusses politics, Nixon “is seldom 
blamed or mentioned. People talk about government as an abstraction rather than about Nixon as 
a person. They seem disillusioned with the System rathe  than with a party or an individual.” It 
was not Nixon, but the “government” that was the enmy.95  
 Moreover, the Lockheed bailout exposed the limitations faced by anti-militarists and anti-
statist ideologues in making federal policy. The combination of a pro-growth and national 
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security discourse offered enough weight to counteract anti-militarism and anti-statism in 
Congress. The unlikely bloc of anti-militarist Democrats and free-market conservatives upset 
over the intrusiveness of the federal government in market functions, failed in their challenge to 
the national security state.  Figures on Capital Hill found that governing from the basis of 
ideology was difficult when faced with the structure of federal government and its vested 
interests. As the country crawled further into the economic doldrums of the 1970s, anti-
militarists and anti-statists in power abandoned their respective ideologies to save the jobs and 
federal benefits militarization provided to their constituents.  While Cold War workers were able 
to pressure their political representatives to support legislation like the Lockheed loan 
guarantees, their power was limited in strengthening the social compact between labor and the 
state.  Victims of the international dynamics of the Cold War, defense workers rallied to save 
their jobs in the summer of 1971 only to resume the same struggle throughout the 1970’s and 
1980’s, once plant closures and job losses became endemic to their industry.  
 By 1972, America’s future was in doubt both at home and abroad. Fissures between 
Democrats over foreign policy, structural changes in the Cold War economy, a continued war in 
Vietnam, and the instability of détente coalesced into a volatile poison to which the anti-
militarists had no antidote.  These issues spelled disaster on the horizon to the Cold War 
communities. Defense workers regularly feared they would lose their jobs in the 1970s—while 
inflation eroded their earnings. These conditions left Cold War workers feeling subject to forces 
that were seemingly beyond their control. The precarious condition of the Cold War economy 
sent many of its dependents to go searching for political figures who promised to keep the spigot 
of federal defense dollars flowing to their communities, even though the international and 
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Chapter Four: Making Foreign Policy at the Grassroots
 
 
 On June 28, 1976, Ronald Reagan wrote to Southern Chairmen’s Association member 
Clark Reed to explain his stance on the issues affecting his challenge to incumbent President 
Gerald Ford. What at first looked to be a hopeless cause for Reagan was shaping up to be a battle 
that the former California governor could win. Reagan told Reed he opposed mandatory school 
busing (which he said should be settled by “local communities”), a national health insurance 
program, and the Humphrey-Hawkins bill. Reagan alsotook the opportunity to take stock of how 
his campaign had evolved since the previous November, noting that the months of “campaigning 
has convinced me as well of something I didn’t know when I began: the American people are 
ready to halt the retreat of the last several years that has gone under the name of detente.” Public 
opposition to détente—and more broadly, Ford’s foreign policy—jumpstarted Reagan’s 
campaign after defeats in a number of early primary elections.  Reagan did not intend to make 
foreign affairs the cornerstone of his candidacy, but refocused his attention to the Cold War after 
he found audiences responded enthusiastically to his call for expanding America’s global reach 
to fight communism. Americans wanted to refight the Cold War, Reagan concluded, as they had 
demonstrated their belief that the “best guarantee for peace—the guarantee our Soviet 
adversaries understand—is military strength.”1 
 As Reagan hinted in his letter, grassroots activism in 1976 provided the context for his 
campaign’s focus on national defense and foreign affairs. These grassroots activists were a 
diverse group. Eastern European immigrants upset over the Helsinki Accords and the Strategic 
Arms Limitations Treaties (SALT), defense workers and military personnel who lost their jobs to 
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budget cutbacks, anti-Castro Cuban-Americans, and Southern Democrats angered over American 
involvement in Southern Africa, all gravitated toward Reagan in 1976 to expand American 
military might. This anti-détente coalition feared the repercussions these events would have to 
American military power at a time when the United States appeared to be losing its superpower 
credibility at home and abroad. 
 While recent historians have noted that the recruiting of new groups of Americans within 
the 1970s Republican coalition propelled Reagan to power in 1980, partisan mobilization alone 
did not make made Reagan’s campaign. 2 Structural changes in the 1970s enabled grassroots 
agency, influencing partisan politics and the domestic dimensions of the Cold War. The end of 
the Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and the decline of the American economy created a 
heady and combustive political and cultural atmosphere in the United States that formed the 
context for foreign policy debates in the mid-1970s. Reagan’s supporters also exploited changes 
to campaign finance law and tectonic shifts in American electoral politics (particularly the 
increasing advantage special interests and activists exerted over the party system), creating the 
rightward shift in U.S. foreign policy. 3 
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 The remaking of the American political system in the 1970s affected public attitudes 
toward U.S. foreign policy on a national, as well as local, level, and these changing attitudes 
collided during the 1976 Republican primary. The various factors that created the conditions for 
a more hawkish approach to foreign policy making in the 1970s in turn shaped Reagan’s first run 
for the presidency. Voters’ distrust of détente, and their general interest in adopting more hard-
line national defense policies, convinced the former California governor that the country would 
embrace an interventionist, aggressive, and uncomprising foreign policy agenda were he 
elected.  Reagan promulgated a Manichean anti-communist ideology throughout much of his life, 
but was restrained on his critique of American foreign policy during the early months of the 
primary election. He took a cautious stance against détente throughout 1975, stating that he was 
not opposed to détente in principle, but to détente as conceived, practiced, and advocated by 
President Ford.  Reagan even promoted the policy goals of détente as an envoy to Europe and 
Asia during the years of the Nixon administration. But after winning Sunbelt states like North 
Carolina and Texas on a more hard-line foreign policy stance, Reagan was able to capture voters 
in other areas of the country, expanding the reach of t e anti-détente coalition. 
 Rather than viewing Reagan’s unequivocal opposition to détente in 1976 as a forgone 
conclusion, this chapter suggests his foreign policy agenda changed over time, due to increasing 
public criticism over American relations with the Soviet Union and communist superpowers 
within American political culture. Only after Reagan was convinced that voters had repudiated 
détente did he commit to a hard-line foreign policy. While Reagan was a conservative ideologue, 
he was also a politician willing to modify his political agenda to attract and maintain public 
support. As anti-militarists assumed greater prominence in the Democratic Party, the politics of 
the Cold War garnered new constituencies for Reagan nd other Republicans in 1976, including 
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Democratic voters in the Northwest, Midwest, and the South who relied upon the defense 
industry which the Democrats wanted to scale back. National defense and foreign policy matters 
transcended party lines and sectional differences, solidifying the conservative base of the 
Republican Party, but also attracting moderate voters to Reagan’s campaign and his vision for 
the country, thus enabling the political realignment of the 1970s to take shape. As the political 
climate changed to favor Reagan’s hawkish policies, so did Reagan. 
 Indeed, Reagan drew constituencies away from the Democratic Party in areas where 
national defense issues and the Cold War economy shaped local politics. As détente threatened 
the financial stability of Cold War communities that voted for Democrats prior to 1972, these 
communities began to lean Republican once the Democratic Party abandoned Cold War 
liberalism. While anti-militarist Democrats continued to represent Cold War communities in the 
1970s, they frequently modulated their opposition to a large defense budget with support for 
defense programs that benefited their constituents, leading to ambivalence between Cold War 
workers and frustration among the anti-militarist public. Moreover, local communities dependent 
upon the Cold War witnessed two interrelated factors hat scared them in the 1970s: a drop in the 
defense budget and economic decline. Post-Vietnam De ocrats offered long-term conversion to 
civilian work to replace the defense economy, but these proposals had little appeal to workers 
who saw their job security disappear in the early 1970s. As defense plants and military bases 
closed due to the resolution to the Vietnam War, Cold War communities argued that defense 
employment was needed immediately to ameliorate the conomic crisis. Conversion would have 
to wait.   
 The collapse of the Democratic Party after George McGovern’s presidential campaign in 
1972 was also a catalyst for the Democratic decline in Cold War communities. McGovern’s 
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failure to adequately address how the demilitarization of the Cold War could be accomplished 
without massive job layoffs—a topic he covered with great eloquence in his early Senate 
career—meant defense industry employees and union bosses that represented them did not 
openly support the presidential candidate in 1972. After McGovern lost the election, the 
Democratic Party splintered into various constituenci s. The New Deal coalition broke down on 
class lines, as the cultural left and working-class were perceived to be at ideological odds with 
one another. These fissures contributed to the creation of what political scientist Bruce Miroff 
has called an “identity crisis” within the Democratic Party.4  
 The diverse political coalition that changed Reagan’s campaign strategy in 1976 reflected 
the breakdown of U.S.-Soviet détente well before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, 
making further negotiations between the U.S. and Soviet Union difficult. Without widespread 
public legitimacy, future diplomatic agreements between the United States and communist 
powers were elusive.5  But Reagan’s 1976 primary campaign also offers insight into the 
limitations and obstacles faced by American conservatives in the 1970s. As historians Meg 
Jacobs and Julian Zelizer have shown, Reagan’s appro ch to governing—his designs for 
deregulation, reducing taxes, limiting social welfare benefits—were not always well received by 
the public in the 1980s.6 The limits of Reagan’s conservative ideology, however, were on full 
display well before his presidency. Reagan was confronted in 1976 with the fact that Americans 
liked the New Deal and Great Society programs that conservatives wanted to cut. Americans 
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favored a reduction in the size of the federal government as long as it did not threaten programs 
from which they benefited. Part of the story of Reagan’s rise to the presidency is how national 
defense and foreign policy allowed Reagan and his supporters to respond to this disconnect 
between the public’s reliance on federal programs and their antagonism toward big-government. 
National defense politics offered a solution to resolving this dilemma.  
    
The Democratic Party and the Transformation of Cold War Politics 
 President Richard Nixon finally aimed to realize his goal of creating a Republican “New 
Majority” as he prepared to run for re-election in 1972.  Nixon hoped to wed blue-collar labor, 
blacks, and white ethnic groups to his base of white suburbanites that got him elected in 1968, 
thus splintering the traditional Democratic coalition. Standing in his way was South Dakota 
Democratic Senator George S. McGovern. A dark-horse contender, McGovern was thought to be 
too far to the left of his party to be elected. Indee , few political pundits gave McGovern more 
than cursory attention in the early months of the race, as the Senator was given a 200-to-1 chance 
to win the nomination.7 McGovern overcame these odds by expertly tapping into the culture of 
anti-militarism that pervaded the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s. McGovern’s 
anti-Vietnam background quickly distinguished him from the field of leading Democratic 
candidates including Edmund Muskie, Hubert Humphrey, and Henry “Scoop” Jackson. Jackson 
in particular experienced a barrage of attacks from his Washington state constituents over 
Vietnam. Since the Americanization of the war in 1965, Washingtonians urged Jackson to renege 
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on his support for the war, arguing that the United States could not rely solely on its military 
power to remedy global conflicts.8 
 In addition to the predominance of antiwar politics within the Party, McGovern rose to 
the front of the Democratic pack by taking advantage of new delegate rules instituted by the 
Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection, m re popularly known as the 
McGovern-Fraser commission. Created in 1968 following the Democratic National Convention 
in Chicago, and headed by McGovern and Democratic representative Donald Fraser of 
Minnesota, the McGovern-Fraser commission did nothig short of remake the structure of the 
Democratic Party. The purpose of the commission was to unite the reformers and regulars within 
the Democratic Party, making it more inclusive of new constituents while redistributing power 
away from the party elites (labor leaders, senior Cngressmen, and state bosses) who dominated 
the procedures for selecting the party’s presidential candidate. In doing so, the McGovern-Fraser 
commission abolished rules and regulations that placed restrictions on public influence on 
primary elections, including the selection and compsition of delegates.  The McGovern-Fraser 
commission also embraced the civil rights revolutions f the 1960s and mandated that delegates 
consist of minorities, women, and young people relative to their state populations.9  Indeed, 
McGovern’s core supporters were not the Democratic elites who dominated conventions in the 
past, but young activists assembled from the antiwar left. Students, civil rights figures, women’s 
liberationists, and members of Ralph Nader’s consumer ovement (“Nader’s Raiders”) 
coalesced around the candidate, attracted to his antiwar position and his detachment from the 
Democratic Party machine. The ratification of the tw nty-sixth amendment in 1971, which 
                                                
8 Letter to Henry Jackson, December 21, 1965, Accession 3560-4, Box 161, folder 17, Henry M. Jackson Papers, 
Special Collections Library, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington; Letter to Henry Jackson, October 15, 
1969, Accession 3560-4, Box 184, folder 1, HMJP. 
9 For the impact of the McGovern-Fraser reforms, see Miroff, The Liberals’ Moment, 19-23. 
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lowered the minimum voting age to 18, also helped bring young voters to McGovern.  The 
administrative composition of the McGovern campaign was therefore unprecedented in terms of 
its age, racial and gender diversity. While tension existed between the activists and McGovern, 
this conglomeration of left-wing support supplanted the need for the Democratic candidate to 
cater to labor bosses and the machine politics of the 1960s associated with men like Chicago 
mayor Richard Daley—who was tossed from the convention floor. By July, McGovern had 
sealed the Democratic nomination, shocking the politica  punditry and the party regulars.  
 The surprise success of the McGovern campaign repres nted the political apotheosis of 
the antiwar movement. The transformation of American politics and the revolution in the 
Democratic Party came at a price, however, as McGovern’s nomination opened fissures within 
the Party. These rifts were not entirely McGovern’s fault. Cold War liberals and Southern 
Democrats were horrified by McGovern’s anti-militarst agenda. Instead of rallying to 
McGovern’s side after he received the nomination, his former opponents preferred to watch his 
candidacy implode. Henry Jackson incorrectly portrayed McGovern as being in favor of 
“Amnesty, Acid [and] Abortion,” and when he won the nomination, Jackson gave him an 
endorsement that was less than enthusiastic.10 Labor unions such as the American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) had little respect for McGovern either. 
They despised his opposition to the Vietnam War and his role in party reforms. They also hated 
McGovern’s call for massive defense cuts.  Cutting he defense budget was a priority for 
McGovern, one that was a close second to ending the Vietnam War. The Nixon campaign noted 
there was “strong support for the idea that we need to spend a large portion of our recourses on 
our own domestic problems” and a significant number “of voters are in favor of cutting the 
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defense budget.” Even though national defense was low on the list of voters’ priorities, 
McGovern made it a salient topic of discussion.11 McGovern proposed cutting nearly 87 billion 
dollars from the defense budget in 1972 and transferring the monies saved to social welfare 
programs.12 Dismantling the Cold War state angered the AFL-CIO who since the 1940s believed 
that increases in defense spending not only preventd the spread of communism but provided 
economic security to American workers.13 After the July convention, McGovern faced his own 
insurgency in the form of AFL-CIO President George M any.  
 More problematic for McGovern was his difficulty relating to the traditional constituency 
of the Democratic Party and postwar liberalism: union workers. McGovern’s anti-militarism was 
more a liability than strength in winning skilled defense labor over to his side. McGovern saw 
his glowing pro-labor record in the Senate overshadowed by the difficulties he faced in 
explaining how he would transition the defense economy to peacetime status. Talk of 
demilitarizing the Cold War was not merely election year posturing on the part of McGovern; he 
cared deeply about reducing the size of the military-industrial complex. Since his election to the 
Senate in 1962, McGovern was a leading voice for defense cuts on Capitol Hill and curtailing 
military expenditures in favor of spending on domestic programs. Shortly after taking office, he 
proposed a National Economic Conversion Commission that would divert workers in defense to 
peacetime jobs. Under McGovern’s plan, scientists and engineers in defense would be 
reemployed to serve civilian purposes including working on solutions to “water pollution, air 
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pollution” and building public works projects.14 Contrary to his anti-business image, McGovern 
thought defense companies should receive government funds to aid them in the transition 
process. “I believe the Federal Government has a clear obligation to these companies, 
communities, and individuals that have become dependent on our defense budget for their 
income, and that we must create the necessary governmental machinery to prevent changes in 
our Defense Establishment from resulting in an inevitable loss of employment and income,” 
McGovern said in 1964.15  
 In 1972, however, McGovern failed to articulate his ideas on reconversion in a 
convincing manner. In response to one worker’s concern that “whenever the war is over, then 
there’ll be more layoffs,” the South Dakota senator stated that if the United States “had to 
depend on war, we’re in sad shape in this country,” and talked vaguely about full employment 
and reinvesting defense dollars into environmental and housing programs. The subject of defense 
conversion was not mentioned.16 Attacks on McGovern’s defense budget ensued during the 
months up to the election. The National Review claimed McGovern’s defense cuts reduced 
American military forces without heeding threats from the Soviets, making his defense budget 
“the first step down the rather short road to a Carthaginian peace for the United States.” The cuts 
would also mean reductions in military pensions.17 Members of McGovern’s own party 
eviscerated his defense budget as well. McGovern’s chief Democratic rival, Hubert Humphrey, 
pounced on proposals for defense reductions, stating they were examples of McGovern’s 
detachment from the problems faced by American workers. Trying to scare aerospace employees 
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in California into voting for him during the Democratic primaries, Humphrey implied that if 
McGovern were elected, further job losses would ensu . When McGovern criticized Humphrey’s 
endorsement of the Lockheed bailout, his campaign stuck back by saying, “When we talk about 
Lockheed and the space shuttle, we’re really saying: who was really concerned about the 
working-man in California?” The group Democrats for Nixon used Humphrey’s critique of 
McGovern’s defense budget in a provocative television commercial against the Democratic 
nominee. The ad quoted Humphrey’s claim that McGovern’s defense policies were “cutting into 
the very security of this country.” The leader of Democrats for Nixon, former Nixon Treasury 
Secretary John Connolly, believed Democrats had large y defected to Nixon because of 
McGovern’s plans for “large cutbacks in defense spending.”18  
 Even though McGovern’s campaign provided evidence that defense cuts meant net job 
increases in the future, not job losses, his messag on defense failed to gain traction due to the 
hostility he faced within his own party and from the right. On top of this criticism, McGovern 
also sabotaged his defense-cutting strategy by being specific about the military installations he 
would eliminate, thus angering those workers in defense communities who faced job losses. 
McGovern was bold enough to tell defense workers in central Florida that he would do away 
with the space shuttle program, cutting Cold War jobs that depended upon sending men into 
space. As journalist Hunter S. Thompson imagined, “This is not the kind of thing people want to 
hear in a general election year—especially not if you happen to be an unemployed anti-gravity 
systems engineer with a deadhead mortgage on a house near Orlando.”19  
                                                
18 For the ad, see “The McGovern Defense,” 
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 McGovern’s missteps, combined with the attacks on his defense policies, hamstrung the 
candidate. In the months leading up to the elections, workers in the Cold War economy admitted 
to being unenthusiastic about McGovern. While a fair number of unions supported McGovern’s 
defense budget and his recipe for ending the military-industrial complex, including the United 
Auto Workers (UAW) and the Communication Workers of America (CWA), members of the 
International Association of Machinists (IAM), whic was affiliated with the AFL-CIO, did not. 
In September, The New York Times went to Burbank, California and interviewed employees 
whose jobs were rescued by the Lockheed bailout one year earlier to ask them their thoughts on 
the election. The newspaper found that few supported Nixon, but not many more liked 
McGovern. Times reporter Philip Shabecoff wrote that those “who work in and around the 
Lockheed plant here have very few good things to say about George McGovern,” especially on 
economic issues. “Nixon has tried to kill us off, but we’ve got nothing from McGovern for nine 
years but a lot of talk,” said Gerald Sklarsky, presid nt of local Lodge 727. Some workers were 
going to vote for Nixon, others McGovern, saying that the President failed to “do something for 
us working around here,” even though he was from their home state. Their union, the IAM, 
endorsed McGovern, but the decision inspired neither celebration “or howls of outrage.” The 
overwhelming sentiment among the workers was apathy. As Sklarsky told the Times, “I’m going 
to sit this election out. I can’t say either one of them [Nixon or McGovern] has done us any 
good.”20  
 Workers like Sklarsky knew that job security remained tenuous in a period of 
deindustrialization and economic decline. Like many Americans, defense workers were opposed 
to the Vietnam War, but the Paris Peace Accords left th m concerned about their jobs. Patricia 
Ash made bombs at the Crane Naval Ammunition Depot in Crane, Indiana for $3.84 an hour and 
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wanted to keep her job after the war was over. Ash said a “cease-fire worries me” as it would 
surely lead to layoffs within the plant. While she would “just as soon have a cease-fire, like 
anyone would,” since she had a young son who could potentially be sent to fight in Vietnam, she 
also said she would “hate to lose my job.” Ash was, like many workers in her situation, irresolute 
toward future job prospects. She tried to convince herself that when the Vietnam War ended and 
she lost her job, she “could always find another one, I guess.”21  
 Compounding McGovern’s troubled relations with defense labor was that to many 
McGovern supporters, defense workers contributed to the culture of militarization—and 
therefore were part of the problem, not the solution.  The anti-war movement that supported 
McGovern felt Vietnam was a product of the “military-industrial-labor complex… [that] is 
locking itself into the structure of our country.”22  McGovern’s base also consisted of middle-
class activists who saw little distinction between union workers and the labor bosses responsible 
for the old ways of doing business in the Democrati Party. The Democrats (and soon the 
Republicans) were morphing into a Party that was more attentive to the ideological 
predispositions of elite activists who saw political b rgaining, patronage, and quid-pro-quo 
exchanges as thwarting the participation of the masses.23  As the Democratic Party catered more 
to upper-class suburbanites than its working-class b e—and further embraced defense cuts 
rather than defense increases—Cold War workers search d for a new political home. 
 Without the support of a unified labor movement, ad with the Nixon campaign dividing 
the Democratic base along cultural and racial lines, McGovern lost the 1972 election in a 
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landslide. He captured one state (Massachusetts) and the District of Columbia. As historian 
Jefferson Cowie has pointed out, McGovern managed to obtain a significant portion of the labor 
vote and lower income voters, even more so than white-collar workers and college educated 
Americans. But so too did Richard Nixon. While Democrats picked up a number of seats in 
Congress in 1972, Nixon exercised a clear mandate. Th  President captured the economic and 
cultural anxieties of the American voter better than McGovern in 1972. Nixon’s Republican 
majority was closer to completion after the results of the 1972 election were in. 24 
 Nixon’s triumph was short-lived, however, once theWatergate scandal unfolded in 1973 
and into 1974. The Watergate crisis overshadowed th midterm elections in 1974, leading to 
huge Democratic gains in Congress. Democrats picked up forty-three seats in the House and 
gained four in the Senate. These new Democrats hailed from wealthy Sunbelt suburbs and 
Northern districts once held by liberal Republicans. Wallace Democrats were now replaced by 
Sunbelt moderates. Without Watergate, few of these Democrats stood a chance of being elected 
in 1974. The freshmen class rode the anti-Washington fervor straight into Capitol Hill, promising 
to tackle the corruption and cronyism that they told Americans was so cancerous to lawmaking. 
Having come from upper-class, wealthy districts, these Democrats were a new breed of liberals 
who little resembled their New Deal predecessors. As the former McGovern campaign manager 
and newly elected Democratic Senator Gary Hart said about his colleagues, “we’re not just a 
bunch of little Humphreys.”25 Many held moderate views on economic issues and liberal views 
on foreign policy. These so-called “Watergate Babies” were progenies of interest groups and 
identity politics; they were concerned about environmentalism, consumers’ rights, and reducing 
the inflation rate, and felt little connection to the traditional base of the Democratic Party 
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including labor and labor unions. Kenneth Young of the AFL-CIO lamented that “the freshmen 
Democrat today is likely to be an upper-income type, and that causes some problems with 
economic issues. It’s not that they don’t vote what t ey perceive to be working class concerns, 
but I think a lot of them are more concerned with inflation than with unemployment.”26 In 
regards to fighting the Cold War, Watergate Babies favored restrictions on American conduct 
abroad, and wanted a leaner defense budget. Many opposed the Vietnam War and wanted to 
avoid the mistakes made by Cold War liberals—who they eld responsible for Vietnam. 
 The political economy of the Cold War, however, interfered in the Watergate Babies’ 
attempts to reduce America’s military posture. As Sunbelt Democrats, the new legislators came 
from districts and states that relied heavily on defense spending and leaned Republican prior to 
Watergate. The new Congressmen wanted to withdraw America’s presence overseas but keep 
Pentagon funds flowing to defense contractors and military bases in their districts.  Incoming 
Democrats therefore found themselves trying to separate their anti-militarism from their 
relationship to the political economy of the Cold War, with little success. Representative Philip 
Hayes was among the Democrats elected in 1974, repres nting the 8th district in Southern 
Indiana that had been held by Republican Roger Zionfor the last eight years. Hayes opposed 
defense increases but felt pressured to prevent the Defense Department from closing a local 
naval munitions depot in his district, leaving several hundred Indianans unemployed. Hayes 
admitted that anti-militarism in defense communities only went so far as he faced “strong 
pressure to maintain what is euphemistically called a ‘strong national defense position’ as are 
other members who have military bases and defense contra tors in their areas.”27 
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 The shifting regional and socioeconomic makeup of the Democratic Party after 1974 
created a problem: how could liberals curtail defense expenditures without angering their 
constituents who approved of the jobs they engenderd at home?  This dilemma led to a 
moderation and evolving centrism within the party. Post-Watergate Democrats had few good 
answers to Americans’ dependency on militarization, leaving them exposed to right-wing 
political candidates who claimed they were “weak” on f reign policy in future elections. Post-
1974 Democrats were caught between the politics of the Cold War in local areas and their 
national commitment to reducing America’s military presence abroad, creating opportunities for 
the right in an age of anxiety over the direction of ational defense policy.  
 
Creating a Foreign Policy Constituency 
  After Vice President Spiro Agnew resigned on October 10, 1973, Richard Nixon 
appointed Michigan Representative Gerald Ford as his replacement. Nixon’s own resignation in 
August 1974 then left the presidency to Ford, who became the first unelected executive in the 
nation’s history. Ford was also the fourth president to inherit the war in Vietnam, which would 
end in April 1975, but not before an acrimonious debat  with Congress over funding of the South 
Vietnamese regime. In terms of dealing with American’s chief rival, the Soviet Union, Ford 
vowed to continue Nixon’s policy of détente and lean d on Secretary of State and National 
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger for guidance in managing foreign affairs.28 Once in office, 
however, Ford found that in a post-Vietnam, post-Watergate America, détente had difficulty 
withstanding attacks on its legitimacy. Détente hadits share of detractors for years, but now 
those critiques resonated with a wider audience.  After 1974, Ford and Kissinger confronted 
charges from the left and right that détente neglected human rights and appeased communism. 
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The passage of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and the fall of South Vietnam made Americans 
question whether the means of détente served appropriate ends. Détente also seemed to be 
tainted with the politics of Watergate. The secretive nature of Kissinger’s diplomacy, his 
backdoor channels and negotiations with foreign leaders, made Americans wonder what 
Kissinger was up to and whether he had the country’s best interests at heart.  No longer was 
Kissinger “Super K,” but instead a cagey and devious diplomat whose policies would lead to 
Soviet hegemony. Kissinger tried to dismiss the vitriol, but détente continued to unravel during 
the second half of the 1970s.29 
 One of the first domestic challenges to détente involved the visit to the United States by 
the writer and Soviet dissident Alexander Solzhenitsy . In his book, The Gulag Archipelago, 
Solzhenitsyn chronicled his eight-year detention in a Soviet labor camp, and after its publication 
in 1973, he was deported from the Soviet Union. The book was received well in the United 
States, and the right (and Cold War liberals) lauded Solzhenitsyn for his outspoken criticism of 
the Soviet regime. North Carolina Republican Senator Jesse Helms hoped to bring Solzhenitsyn 
to the United States in March 1974, after he wrote t  the author that he was a “citizen of the 
world” who was poised “on the threshold of a new phase in your struggle for truth and freedom 
in your own native land and in the entire world.”30 Solzhenitsyn declined the offer in 1974, but 
he did make a visit to the United States in June 1975. After arriving, Solzhenitsyn met with his 
most ardent admirers in Congress including Helms, Strom Thurmond, and Henry Jackson. 
Solzhenitsyn then spoke to members of the AFL-CIO, where he demanded a “true détente” 
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between the United States and the Soviet Union that was not “based on smiles, not on verbal 
concessions, but…based on a firm foundation.” Détente, as enacted by Kissinger, was leading 
the United States “down a false road,” Solzhenitsyn said, that would inevitably lead to American 
weakness in the eyes of the world. He urged America to “try to slow down the process of 
concessions and help the process of liberation,” of th se suffering under communism.31 
 Helms and Thurmond requested that Ford meet with Solzhenitsyn, but Ford refused. 
Kissinger discouraged Ford from meeting with the recent Nobel Prize winner, believing it would 
imperil détente. Other prominent members of Ford’s staff disagreed; Deputy Chief of Staff 
Richard Cheney fired off a memo on July 8, 1975 to Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld expressing 
his anger over Ford’s refusal to meet with Solzhenitsy . Détente could not conceal the fact that 
the United States and the Soviet Union still perceived each other as enemies, Cheney wrote, and 
it was “important that we not contribute any more to the illusion that all of a sudden we’re bosom 
buddies with the Russians.”32 On July 7, 1975, Helms declared on the floor of the Senate that 
Ford’s decision not to meet with such a “dedicated exponent of freedom” was a shameful 
moment for the nation. The rebuff of Solzhenitsyn proved that détente was a “deceitful device,” 
that would allow the Soviets to continue to “throttle and enslave countless millions of people all 
over the world.”33 The Solzhenitsyn affair also angered his admirers within the conservative 
movement. William F. Buckley, writing in the National Review, commented “that the 
conservative right has embraced” Solzhenitsyn for “his tactical and strategic intuitions about the 
futility of the policy of détente.” Buckley even felt compelled to “salute the leaders of the AFL-
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CIO” for inviting him to speak. Ford’s staff also received complaints from voters for his 
handling of Solzhenitsyn. One letter writer, Carol Hummel, said she was “deeply disappointed in 
the treatment that Ford and the Congress gave to one great Russian citizen, Alexandr 
Solzhenitsyn.”34 
 Ford was in trouble again only weeks after the Solzhenitsyn incident, when he signed the 
Helsinki Accords on August 1, 1975. Ford had anticipated the domestic reaction to the Helsinki 
Accords would be mild at best, since they represented the stated goals of détente: freer trade 
relations, concern for human rights, and recognitio of sovereign countries to regulate domestic 
affairs. To certain people in Eastern Europe, and the United States, this last provision amounted 
to the U.S. accepting past and possibly future Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe. Kissinger, 
never enthusiastic about the Helsinki Accords, failed to understand this argument and was 
baffled by the subsequent controversy over Helsinki.35 The agreements did not endorse the 
Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe, but codified the boundaries of the Soviet Union that existed 
since the 1940s, Kissinger argued. He told Ford to disregard criticism of his participation in the 
negotiations, as the accords were favorable to “the interests of the Baltic-American community.” 
Ford did not intend to surrender Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union, and any suggestion 
otherwise was absurd.36 
 Americans of Eastern European descent felt differently. The Polish-American Congress 
warned Ford that he confronted a growing number of “meetings, demonstrations and petitions” 
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among Eastern European immigrants in opposition to the Helsinki Conference. One protest was 
held in Ford’s home city of Grand Rapids, Michigan in July 1975. Western Michigan University 
student Silins Gunlis led two hundred Baltic Americans in a demonstration against the Helsinki 
Accords. Gunlis said that he and those in attendance were “asking people to stand up and say that 
the Helsinki Pact is morally wrong.” Protesters carried signs with slogans such as “There Are No 
Small Countries,” and after the protest disbanded, activists went around the city with a petition 
seeking “U.S. recognition of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania,” which WMU student Ruta Ozols 
said she had no trouble getting people to sign. With seemingly no end in sight to the protests, 
national and local politicians tried to convince Ford to rethink his commitment to the treaty.37 
Democratic congressman Charles Bennett told Ford that he was approached by a number of 
constituents on the “proposed agreement to recognize the boundaries of Russian domination in 
Europe” and felt the treaty was “not an asset” for the United States. A local Republican leader 
from Tulsa, Frank A. Wallace, wrote to Ford that he was “getting weary of trying to defend your 
administration and its actions” to local residents and wondered how the President could 
champion the “aspirations of all peoples for self-determination and liberty” and at the same time 
authorize the Helsinki pact. 38  
 To some Americans, the conduct of the United States broad was evidence of the 
overreach of the federal government at home. In the South, U.S. policy toward Rhodesia was 
compared to desegregated busing in public schools. Occupied by white minority rule since 1965, 
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Rhodesia exhibited the dying gasps of western colonialism in Africa. As a bloody civil war raged 
between the ruling whites and black nationalists in the early 1970s, President Nixon remained 
unconcerned with the status of Rhodesia. Nixon’s indifference angered Southern Democrats in 
Congress, who sympathized with the white regime led by Ian Smith and worked to gain 
international recognition of the country. Southern Democrats rallied to obtain passage of the 
Byrd Amendment in 1971 (sponsored by Virginia segregationist Harry Byrd) that allowed 
shipments of chrome ore to the United States from Rhodesia, defying U.N. sanctions against 
trading with the white minority government. But after he collapse of Portuguese control over 
Mozambique and Angola between 1974 and 1975, Kissinger recognized that white rule in 
Rhodesia was untenable. Touring the country in 1976, Kissinger said that U.S. sponsorship of the 
black nationalists in Rhodesia was in the interest of “racial justice.”39 White Southerners were 
incensed over the change in relations. Memphis resident Leslie Birchfield wrote to Ford that he 
would not vote for the President unless he “fires Henry Kissinger” over his policy toward 
Rhodesia. “The way I see it,” said Birchfield, “our role in southern Africa duplicates the role of 
the Federal Government in bludgeoning of the Southern p ople into accepting School Integration 
against its will. The same evil effects will come in southern Africa as has already come to our 
public school system.”40 
 Workers in the Cold War economy also situated domestic issues within the context of 
American foreign policy. As they did in the 1960s, defense workers ridiculed cuts in the defense 
budget as signs of military weakness. When the economy worsened in the 1970s, these workers 
held steadfast to their jobs—and the foreign policy that employed them. Californians dependent 
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on the defense industry complained to their senators and representatives in 1975 about the 
lagging aerospace industry, as California Congressman William Ketchum wrote to Ford that “if 
the Nation is to benefit from a broad mobilization base” and raise employment levels, then more 
contracts were needed. Those affected by cuts felt betrayed by the federal government. As the 
government spent less on defense following the Vietnam War, the impact was felt broadly 
among suburban communities buttressed by federal defens  dollars. Trimming the military 
budget hurt not only builders of missiles, but textil  companies that relied on selling material to 
the military, as well as the restaurants and coffee shops that served lunch to suburban defense 
workers.41 
 The criticism of defense cuts under Ford added to the compilation of public grievances 
toward détente. The series of foreign policy crises—both large and small— during the early 
months of the Ford administration, made détente subject to voracious attacks from a range of 
critics. Americans were never enthusiastic about negotiating with their communist enemies 
during the Cold War—détente was a necessary reality in the era of Vietnam. But a critical mass 
of Americans now deemed détente contrary to U.S. interests at home and abroad.42 Members of 
an anti-détente coalition were disenchanted with bot  p litical parties on national defense issues. 
As jobs were lost to cuts in defense spending and the U.S. seemingly bowed to Soviet demands 
on the world stage, the mainstream wings of both parties continued to advocate for 
demilitarization (on the Democratic side) and continued rapprochement (from the Republicans). 
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This was unacceptable to Americans with personal connections to the Cold War who wrote 
letters and marched in protests against the policy f détente. 
 By late 1975, the Ford’s staff feared that defense cuts and foreign policy crises 
collectively jeopardized his support from ethnic groups and Sunbelt suburbanites who were 
pivotal to his re-election in 1976. Grassroots leaders thought Ford was now undoing Nixon’s 
efforts, as they had “worked very hard during the last decade to cement the allegiance of many 
East European ethnic groups to the Republican Party,” nd feared that Ford might lose these 
voters due to “negative coverage in the American eth ic press for his participation in the 
[Helsinki] conference." Ford had not done enough to reach out to various ethnic groups “who 
feel no identity” with the President and his policies.43 Internal polling by Ford’s staff in 
December 1975 showed that the public had shifted rightward on foreign policy, as Americans 
professed to be more conservative on foreign policy than Ford or Congress, and were less 
inclined to favor future diplomatic consultation with the Soviet Union.44 Détente had led to the 
deterioration of American military power, and this d turbed many Americans who wanted to 
revert to the Cold War status quo.  Heading into an election year, opponents of détente wanted a 
new direction in foreign policy, and Ronald Reagan wanted to be at its helm. 
 
Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the 1976 Republican Primary 
 Reagan contemplated running for president even before his second term as governor of 
California expired in January 1975. In the days after Nixon’s resignation, Reagan met with a 
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cadre of political operatives, including former Nixon staff member John Sears and Reagan’s 
press secretary Lyn Nofziger, to determine the viability of a presidential run. They told Reagan 
that Ford was unpopular and vulnerable. He was an unelected, moderate President, marred by the 
legacy of Watergate and an economic recession, and would have difficulty maintaining 
credibility within the Republican Party. Reagan agreed, whereupon his advisors soon formed the 
committee Citizens for Reagan, headed by the Republican Senator from Nevada, Paul Laxalt. 
While Citizens for Reagan began to raise money and coordinate an infrastructure for a Reagan 
presidential campaign, Reagan made sure to keep himself in the public eye, waiting to see if a 
primary candidacy was still in the works. He wrote a syndicated newspaper column, gave a 
regular radio address, and made speeches across the country touting his philosophies on 
government spending, taxes, and foreign affairs.  
 Ford’s advisors knew there were rumblings over a Re gan campaign in 1975, but were 
unconcerned. Internal polling showed voters believed Ford to be the better person to tackle 
inflation and the economy. Reagan’s strength was in foreign policy, but the Ford campaign 
predicted that foreign affairs would not be a factor. “Only in some areas of foreign policy does 
Reagan beat Ford, and foreign policy is a distant fourth among voter concerns this year,” they 
wrote. They saw no scenario where Reagan would defeat Ford.45 Members of Reagan’s staff 
realized too that Ford had the upper hand. Political history and the incumbency were on Ford’s 
side. “No one since the Civil War has successfully challenged an incumbent president for the 
nomination and gone on to win the general election,” wrote Reagan fundraiser Jaquelin H. Hume 
in an internal memorandum. If Reagan lost, he “and ll his supporters will be persona non grata 
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with the [Ford] administration. Since this will include most conservatives, this can seriously 
reduce conservative influence.”46 
 On November 20, 1975, Reagan officially announced his candidacy. Dennis Dunn, 
Chairman of the King County Republican Central Committee in Seattle, typified conservative 
thinking in his hope that the primary campaign would revolve around foreign policy. “It may 
well prove to be that Ford’s most serious blunder was the inexcusably crude fashion (and 
politically dumb) in which he treated Alexandr Solzhenitsyn. I doubt that anything in recent 
years has enraged the true American conservative anymore than this most recent display of the 
Rockefeller-Kissinger type of mindless gaucherie.”47 But Reagan largely ignored the sentiments 
of individuals like Dunn. Reagan had discussed foreign policy issues repeatedly in his radio 
addresses and in speeches to groups such as the Veterans of Foreign Wars, where in August, he 
called the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam a tragedy, and claimed the Ford 
administration had not done enough to confront the thr at of communism.48  
 But in the early days of the campaign, Reagan large y ran on a platform of reducing the 
size of the federal government, not foreign affairs.  While the Ford campaign believed foreign 
policy was Reagan’s strength, big-government appeared to be the most salient issue to Reagan’s 
more ideologically conservative advisors such as the ACU’s Jeffrey Bell. In his first speech as a 
presidential candidate, Reagan said he was running to change the corruption and cronyism in 
Washington D.C. that originated from the “root” of America’s problems: government largesse.49  
The economy was also an overriding concern for Reagan. In the summer and fall of 1975, polls 
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showed that Americans were overwhelmingly distraught by rising taxes, inflation, and 
unemployment. In states like Wisconsin, Reagan was told by advisors that domestic issues were 
of the utmost interest to voters, where anxiety over high taxes meant, “[t]axpayer groups have 
been springing up like weeds,” while “national security and the social issues are less important” 
than the economy.50 
 In September 1975, Reagan put forward a specific plan to stimulate the economy by 
reducing government spending. In a speech in Chicago, Reagan proposed to transfer federal 
expenditures for areas such as housing, health care, public education, welfare, and transportation 
to state governments, while most areas of defense spending, the second largest budget item 
behind entitlements, would be untouched.51 Reagan claimed his program would ultimately 
reduce the federal budget by ninety billion dollars, giving local governments more control and 
streamlining government services to Americans who deserved them. Once Reagan announced his 
candidacy, however, his redistribution plan did not stand up to scrutiny. Office of Management 
and Budget James T. Lynn analyst wrote that it “would, by necessity, result either in a significant 
increase in the tax burden on the American people, r in a radical reduction in the transferred 
programs which would leave recipient groups worse off than they are now.”52 A preponderant 
number of first-in-the-nation-primary New Hampshire voters relied on government benefits, and 
worried about insinuations that local taxes needed to be raised and government benefits slashed 
to pay for Reagan’s program.53  
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 When he lost the Iowa primary in February, Reagan tried to distance himself from the 
ninety billion dollar program.  In press conferences, Reagan avoided discussion of the plan’s 
details, albeit unsuccessfully. When questioned by reporters about how he chose the government 
programs to cut, Reagan said he “never did pay any attention to that list. That was just some stuff 
the economists gave me.”54 The “ninety billion dollar gaffe” plagued Reagan’s campaign in New 
Hampshire, where he lost to Ford. Moreover, the American economy began to recover in late 
January after a prolonged recession. Increases in consumer spending and stock market prices 
discredited Reagan’s claim that Ford had mismanaged the economy and made domestic issues 
less resilient as the weeks went on. 55  
  After falling in Iowa and New Hampshire, Reagan lost the next four primaries: 
Massachusetts, Vermont, Florida, and Illinois. After Illinois went to Ford, journalists Rowland 
Evans and Robert Novak felt the President had all but sealed the nomination.56 Even Reagan’s 
advisors, groping for a coherent campaign strategy, cautiously urged the former governor to 
reconsider continuing in the race after May.57 If Reagan did not win the next primary in North 
Carolina, his quest for the White House was over. To win North Carolina, Reagan had to 
assemble a new coalition of supporters on issues other than big-government. Attacks on federal 
programs would not be enough to carry Reagan into the White House. David Keene, in a 
memorandum to Reagan, noted that building a coalitin n North Carolina meant attracting 
white-collar suburbanites from urban areas in the Piedmont region, “disaffected Wallacite 
Democrats” from the eastern part of the state, and voters in the western mountains who occupied 
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the base of the Party since the Civil War. Keene recommended to Reagan that they put a 
campaign together that wedded the “sectional and social” factions within the North Carolina 
Republican Party between the metropolitan suburbs and the rural areas of the state. In 1968, 
Nixon captured a significant portion of the vote in Raleigh (from which Jesse Helms emerged as 
a senatorial candidate) and dominated in the surrounding suburbs of Charlotte. Reagan had to 
repeat Nixon’s performance and court conservative vot rs in the counties that elected Helms.58  
  In North Carolina, Reagan received much needed help by well-coordinated, well-funded 
grassroots activists hoping to revive his chances of victory. One resident of Charlotte wrote to 
Paul Laxalt—even before Reagan announced his candidcy—that she was eager to volunteer for 
the Governor, as she “will work day and night for Regan [sic]. I can type, answer, the phone, get 
out mail or whatever I can do to help,” because Ronald Reagan was “the only one I think could 
help the U.S. now.”59 Financially backing these grassroots activists was the political machine 
that elected Helms to the Senate in 1972. Helms defeat d the Democratic nominee, 
Representative Nick Galifianakis, by uniting the western base of the Republican Party with the 
traditionally Democratic eastern part of the state, where he attracted former followers of 
Democratic presidential candidate George Wallace, known for linking his sympathies for racial 
segregation with hostility toward the federal government. Helms’ election in 1972 led to the 
creation of the North Carolina Congressional Club, an organization that wielded money and 
influence on behalf of Helms and the collection of right-wing groups and individuals that backed 
his Senate campaign. Helms’ close advisor and avid Reagan enthusiast, Tom Ellis, ensured the 
Reagan campaign had the full patronage of the North Carolina Congressional Club, which used 
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its money and members to mobilize campaign workers, gather crowds for Reagan’s speeches, 
and assemble a media presence for Reagan on local television stations throughout the state.60 
 The issue that made North Carolinians gravitate toward Reagan was not big-government 
or the economy, but national defense.  National defense issues enticed defense workers near 
Greensboro, who were employed by Western Electric to build the anti-ballistic missile system 
(ABM). They also attracted voters in the eastern part of the state, which since 1969 “produced a 
larger percentage of volunteers for the Army and other military services than any other part of 
the country.” National defense also interested voters n ar Camp Lejeune and Fort Bragg Army 
base in the southern part of the state, which voted v rwhelmingly for Nixon in 1972 because of 
McGovern’s proposals to cut military spending.  National defense in North Carolina—as in 
many Sunbelt states— was intrinsically connected to other economic and social issues that were 
dependent upon military spending. American military superiority, the fate of the Panama Canal, 
and the inadequacies of détente were issues that voters throughout the state were vested in for 
ideological, personal, and material reasons.61 
 Sunbelt voters’ interest in Cold War politics was fir t recognized by the Reagan 
campaign during the Florida primary. On March 4th, Reagan gave his first major speech on 
national defense, sounding like Solzhenitsyn when he said “all our smiles, concessions, and 
toasts of détente have not brought genuine peace any closer,” and that Ford had “shown neither 
the vision nor the leadership necessary to halt and reverse the diplomatic and military decline of 
the United States.” Requests for the text of the Florida speech poured into Citizens for Reagan. 
Unemployed aerospace workers and Cuban-Americans angry over the President’s policies 
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toward Castro liked the speech. Out of fifty Republicans polled by the Reagan campaign, twenty-
eight supported Reagan, and of that number, twenty said they liked Reagan for his opposition to 
Castro and his call for a stronger defense. After th  Florida primary, David Keene geared the 
campaign toward an “attack strategy” against Ford, believing that the “Reagan attacks on 
détente” helped the campaign to build energy with the Republican electorate.62 
 Campaign manager John Sears and the rest of his staff did not anticipate the sizeable 
response to Reagan’s address on national defense in Flor da. The Reagan campaign’s polling 
company, Decision Making Information (DMI), had not extensively polled voters on foreign 
affairs in early primary states such as New Hampshire and Illinois.63  Reagan was also cautious 
on foreign policy in New Hampshire. Reagan claimed h  was not opposed to détente entirely, but 
to a détente that failed to take into account the history of Soviet aggression toward the United 
States. Détente established a foundation to pursue peace with the Soviet Union, and the United 
States “should continue to do so,” Reagan said, while remaining skeptical of Soviet intentions. 64 
In a February speech at the Phillips Exeter Academy in Exeter, New Hampshire, Reagan was 
sufficiently critical of détente, but not dogmatic. “We are told that Détente is our best hope for a 
                                                
62 The Right Report, March 10, 1976, folder: “Campaign—General File,” Box 32, Ron Nessen papers, GRFL; 
Statement by Ronald Reagan, March 4, 1976, Correspondence—File Copies folder, Box 7, CFR papers; Letter to 
Reagan supporter, undated, ibid; Memorandum for Governor Reagan from David Keene, October 29, 1975, Florida 
folder, Box 4, CFR papers; Notes on yellow legal pad, “Dade—Lou Conde,” Florida (1) folder, Box 30, CFR 
papers. Florida’s importance to Reagan’s candidacy is also emphasized in Link, Righteous Warrior, 156; 
Memorandum from Wayne Valis, March 10, 1976, campaign-general file, Box 32, Ron Nessen Papers, GRFL. 
63 See polling results in “A Survey of Republican Voters in the State of Illinois For the Citizens of Reagan 
December 1975,” Box 179b,  Series IV, Richard Wirthin Files, Ronald Reagan 1980 Presidential Campaign Files, 
Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California, (hereinafter cited as RRPL; “A Panel Survey of 
Republican Voters in New Hampshire, January 1976,” Box 179c, ibid. When Republican voters were polled in 
Illinois, only two percent of respondents said that a new direction in foreign affairs was the most important issue; in 
New Hampshire, that number was six percent. Only seven percent of voters in Illinois claimed foreign policy was 
the most important issue in the election, compared to thirty eight percent, which said economic issues w re their 
priority.  In New Hampshire, the ratio was forty one percent to thirteen percent of voters who believed th  economy 
outweighed foreign policy. Taken prior to the economic recovery, these polls partly help explain why Reagan did 
not emphasize foreign policy until Florida. Furthermore, New Hampshire and Illinois had less of a connection to the 
military and national defense spending than did later primary states in the South and West. 
64 Shirley, Reagan’s Revolution, 91-92. 
 201
lasting peace. Hope it may offer, but only so long as we have no illusions about it,” Reagan told 
the audience.  He went on to claim that, “Détente, if it is a one-way street, will fail. As a two way 
street it may succeed.”65  
 Reagan also glossed over his background as a proponent f détente during the Nixon 
administration. Hoping to bolster his image among conservative Republicans, Nixon sent Reagan 
on a tour of Southeast Asian nations in October 1971, where Reagan offered “very helpful 
explanations of the Nixon Doctrine” to Southeast Asian leaders skeptical of the President’s 
efforts toward “opening” China to the United States.66 Eight months later, Reagan was sent as an 
envoy to Europe—after Nixon and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev signed the SALT treaty—to 
assure Western European leaders that the U.S. would c ntinue working to reduce tensions with 
the East through negotiation and diplomacy. 67 Together with his muddled positions on foreign 
affairs during the beginning of the primary, Reagan’s role within the Nixon administration 
indicates that he lacked a grand strategy prior to 1976, and was unprepared to respond to voters’ 
concerns with national defense and American foreign policy.68 
 Various independent right-wing groups also helped the campaign’s shift to national 
defense. Reagan received much needed help from the Supr me Court with its January 1976 
ruling in Buckley v. Valeo, which allowed unlimited contributions to independt organizations 
that lobbied on behalf of political candidates. The court’s decision gave rise to the proliferation 
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of Political Action Committees (PACs) that supplemented funds from Citizens for Reagan, 
which often had trouble paying its creditors.69 With money flowing from independent groups 
such as the American Conservative Union (ACU) and the Conservative Victory Fund, movement 
conservatives bought time on radio and television arwaves emphasizing Reagan’s hard-line 
stance on national defense. The ACU began placing ads in approximately ten local newspapers 
in Florida; by North Carolina, that number had grown to thirty-three. A major focal point of the 
radio advertisements for Reagan was his opposition to the Panama Canal treaties that ceded 
control of the waterway to General Omar Torrijos. Over eight hundred radio commercials were 
sponsored by the ACU that criticized the Panama Canal Treaties and blamed Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger for coddling the Soviets. The ads also nnounced that “Ford stands for 
continued drift with the liberal policies of big government and détente” while Reagan was the 
embodiment of “new initiatives in freedom based on limited government, personal liberty, and 
peace through strength.”70 The theme of the ACU ads also supplemented the attacks levied on 
Ford by Helms, who equated federal welfare programs with the Panama Canal treaties, implying 
that the federal government was transferring its resources to socialistic projects at the expense of 
national security.71 
 On March 23rd, Reagan defeated Ford in North Carolina by six percentage points. In 
Guilford county, where Greensboro and hundreds of defense workers were located, Reagan won 
by 418 votes. In Onslow County, home of Camp Lejeune, Reagan beat Ford by a 640-319 
margin. In the four counties that occupied Fort Bragg, Cumberland, Harnett, Hoke, and Moore, 
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Reagan won the first three and lost Moore.72 Reagan also took the entire eastern coast of North 
Carolina except for Dare County, where Ford prevaild with merely five votes.73 Bruce Wagner, 
in charge of advertising for the Ford campaign, noted that national defense had won the election 
for Reagan, lamenting “this effective change in camp ign tactic” that allowed Reagan “to seize 
the campaign momentum that had previously belonged to President Ford.” Wagner wrote to Ford 
campaign manager Rogers Morton that Reagan’s use of m dia to promote his ideas on national 
defense was the reason for Ford’s defeat. Wagner argued that, “Ronald Reagan has demonstrated 
his ability to revitalize his campaign with a series of highly personalized half-hour television 
addresses,” which highlighted Reagan’s differences with Ford on national defense policy.  
Campaign worker Peter Kaye was also upset that Ford had not used television effectively as 
Reagan. He believed the campaign should have made an extended television commercial prior to 
the North Carolina primary to counter Reagan’s assertions. Reagan now had the upper hand as 
“[t]he issue is defense and détente,” wrote Kaye.74  
 After North Carolina, Reagan became focused on promoting a hawkish image to 
Republican primary voters opposed to the current direction of American foreign policy. The 
challenge for Reagan’s advisors was to avoid comparisons to Goldwater’s presidential campaign 
in 1964, when Goldwater was portrayed as irresponsible and reckless in his foreign policy to the 
extent that it would imperil global security. In selling Reagan’s image abroad as a diplomat and 
statesman, the campaign had to confront the “notion spawned by some in [the] U.S. press that 
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RR is a warmonger, bomb–thrower and recklessly belligerent,” impressions that marred 
Goldwater in 1964.75 Goldwater’s endorsement of Ford exacerbated the perce tion of Reagan as 
an extremist on foreign policy. In explaining his decision to support Ford, Goldwater said he saw 
little difference between Ford and Reagan on substantive issues and believed a change in 
leadership would delay austerity reforms and hurt the Republican Party in the long term. He 
thought it unnecessary to “finally come so close to achieving what we set out to achieve three 
elections ago [in 1964] and risk it all now over a hair-splitting debate within the party about 
which of two genuine and bona fide conservative candidates is the more conservative.”76  
 While careful to avoid a repeat of 1964, the campaign pressed on with Reagan’s focus on 
national defense, as debates over the direction of national defense and U.S. foreign policy 
emerged as the core issues in the primary. Seeing the success national defense played in turning 
North Carolina to Reagan, his supporters and campaign staff replicated the strategy in the next 
major primary state, Texas. Before the Texas primary, Citizens for Reagan enlisted the Houston-
based advertising and public relations firm Chamberlain-Frandolig, Inc. for their help in 
assessing a profile of the typical Texas voter. The report claimed there was no other state “more 
critical to the Reagan campaign than Texas” where Reagan had the potential to extract “latent 
conservative support” from voters who “can be generated through effective utilization of key 
issues and organization to give the Governor a resounding victory.” But Reagan first had to 
overcome Texans’ suspicions toward Reagan’s social security policy following the catastrophe 
of the ninety billion redistribution plan. The “misinterpretation” of Reagan’s policy on social 
security was “continuing to erode his support among the generally conservative senior citizens, 
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where his appeal could be the strongest.” Reagan had to clarify his commitment to social 
security, but also draw attention to other issues affecting Texans and Americans nationwide. 
Among these were national defense. The report recommended that Reagan gear his tough 
defense posture to workers in Houston, San Antonio, and Corpus Christi, people who had lost 
their jobs to base closures and military cuts. Moreover, a “[m]ajor policy address on national 
defense posture/local base closures should be in San Antonio before as many retired officers as 
can be brought in and aired Statewide.” The agency also suggested Reagan promote his 
opposition to the Panama Canal Treaty in the Gulf Port, which presumably would suffer 
economically if the U.S. renounced its oversight of he canal.77 
 The subject of national defense—more than other policy issues—overcame Texans’ 
anxieties that Reagan would eliminate federal programs like Social Security.  Indeed, Reagan’s 
national defense policy appealed to residents of a state who received eight percent of total federal 
defense expenditures. Texans were a product of the Sunbelt South: a population who “generally 
opposes high federal spending on domestic programs and supports generous outlays for military 
and space spending.” 78  Where Reagan began his speeches in the early primaries by focusing on 
government bureaucracy, he now made “the decline in U.S. military power” his opening concern 
in Texas.79 Reagan continued to give half-hour televised addresses on national defense that were 
financed by individual donors who purchased airtime for the campaign. A sole donor, “Mr. 
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McAllister,” gave enough money to buy a “1/2 hour of TV time to show Reagan’s stock 1/2 hour 
talk.”80   
 Reagan’s momentum in Texas resulted from the campaign’s ability to resourcefully 
organize and collaborate with the grassroots anti-détente, Cold War coalition in ways he did not 
prior to North Carolina. The Reagan campaign establi hed a reciprocal and symbiotic 
relationship with their supporters in Texas, using their concerns on national defense as 
opportunities for building a broader constituency. Reagan framed foreign policy and national 
defense issues in Texas to appeal to the widest group of voters possible, forming associations and 
relationships between the sinking economy at home (particularly in Cold War communities) and 
the weakening of American military power abroad. Texans’ distrust of détente had obviously 
predated the Reagan campaign in 1976, but Reagan managed to congeal the suspicion, if not 
outright antagonism toward détente by emerging as an insurgent candidate who would reverse 
the foreign policy consensus on détente among Democrats and Republicans. Throughout the 
Texas primary, Reagan reminded voters that their decision on Election Day could alter 
America’s Cold War foreign policy and its bearing on defense spending at home. 
 Indeed, Reagan’s national defense policies united voters throughout the state. In cities on 
the Gulf of Mexico, Reagan played up his message that the Panama Canal treaties were a 
giveaway to the communists, which ACU chairman M. Stanton Evans said was treated as a 
“local issue there.”81 Reagan criticized Kissinger’s tour of Rhodesia in San Antonio, a city that 
had the “heaviest concentration of active & retired military,” and confirmed his approval for the 
Byrd Amendment. In doing so, the New York Times noted that Reagan was addressing “George 
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Wallace Democrats, whose support he has actively sought.”82 In April 1976, just as the contest 
between Reagan and Ford grew heated, Ford was accused of transferring military installations to 
Texas in order to win votes in the Lone Star state. Moreover, less than two weeks away from the 
primary, rumors also surfaced that Ford had decided to wait after the Texas primary to decide on 
whether to announce a plan to increase the size of the Navy by 600 ships. If Reagan won Texas 
based upon his criticism of U.S. military weakness, the Department of Defense would then 
announce the rebuilding and expansion of the naval fleet. 83 Ford tried to refute Reagan’s charges 
that he allowed the deterioration of the United States to “a position of military inferiority” as 
“preposterous” and said Reagan had zealously resorted to focusing on national defense “because 
a grab bag of other issues has been tried and faile.” Ford’s attempts to defend his record on 
foreign policy demonstrated to the Times “that Mr. Reagan had turned it [national defense] into
the focal point of the May 1 Republican primary in Texas.” As Ford crisscrossed the state of 
Texas, “from Central to West Texas to the Panhandle,” th  President was met with voters’ 
questions “about national defense, the Panama Canal, and détente.”84 
 On May 1, Texas Republicans voted for Reagan over Ford nearly two to one. After 
Reagan won Texas, major media outlets reported on how foreign policy issues such as the “arms 
race” engendered success for conservative Republicans like Reagan. The New York Times noted 
that the focus in the Republican primary after May 1976 was on “whether the United States is 
No. 1 in military power.” The Times compared Reagan’s comments on the supposed weakness of 
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the United States to Kennedy’s 1960 campaign where  blamed Eisenhower for a “missile gap” 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. 85 Time magazine too observed that “national 
security was one of Reagan’s big winners” in Texas where “Reagan attacked Ford for cutting 
back on military bases…while continuing to subsidize the United Nations.” Reagan’s win on 
national defense issues, the magazine posited, would f rce Ford to modify his positions on U.S. 
foreign policy and possibly even “dump Kissinger.”86 That same month, Ford received returned 
donation letters with the words “I will not support you in any way until you get rid of Henry 
Kissenger [sic],” scrawled on them. Other critics of Ford asked the President to “kick Kissinger 
out on his Dead End.” In response, Ford’s campaign staff felt they were “in trouble,” as Ford had 
lost “what has traditionally been the exclusive province of an incumbent president... foreign 
policy.”87 Barry Goldwater wrote to Ford on May 7, six days after his loss in Texas, advising 
him “to be more punchy” in his speeches but not to get into a sparring match with Reagan over 
the issues, telling him outright that he was “not gin  to get the Reagan vote. These are the same 
people who got me the nomination [in 1964] and they will never swerve.” Rather than trying to 
convert Reagan voters, Ford should target “middle America.” Goldwater concluded by telling 
Ford to “get off Panama” and focus on other issues.88 
 In post-Texas primaries, Reagan’s attention to Cold War politics generated new public 
criticism of Ford’s national defense policy. The campaign’s victory in Texas reinforced public 
criticism of détente, but also made the electorate more attentive to foreign policy issues—and 
willing to vote for Reagan because of them. Rather an reacting to preexisting discontents over 
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the direction of American foreign policy, Reagan’s win in Texas allowed him to broaden his 
grassroots anti-détente coalition. Reagan won the next three primaries: Georgia and Indiana on 
May 4th, and Nebraska on May 11th. In Indiana, where Reagan received a third of his votes from 
Democratic crossovers, the “questions of détente, defense spending, and above all, the role of the 
United States vis-à-vis the rest of the world were among Reagan’s best levers.”89 By the time of 
the California primary in June, more voters admitted to be voting for—or against—Reagan 
because of his stance on national defense and foreign affairs. Anne Nixon, chairperson of the 
Monterey Citizens for Reagan chapter, solicited donati s for Reagan by touting Reagan’s 
stance on national defense and criticizing Ford’s handling of U.S.-Soviet relations and American 
policy in Vietnam, Greece, and Angola. Nixon told Californians that while Ford was a “nice 
guy” who reduced the tide of Democratic spending in Washington, Reagan was the only man 
who “understands the national peril from without” and was an “articulate campaigner for 
Americanism.”90   
 Reagan overwhelmingly won his home state, beating Ford by thirty percentage points and 
setting the stage for a showdown over Republican delegates at the Republican National 
Convention in Kansas City. In the days leading up to the convention, Reagan’s base reiterated 
that the way to beat Ford was to maintain his attacks on the President’s national defense and 
foreign policy. Grassroots activists sent Reagan their advice and checks for donations in small 
amounts of five, ten, or twenty five dollars. William Haggerty from Canonsburg, Pennsylvania 
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was a “registered Democrat,” and told Reagan that “the way to win the number of needed 
delegates” was to play up the threat of the Soviet Union. Grace and Lee Wooster were “retired 
registered Democrats” who found that claims that there was “no difference” between Ford and 
Reagan were untrue, and enclosed an article from the conservative magazine the Christian 
Crusade Weekly that suggested Ford and Kissinger had allowed the Soviets to expand their 
military power. Florence Daige of Attleboro, Massachusetts told Reagan that he “alone can save 
our country and Panama Canal. We need [a] leader who will build this country up to Number 1 
and say no to the Russians, [and] open our defense plants to give our men work.” One person 
wrote to Reagan’s wife Nancy that Reagan should introduce into the Republican platform a 
demand for the resignation of Henry Kissinger, believing the Secretary of State’s conduct to “be 
enough to defeat Gerald Ford.”91 
 While Reagan had the support of his grassroots base at the outset of the convention, he 
lost a portion of it after he chose Pennsylvania Senator Richard Schweiker as his vice 
presidential nominee. Schweiker was a liberal Republican with strong ties to labor, but fell in 
line with Reagan’s positions on defense.  Reagan felt Schweiker would lure Ford voters to 
Reagan. Reagan had captured the foreign policy hawks that disliked Ford for his defense of 
détente, but thought the selection of Schweiker could attract moderate voters who preferred the 
President’s economic policies but not his foreign policy. For many of Reagan’s most dedicated 
supporters, however, men like Schweiker represented what was wrong with the Northeast wing 
of the Republican Party. One Reagan voter who professed to be an “independent-leaning-toward-
Democrat,” claimed Reagan “blew it” by picking Schweiker “just like Wallace did when he 
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picked Curtis LeMay” in 1968. He was contemplating donating “a few dollars to your campaign 
till this Schweiker came on” the ticket. Most of Reagan’s top advisors and aides, including 
Helms and the Representative from Ohio, John Ashbrook, privately disapproved of Reagan’s 
choice, believing Schweiker to have failed the testof being a true conservative. But others 
favored the choice of Schweiker. Reverend Salvator Franco from New Hyde Park, New York, 
praised Reagan’s pick for vice-president as “Schweiker is for prayer in school, against busing 
and gun control, against abortion on demand and thinks détente has been a one-way street.” 
Franco said the “people in Nassau County [are] anxious to support Reagan Schweiker ticket.”92 
Events on the convention floor also hurt Reagan. The Mississippi delegation made the surprise 
move of shifting delegates to Ford, despite the state voting for Reagan in its primary. The 
bleeding of Reagan supporters due to the falling out over Schweiker and the Mississippi 
delegation meant the end of Reagan’s candidacy. After all the votes were counted, Ford had 
1187 delegates, while Reagan had 1070.  Reagan conceded to Ford, but not before his supporters 
inserted a “morality in foreign policy plank” into he Republican Party platform. While it did not 
call for Kissinger’s resignation, it did criticize détente and the Helsinki Accords and praised 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Furthermore, as historian John Lewis Gaddis argues, Reagan’s forced 
Ford “to disassociate himself symbolically, if not in substance, from the entire concept of 
détente” during the campaign. 93  After the Florida primary, Ford used the term “peac  through 
strength,” rather than détente, a slogan later usedin alluding to Reagan’s foreign policy.  
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 Through his appeal to Republicans and crossover Democrats on détente and national 
defense, Reagan’s 1976 campaign aided the process of political realignment in the 1970s. 
Structural forces aligned for Reagan at a convenient time. Economic anxiety, the end of the 
Vietnam War, public antipathy toward the political system, schisms among Democrats on the 
defense budget, and various international events aroused activism among local voters and 
constituencies in favor of higher military spending. National defense enabled Reagan to build a 
coalition that outweighed specific concerns about spending on government programs, the size of 
the federal state, or social issues. Indeed, Reagan’s focus on national defense spending allowed 
him to reach into a grab bag of issues related to the subject: American internationalism, federal 
spending priorities, the role of the federal governme t, and the condition of the American 
economy to name a few. Reagan’s general message on th  need for higher defense spending had 
currency among hard-line conservative Republicans, but Sunbelt Democrats and moderate anti-
communist Republicans as well, allowing Reagan to elide his early reputation as an anti-
government zealot. The Reagan coalition’s  bold statement in support of the “remilitarization” of 
the Cold War placed demands upon policymakers—Democrats and Republicans alike—to renew 
a foreign policy that refused concessions with communist powers and expanded American 
military power.  
 
The Domestic Origins of the “Second Cold War”  
 Reagan attributed his defeat in 1976 to Ford’s influence in Northern states and the power 
moderate Republicans still held within the Party. Reagan told former President Richard Nixon 
that the reason he was defeated in Kansas City was New York Republican Nelson Rockefeller’s 
 213
influence in a few “North East states where the party structure controlled the vote.”94 While Ford 
defeated Reagan in the primary election, he lost in the general election against Democrat Jimmy 
Carter. Americans wanted someone removed from the mainstream of American politics, and 
Carter delivered. A former Governor of Georgia, Carter promoted his background as a 
Washington outsider on the campaign trail and vowed to change the culture of policy making in 
Washington, D.C., making it more transparent. Carter was unlike previous postwar Democratic 
candidates since the advent of the New Deal. In some ways, Carter sounded similar to Reagan as 
Carter favored the deregulation of business and supply-side economics. Expanding government 
programs was not the solution to economic deprivation, Carter felt. In this sense, Carter was the 
first post-New Deal president.95 In his first State of the Union Address, Carter told Congress and 
the American people that Americans “need to realize that there is a limit to the role and function 
of government. Government cannot solve our problems” as it was unable to “eliminate poverty 
or provide a bountiful economy.”96 In his foreign policy, Carter was dedicated to arms control 
and nuclear disarmament and talked about cutting the defense budget. Carter also made human 
rights an obligation of his foreign policy agenda. Carter had, in his words, “studied the record of 
abuses in different nations as reported by Amnesty International, the United Nations, and other 
organizations,” and expected that human rights issue  would “cut across our relations with the 
Soviet Union and other totalitarian governments.” Carter aimed to combine his human rights 
agenda with détente, diverging U.S. foreign policy from the dispassionate realism that 
                                                
94 Letter to Richard Nixon from Ronald Reagan, August 27, 1976, Box 1, Post-Presidential Correspondence with 
Ronald Reagan, RNL. 
95 William E.  Leuchtenberg, “Jimmy Carter and the Post-New Deal Presidency,” in Gary M. Fink and Hugh Davis 
Graham, eds., The Carter Presidency: Policy Choices in the Post-New Deal Era (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 1998), 7-28. 
96 The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of Congress, January 19, 1978, Public Papers of 
the President, Jimmy Carter, 1977-1981, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=30856#axzz1qpNfEw5d.  
 214
characterized Kissinger’s diplomacy while rebuilding Americans’ interest in accommodations 
with the Soviet Union.97  
 Carter discovered, however, that by pursuing rapprochement with the Soviets, he would 
reunite the diverse factions within the anti-détente coalition against his administration. The 
combination of changes to the international political system and the affects the coalition of 
national security activists had on the political landscape after 1976 set in motion a 
conglomeration of forces that Carter was forced to confront at the outset of, and indeed, 
throughout his administration. Moreover, new groups and individuals emerged in the second half 
of the 1970s that questioned America’s post-Vietnam foreign policy, expanding the size of the 
anti-détente coalition. After Reagan united the grass oots opposition to détente during his 
campaign, the critiques of American foreign policy in the era of détente did not fade out, but 
lingered among the political culture of the times. Carter had to deal with the consequences. 
 Carter’s opponents on foreign policy came from both the Cold War left and the right. 
Organizations such as the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) compiled Cold War hawks 
from both parties whose “objective [was] to alert the nation to the growing threat posed by the 
Soviet drive for world domination.”98 The CPD was the product of the 1975 CIA report entitl d 
Team B, which countered the Ford Administration’s official claim that détente created a lasting 
peace. In addition to these national security elites, Christian evangelicals like Pat Robertson, Tim 
LaHaye, and Jerry Falwell gave Carter greater problems. Carter did not anticipate criticism from 
evangelical Christians after his election in 1976. Evangelicals had largely backed Carter’s 
election, believing his claim to be a “born-again” Christian meant he wanted to repeal abortion, 
mandate school prayer in public schools, and put a halt to the gay rights movement. Leading 
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evangelicals soon discovered, however, that Carter’s Christianity did not mean using the state to 
dictate human behavior. Religious worship was a private matter to Carter that should not be 
politicized in the public sphere.  
 Carter further antagonized the opponents of détente by spending what little political 
capital he had in his first year in office on the ratification of the Panama Canal treaties. After 
Carter signed the treaties on September 7, 1977, evang licals’ honeymoon with Carter was over. 
Evangelical Christians were fiercely anti-communist and viewed a strong national defense as 
important as busing or abortion. Carter was either for increasing American military power or an 
appeaser of communism. Signing the Panama Canal treaties convinced evangelicals that Carter 
was the latter. In the following months, evangelicals led by the Reverend John Gimminez of 
Virginia Beach, held “Washington For Jesus” rallies at the capital to ban abortion and “double 
the defense budget.”99  Carter met with evangelical leaders such as Oral Roberts and Jerry 
Falwell only once, and the meeting did not go well.100  
 Those members of Congress who supported the Panama C nal treaties also faced trouble, 
as the 1978 midterm elections unseated Republicans and Democrats who voted for the treaties. 
Whereas the 1976 election saw the gradual emergence of PACs, by 1978 they came to dominate 
electoral politics. Among right-wing PACs, the National Conservative Political Action 
Committee (NCPAC) spent the largest amount of money during the 1978 election. NCPAC spent 
a total of $2,842, 851 during the midterm elections, two hundred thousand of which went directly 
to anti-Treaty candidates.101 Right-wing PACs also steered money and attention to key states that 
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voted for Reagan in 1976, hoping to remove from office the Democrats and Republicans who 
voted for the Panama Canal treaties. NCPAC, Citizens for the Republic, and the Committee for 
the Survival of a Free Congress, also targeted candid tes who in their view failed to possess the 
attributes that qualified them as “conservative.”  
 The controversy over the Panama Canal Treaty primarily ousted Sunbelt Democrats and 
Watergate Babies from Congress. In states like Texas, 79 percent of the public were still opposed 
to the treaty, with little separation between Democrats and Republicans.102 Little-known right-
wing Republican Gordon Humphrey was successful in defeating Tom McIntyre for a senate seat 
in New Hampshire in 1978 largely by stressing his opposition to turning over the Panama Canal. 
In an editorial, the Manchester Union Leader said the fight over the canal, “was a critical battle 
between the Liberal Establishment and the American people, and for that reason” it was the 
“pivotal issue of 1978, whose repercussions one way or the other will affect the lives of us all, 
not only here in the United States but, for that mater, on a worldwide scale.”103 NCPAC and the 
Conservative Caucus also attacked McIntyre over his support of the Panama Canal Treaties, 
claiming his voting record threatened the security of the United States. 104 In other Senate races 
between Dick Clark (D) and Roger Jepsen (R) in Iowa, and William Hathaway (D) and Bill 
Cohen (R) in Maine, the Canal issue played a secondary role in the defeat of the Democratic 
candidates. As historian Adam Clymer has written, the Panama Canal treaties “served as a 
lightning rod as conservatives tried to take over th  Republican Party” in the 1970s.105 
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 But the Panama Canal was hardly the only contentious f reign policy issue during 
Carter’s administration. Carter also tried to quell opposition to the second round of Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) with the Soviets. Particularly discomforting was the opposition 
toward SALT II among white ethnic Americans who Republicans actively courted in the 1970s. 
The debate over SALT II among American immigrants from the Soviet bloc took place in the 
midst of lingering concerns over the Helsinki accords that affected “Eastern Europeans who 
come from countries totally dominated by the Soviet Union.” Republican congressman from 
Illinois and chairman of the ACU, Philip Crane, creat d a group called Alliance for Freedom that 
planned to defeat SALT II and was “composed heavily of Eastern European ethnics.”106 
Americans from Eastern Europe decent living in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (a key state for Carter 
in 1980) attended a breakfast with Carter administration members who tried to convince them on 
the merits of the arms talks noting that “their deep distrust of the Soviet Union is having serious 
doubts in supporting SALT II.”107 The Carter administration noted that Greek-Americans were 
upset over Carter’s handling of American relations with Cyprus and Polish-Americans were 
concerned over “U.S. Policy toward Russia and communist country.” This particularly troubled 
the Carter campaign as they felt that one “major factor contributing to Ford’s losing the 1976 
election was his statement that Poland is a free country.”108      
 In addition to trying to woo ethnic groups, Carter’s staff also tried to build a coalition of 
Republicans and Democrats around his proposal for a strong, but leaner defense budget. 
Presidential Assistant Anne Wexler believed that Carter’s defense budget required the 
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“involvement of the good government groups and conservative religious groups” which she said 
“have more influence with the Republicans and Southern Members.” In addition to these groups, 
Wexler believed the defense budget needed support from the AFL-CIO and business if Carter 
wanted to avoid alienating two very large constituenci s. But the AFL-CIO continued to fight the 
Cold War during the Carter administration. Carter had poor relations with labor during much of 
his presidency, but the AFL-CIO resisted large defense cuts and opposed the Transfer 
Amendment in 1979, which would reallocate a portion of defense spending to domestic 
programs. Referring to the California initiative tha  placed a cap on property taxes, the union said 
the Transfer Amendment was like “applying the Propositi n 13 meat-ax” to defense at a time 
when there was a “consensus that the Soviet Union has been engaged in a massive military 
buildup.”109   
 A bipartisan coalition on defense was impossible considering the mounting critiques 
against Carter’s leadership on foreign policy. Growing opposition to Carter among the anti-
detente coalition made the President adopt a new strategy toward national defense.  From 
national security elites like Jeanne Kirkpatrick who attacked the foundations of Carter’s human 
rights policy for not favoring dictatorships friendly to U.S. interests, to the growing cadre of 
religious fundamentalists led by Falwell, Pat Robertson and Oral Roberts who believed Carter 
abandoned the world to communism, the President had little chance or opportunity to achieve 
what his advisors wanted. Moreover, the reluctance of labor, business, white Southerners, and 
ethnic groups to support détente painted Carter into a corner on national defense policy. After 
1978, Carter shifted to the right on foreign policy and national defense. The President’s talk of 
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defense cuts changed to requests for defense increases, s Carter announced the building of the 
MX missile (which he earlier opposed), and increased funding for the Trident II nuclear 
submarine program.110  
 Carter’s vacillation on détente and defense weakened his re-election campaign. When he 
ran against Carter in 1980, Reagan continued the campaign rhetoric he used against détente in 
1976. Now the context had changed. Unrest over high oil prices, stagflation, the Iran-Hostage 
crisis, the invasion of Afghanistan made Carter’s reelection uncertain at best. While the 1980 
campaign was mostly about economic issues, those Amricans who were Reagan supporters in 
1976 because of his foreign policy fell behind the candidate again in 1980 on his domestic 
policy.  Reagan campaigned on the basis that Carter’s failures were symptomatic of the 
bankruptcy of liberalism. Reagan also linked domestic and foreign policy together, something he 
had done well in 1976. In touring states like Virginia, Reagan lured military workers in Norfolk, 
promising pay increases and a more muscular foreign policy.111 Anne Wexler recommended that 
Carter focus his campaign against Reagan on similar grounds, writing that Carter should run on 
the theme of “Rebuilding America’s Strength,” which eerily echoed Reagan’s “peace through 
strength” platform in 1976. Wexler said that Carter should point out to voters that he “reversed 
the decline in real defense spending to rebuild our military strength.” The slogan “Rebuilding 
America’s Strength” also encompassed Carter’s policies toward the economy, employment, and 
energy, as the President was “rebuilding our country’s strength in the world—both militarily and 
morally—and rebuilding our economic strength.”112  
                                                
110 Jeanne Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary, Volume 68, No. 5, November 1979, pp. 
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111 “Virginia: Leaning Toward Reagan,” The Telegraph, October 24, 1980. 
112 Memorandum to Anne Wexler from Al From, September 16, 1980, Campaign 1980 Correspondence Memos 
Clippings [2] folder, Box 7, Office of Anne Wexler, Special Assistant to the President, Anne Wexler’s Subject files, 
JCL. 
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 No campaign theme, no matter how clever, could make the 1980 election go Carter’s 
way. The evolution of Cold War politics since 1972 partly made Reagan’s rise to power as it 
contributed to the shift in the electorate that hadbeen taking place since the early 1970s. The 
realignment of the parties, grassroots mobilization against détente, and the failed response by 
Democrats to structural issues in the Cold War economy during the 1970s—all of which came to 
a head in the 1980 election—made Reagan’s victory pssible. Reagan’s win over Carter elated 
his right-wing followers who believed they finally had one of their own in the White House. The 
1980 election was to them, proof that the American public had repudiated liberalism.  But the 
election of Ronald Reagan, however transformative for the United States, would not be the 
panacea that many conservatives imagined.  
 
Conclusion 
 The groundswell of grassroots support for a hard-line national defense and foreign policy 
convinced Reagan that the American people would support a more strident approach to dealing 
with the Soviet Union. This was exactly the course Reagan took the United States on during his 
first administration, as Reagan approved massive increases in defense spending and the creation 
of programs like Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The origins of the “Second Cold War,” as 
historians have characterized the period of the first Reagan administration, therefore rest not with 
Reagan or his advisors, but with Reagan’s 1976 campaign. The realignment of the Republican 
Party around foreign policy issues in the 1970s provided the political context for the “Second 
Cold War,” and set the early groundwork for a renewed confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
 The remilitarization of American foreign policy inthe 1970s was also a product of the 
Cold War defense economy erected in the 1940s. The Reagan campaign exploited the structures 
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of militarization to obtain his most significant victories in Gunbelt and Sunbelt states dependent 
upon Cold War military spending for economic and social resources. Threatened by defense 
cutbacks, and fearing further retrenchment in foreign policy would lead to base closures, a loss 
of jobs, and a reduction of federal benefits provided by defense spending, Reagan exploited 
national defense issues in local areas to rise to nati nal prominence. With the Democratic Party 
disjointed on the subject of national defense following the 1972 McGovern campaign, Reagan 
offered a clear alternative to détente and demilitarization that more Americans were willing to 
accept in the mid-1970s. To the proponents of a higher defense budget, international events such 
as the Panama Canal Treaty, the civil war in Rhodesia, and the Helsinki Accords reflected the 
loss of military superiority in America’s defense establishment that would then imperil national 
morale, but also the job security of Gunbelt Americans who depended upon the Cold War. The 
diverse anti-détente coalition that formed around Reagan—and which Reagan organized, 















Chapter Five: The Cold War in the Age of Inequality 
 
 In 1984, President Ronald Reagan was reelected over f rmer Vice President Walter 
Mondale with an astonishing 525 electoral votes, a new record. The Republican Party—and the 
conservatives within it—felt the 1984 election was a mandate for the administration’s policies. 
But the election complicated as much as empowered Reagan’s legacy. Reagan’s victory 
rekindled a contentious debate over whether the President's policies actually fulfilled the 
intentions of the “Reagan Revolution,” as some Republicans protested the growth of the federal 
government during Reagan’s first term. Particularly disturbing to Republicans (and some 
Democrats) was Reagan’s inability, or ostensible unwilli gness, to curb the federal deficit. 
Reducing government expenditures was once a priority f r Reagan. In his first term, Reagan 
promised economic growth and deficit reduction through tax cuts, but now into his second, his 
pledge seemed illusory. The deficit more than doubled etween 1981 and 1984, from $79 to 
$184 billion, and by 1982, Reagan was compelled to au horize tax increases to lower the deficit.  
 In addition to his tax policies—that critics said favored the wealthiest Americans—
Reagan’s vast increases in defense spending also contributed to the federal debt. New York 
representative Jack Kemp, Chairman of the House Republican Conference and co-architect of 
the 1981 tax reform bill, tried to neutralize congressional and public criticism that defense 
spending enlarged the deficit. In a bulletin to House Republicans, Kemp dismissed such 
accusations as “simply at odds with the facts.” Kemp further urged his colleagues to disregard 
arguments “that defense spending is a huge portion of the budget”; national security spending did 
not create a "terrible burden on the economy.” There was, as Kemp saw it, “no inherent 
contradiction between economic expansion and a strong national defense.” Republicans’ 
decisions on national defense spending should not be guided by the “country’s fiscal condition, 
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but on our perception of the threat faced by the U.S. in the world... If Republicans want to 
become America’s new majority party, they must be committed to national defense as they are to 
balanced budgets.”1   
 Kemp’s comment reflected how the remilitarization of the Cold War shaped the 
Republican Party’s approach to governance and policy making in the 1980s. As president—at 
least during his first term—Reagan presumed the conservative critique of American foreign 
policy since Vietnam was correct: the United States lagged behind Soviet military capability, 
wavered in dealing with communism abroad, and was too reluctant to exercise military 
predominance to threaten and defeat America’s global enemies. In response to what he believed 
was a decade of neglect of America’s military, Reagan raised defense spending thirty-five 
percent during his time in office. No deficit was too large to Reagan if it prevented a Soviet 
invasion.2  
 Defense monies under Reagan’s administration went toward a wide variety of programs. 
Much of defense spending under Reagan went to research and development in expensive projects 
like the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and Cold War interventions in Central America and 
elsewhere in the developing world. Like presidents before him, Reagan relied on American 
military might to deter potential threats from communist countries. As a policy, “containment” 
was rejected, but not the means used by prior policymakers to deter communist expansion: 
exorbitant defense spending. New international threats from the Soviet Union and its allies 
seemingly demanded a return to the arms and technology race—communism once again 
appeared to be marching toward the West. Reagan responded to the new international context of 
                                                
1 Special Report House Republican Conference, “Are Deficits More Important than Defense?” folder 6, Box 122, 
Jack Kemp Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (JKP). 
2 On the Reagan defense buildup, see Frances Fitzgerald, Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars, and the 
End of the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); Daniel Wirls, Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the 
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the Cold War with a mission to “rollback” communism by placing the United States in a position 
of military dominance over the Soviet Union. 
 The Reagan defense buildup was also an extension of the administration’s domestic 
policy. Indeed, Reagan and his fellow Republicans saw the defense economy as an antidote to 
domestic economic pressures in a post-industrial age. Under Reagan, Republican and 
conservative policy makers reified Democratic uses for the national security state that dated back 
to the 1940s.  In allocating defense contracts, Republicans in Congress and the Reagan 
administration embraced a unique form of defense Keynesianism to ameliorate and stimulate 
employment. The economic contributions of the defense program were implied more than 
outright acknowledged by the Reagan administration, as few administration officials admitted to 
be quasi-Keynesians. But Reagan knew SDI had an important role to play in the American 
economy. In the President’s speeches on SDI and the efense buildup, Reagan promoted the 
missile defense system as a check to Soviet power, but also frequently touted the economic 
growth and good-paying jobs SDI brought to Americans. 
 High-tech areas in the western region of the Gunbelt benefited the most from investment 
in the missile defense shield. SDI remained an experimental and untested program, which meant 
most of the jobs for SDI went to skilled engineers, mathematicians, and physicists. Rather than 
production of current defense products—that required a manufacturing base—Reagan’s weapons 
systems were developmental and required no major investment in industry. With an eye toward 
defeating the Soviets in a nonexistent race for military predominance, Reagan’s defense policy 
meant investment in new programs, not preexisting weapons of war, which resulted in a loss of 
jobs for many unskilled Cold War workers. As historian Judith Stein has written, Reagan’s 
economic policies promoted “nontradable sectors like real estate, financial services, and 
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defense,” which resulted in “hobbling tradable manuf cturing and agriculture.” The defense 
buildup, in essence, exacerbated the problems of deindustrialization, promoting the fortunes of 
the skilled workforce and the shift to what Stein has called the “Age of Inequality.” 3 
 Indeed, Reagan had little interest in the details—and economics—of military contracting, 
but his defense policies had a profound role in the remaking of American politics. The economic 
effects of the Reagan defense buildup reinforced Americans’ impressions that the federal state 
had failed them. Defense spending under Reagan offered t mporary growth to some Cold War 
communities, but did not benefit the entire Gunbelt. The unequal distribution of contracts and 
disproportionate investment in Cold War communities during the Reagan years meant that those 
contractors that profited the least from the defense buildup merged with bigger defense 
companies, or drastically downsized. These policies all meant unemployment on some scale. 
When the Cold War ended, drastic cutbacks in defens further ensued. Defense spending was 
reduced by over a hundred billion dollars after Reagan’s presidency. As a percentage of G.D.P., 
defense was cut by more than half from 1987 to 2000. And the defense jobs lost to peace were 
not replaced by better ones. Like other regions affected by plant closures, the service economy 
often replaced the defense economy in communities hardest hit by the demise of the Cold War. 
The downturn in defense most affected working-class defense employees, as many found 
themselves displaced or underemployed after 1991—skilled workers had more mobility and 
better opportunities than their working-class counterparts. Anti-militarists on the left (from 
within and outside of the Democratic Party) continued to sell defense conversion to ameliorate 
the situation in defense employment, but there were few buyers. Defense companies were 
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resistant to conversion, and their workers feared being dislocated or unemployed in the transition 
to non-defense work—before being laid off.       
 The impact of the Cold War on local communities was not a result of organizational 
victories on the right, despite scholars having viewed Reagan’s presidency as either a triumph or 
revival of conservatism. Certainly, by the 1980s, the political right had wider public acceptance 
than they had in previous decades. In the years before Reagan's election, the right took better 
advantage of changes to the political system, economy, and federal government. In addition to a 
more aggressive foreign policy, high on the list of demands among Reagan’s backers were 
economic programs that promoted the market over state intervention.  Pro-family activists 
including Christian evangelicals and gay rights opponents also reframed partisan identities based 
on cultural issues, promoting “traditional” values to an electorate that was skeptical of 
government intervention on matters related to the family.4 Democrats remained disorganized on 
these issues in the 1980s. The failure of the Carter dministration to tackle stagflation, 
unemployment, and the reengagement with the Soviet Union appeared to demonstrate the 
Democrats' inability to address the larger structural p oblems that confronted the country. 
 Rather than examining the years of the Reagan administration as the apotheosis of the 
“conservative movement”— a problematic term—it is better to view the age of Reagan as a 
period that altered public perceptions on the role of government, but at the same time failed to 
leave modern conservatism in victorious repose.5 R agan thought Americans had become more 
conservative on foreign policy and national defense during the 1970s. This was not entirely true. 
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The 1970s and 1980s were more favorable to conservative policies, but the American people had 
not “become conservative.” Polls showed that a majority f Americans favored the Reagan 
defense buildup, but there was also significant popular support for the nuclear freeze movement 
that captivated the sympathies of a significant porion of the American public. Moreover, activist 
conservatives and their political brethren were disnchanted with Reagan’s foreign policy 
throughout his second term. The Cold War right was appalled by Reagan’s diplomacy with 
Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev. To right-wing defense hawks, any compromise with the 
Soviet Union would lead to communist victory and the depletion of America’s power in the 
world. The United States must conduct its foreign policy with this truism at the center, and those 
individuals unwilling to recognize the legitimate existential threat the Soviets posed to American 
national security should simply be overridden.  The nuclear freeze movement, however, and 
conflicts between conservative and moderate Republicans over the fiscal costs of increased 
military spending, prevented the Reagan defense buildup from growing beyond its proportions. 
Reagan’s attempt to implement a universal policy of “peace through strength” was one of his 
biggest challenges. It was also one of his greatest failures. 6   
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Budgets, Bombs, and the Nuclear Freeze Movement 
 Throughout his presidency, massive defense spending was the linchpin in Ronald 
Reagan’s Cold War strategy. Reagan thought heightened defense spending would browbeat the 
Soviet Union into a position of strategic subservience. Accepting the popular opinion that détente 
had done near irreversible damage to American foreign policy, Reagan hoped to repair American 
might through defense increases larger even than those requested by military officials and 
defense corporations that profited from his policies.  To some extent, massive defense spending 
unnerved the business community. Commerce Secretary M lcolm Baldridge, for example, 
reported meetings and “conversations with hundreds of businessmen, representing businesses of 
all sizes in finance and industry” in which the overwhelming consensus was that the resulting 
deficit was impeding economic growth. Anxiety over the deficit made “either continuing higher 
interest rates or inflation, or both, all too possible.” Baldridge, however, declared cuts to defense 
spending off-limits. Believing the deficit should only be tamed by cutting "the rest of 
government outside Defense as much as we can,” he recommended increases in defense—though 
not to exceed five percent, as it was unclear whether the defense industry can “spend that large 
an increase efficiently.” A rise of eight percent would mean a backlog of defense orders since the 
United States defense industrial base had diminished ince the 1960s, and would not be able to 
handle the work requests from the Pentagon.7 
 David Stockman at the Office of Management and Budget and “Cap” Weinberger at the 
Department of Defense, the two men and organizations that worked closely on Reagan’s first 
defense budget, vied over the specifics. Stockman was an heir to the libertarian, Robert Taft 
wing of the Republican Party. Stockman was also an anti-government ideologue who felt, as 
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2], Richard G. Darman Files, Series I, Subject Files, RRPL. 
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head of the OMB, it was his job to begin “abruptly severing the umbilical cords of dependency 
that ran from Washington to every nook and cranny of the nation.”8 The “dependency” that 
Stockman referred to was the American welfare state, which Stockman believed drained the 
coffers of the federal government as Americans demanded more services from federal 
institutions. Defense, however, did not enter into this paradigm. Stockman admitted to be a “‘big 
budget’ proponent on defense,” having been swayed b Jack Kemp and the journalist George 
Will, as well as the Iranian hostage crisis from 1979-1981, on the need for a large defense 
budget. Stockman believed in higher defense budgets “with the zeal of the convert” and in the 
early days of a Reagan presidency hammered out an agreement with Weinberger of a real 
defense increase of seven percent, equaling a defense budget of 1.46 trillion dollars over five 
years.  
 But Stockman was surprised by this figure when he redid the calculations after his 
meetings with Weinberger.  Stockman favored large def nse budgets, but a defense budget that 
high was excessive to the point that it would prevent the administration from considerably 
shrinking the size of the federal deficit. Stockman was suddenly distraught over Weinberger’s 
indifference to the long-term costs of defense spending to the budget and the fate of the “Reagan 
Revolution.” By then, however, it was too late. The proposed figures were released and there 
was “squealing with delight throughout the military-industrial complex.”9  Internal tensions over 
the specific figures aside, the consensus within the administration was that defense increases 
nearing hundreds of billions of dollars were needed to reverse the presumptive “weakness” of the 
United States’ nuclear and conventional military arsenal relative to the Soviet Union. 
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 Reagan received plentiful advice prior to the lastsignificant meeting over the defense 
budget on September 9, 1981. Martin Anderson of the Office of Policy Development, classified 
in Stockman's memoirs as “a flinty anti-spender on everything,” gave Reagan strident 
suggestions reminiscent of Cold War liberals in the 1950s. “National defense and economic 
policy are inseparable,” Anderson said. The President must choose “between having a balanced 
budget, a strong economy, and significant, continuing increases in defense spending or having an 
unbalanced budget, a weak economy, and an eventual forced reduction in future defense 
spending.” Murray Weidenbaum, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors concurred, 
stating that the President had the full support of the American public behind his defense policy, 
and that it too would serve the interests of America’s domestic economy. “A strong national 
defense rests on two essential bases: a healthy national economy, and solid, widespread public 
support for defense expenditures.” Reagan had both. 10  Reagan’s advisors also told him to be 
mindful of his right-wing base that wanted more defense spending. Elizabeth Dole reminded him 
that “[c]onservative organizations, as well as veterans and military groups” would demand 
defense expenditures at the present level and expect him to push for a balanced budget solely 
through cuts in social services.11 It was Reagan’s job to calibrate his defense policy between the 
hawks that supported him in the campaigns and the broader public’s vision.  
 Weinberger came prepared on September 9th to win over the President without Stockman 
getting in his way again. The OMB wanted to cut defense outlays by thirty billion dollars for the 
remaining years of Reagan’s first administration, but the Defense Secretary fought vigorously 
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against cuts.12 Weinberger warned that the OMB’s proposal would “create the worst of all 
worlds” since it would undermine foreign policy by “caus[ing] us to fall further behind the 
Soviets” and not solve the deficit problem.13 In loaded terms, Weinberger argued that the 
obsession over the deficit must be discounted when considering requests for defense increases. If 
the OMB budget went forward, the United States would have to suspend or cancel the use of 
Titan II rockets, 18 naval ships, and two Air Force squadrons. Defense cuts would also mean the 
loss of 135,000 jobs in defense employment that would “spread through [the] economy,” 
eventually leaving 200,000 Americans without work. And what if the President might “have to 
call on [the] military to protect national interests” in his first term? The United States could not 
carry out “the current foreign policy commitment” with its present defense capabilities. The 
results of the 1980 election spoke for themselves, Weinberger said. The American people wanted 
the United States to spend more on defense.14  
  The September 9th meeting determined how the Reagan administration wuld handle 
defense budget politics in the 1980s.  Stockman tried to get Reagan to cut the projected 1982 
budget by twenty billion dollars, down from an original thirty billion dollars. After Weinberger’s 
presentation, however, Reagan felt it was impossible to go with Stockman’s figure. He decided 
instead on a $13 billion cut over three years, a paltry sum. (Overall, defense would make up 7.5 
percent of GDP.) Stockman's cuts “were based on pragmatism, not principle,” he said, but in the 
end, “the President and Weinberger had decided to stick with principle.”15 Stockman was 
wounded by the defeat, but publically defended the increases he aimed to prevent behind closed 
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doors in order to appear a faithful cabinet member. When, two years later, the Reagan 
administration asked for a defense budget of $247 billion for FY 1984, Stockman was one of the 
leading administration officials coaxing reticent senators to approve the increases.16 
 Reagan also faced opposition from Congress on his defense budget. Republicans and 
Democrats in Congress regularly rejected Reagan’s defense budget when it was presented to 
them. By Reagan’s second term, Congress was openly disturbed by the administration’s hubris 
on defense spending—and Reagan’s initial refusals to trim defense costs. When asked to reduce 
figures in the defense budget, Reagan officials eliminated projected pay increases for Defense 
Department employees, rather than touch existing pro rams. This prompted Republican senator 
John Chafee from Rhode Island to comment that “defense has to bear its fair share” in budget 
cuts. Kansas Republican Bob Dole echoed Chafee, saying, “If the President wants budget 
restraint we’ve got to have defense included.” The Reagan administration knew opposition to its 
yearly defense figures was forthcoming, and often used large defense budgets as advantage over 
their Democratic opponents to cut social spending. When confronted with defense budget figures 
for the fiscal year 1985, House Speaker and Massachu etts Democrat Tip O’Neill said that if 
Reagan “is willing to reduce the growth of defense sp nding then he will find that we will be 
helpful in nondefense areas.”17 
 While congressional Republicans and Democrats scored victories in getting Reagan to 
prune the defense budget during his first term, they w re modest accomplishments. Over 
Congress’ objections, Reagan announced plans for building new missile and nuclear 
technologies, including the neutron bomb, the MX missile, and medium range Pershing II 
missiles.  The administration's strategy was to ask for astronomical increases and then rail 
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against suggested, incremental cuts. This approach t  defense spending had, in fact, been taken 
by every administration since Truman. The difference in each case was the international context. 
Reagan’s defense increases inflamed tensions between th  United States and the Soviet Union, 
igniting a "second Cold War" and erasing efforts at détente begun by Kennedy in 1963.  With 
“peace through strength,” the administration retriggered the arms race, even while discarding the 
premises behind Mutual Assured Destruction (M.A.D.). 
 Those who wanted to roll back communism through a massive defense buildup 
welcomed Reagan’s early proposals on defense. The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) 
was among the groups that searched for Reagan supporters among business elites and liberals 
disenchanted over the Democratic Party's anti-militarism in the 1970s. The CPD reached out to 
the U.S. Industrial Council (formerly the Southern States Industrial Council), the Council on 
Foreign Relations, the Chicago Committee, the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs, and the 
National Strategy Information Center, hoping they would open their wallets to help the CPD 
lobby Reagan and Congress on defense.18  The working relationship between the CPD and 
Reagan came immediately.  One month after Reagan’s first peech on SDI, advisors Lyn 
Nofziger and Frank Carlucci wrote to the CPD under th  auspices of the “American 
Foundation,” requesting “help in communicating the ne d for a strong national defense to the 
American people.” Nofziger and Carlucci sought to embark upon “a nationwide communications 
campaign that will emphasize the necessity as well as the many rewards of a strong defense 
effort” to the public.19 In addition to “neoconservative” groups like the CPD, the Reagan 
administration also looked to capture support for its national defense policy among evangelicals. 
                                                
18 See “Board of Directors List,” Lists/Present Danger/Prospective Members/ Contributors folder, Box 18, 
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Stanford, California. 
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A National Association of Evangelicals/Gallup poll conducted in 1983 revealed that 61 percent 
of evangelical respondents favored “Reagan’s handling of the nuclear arms situation.”  Fifty-four 
percent of evangelicals agreed “that America’s falling behind in the arms race would increase the 
danger of nuclear war more than a continuation of the arms race.”20 
 If Reagan’s defense buildup catalyzed his base, it also motivated opposition among the 
left. Anti-nuclear activists concerned about the buildup of nuclear weapons coalesced in a 
nuclear freeze movement in response to Reagan's re-launching of the Cold War. Eventually an 
international phenomenon, the nuclear freeze movement took to the streets at home to protest the 
escalation of nuclear weapons.21 Across the country, ordinary Americans mobilized by the 
thousands in favor of abolition. Collecting petitions outside supermarkets in New England, 
organizing pro-freeze workshops and seminars in the Midwest, filming commercials in favor of 
the freeze even in the pro-defense Sunbelt, nuclear fr eze activists expanded the movement to a 
global scale.22One grassroots supporter of the freeze campaign, E.B. Mullen from Schenectady, 
wrote Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Allen in March 1981 to complain about his recent 
speech to the Conservative Political Action Committee that criticized the movement. Mullen 
noted that Allen could easily “deride ‘wholly minded’ liberals” in favor of the freeze, but it 
would not detract the push for disarmament since many Americans were not “ready to 
accompany you to the nuclear incinerator.”23 An estimated 500,000 to 1 million Americans 
gathered in Central Park to demonstrate against the arms race the following summer. The freeze 
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movement dominated headlines in the early years of Reagan’s presidency, making nuclear 
diplomacy a constant household topic of debate.  Even members of the evangelical right were 
skeptical about the use of nuclear weapons. Seventy-seven percent of evangelicals thought a 
“bilateral” freeze agreement was a good idea, provided there were equitable stipulations for 
drawdown on both sides.24 
 With freeze popularity at levels not seen since the 1960s, a right-wing, anti-freeze 
movement formed to counter its success. It, too, reach d global dimensions. Students for Peace 
and Security (SPS), based in Boston and London, worked to dampen the success of the 
“freezniks” among the young through counter-protests “to the ban-the-bomb crowd.” Melanie 
Sturm, an undergraduate at Tufts, explained part of the appeal. Strum joined SPS because she 
feared the freeze movement was “emboldening the Soviets to continue an aggressive foreign 
policy.”25  SPS was not the lone anti-freeze organization. The London-based companion to SPS, 
Coalition for Peace through Security (CPTS), received $10,000 from the Heritage Foundation for 
making their “top priority” the defeat of the freeze movement. CPTS distributed pamphlets to 
coincide with anti-nuclear protests and enlisted memb rs of the American military and national 
security elites, like Midge Decter of the CPD, to make statements against the freeze.26 Such 
groups also gave important support to Reagan from the o her side of the Atlantic. When the 
President planned to meet with the British Prime Minister in June 1982, the Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament (CND) planned a “Reception Committee” to show that British citizens 
“want[ed] peace, not nuclear holocaust,” and to protest meddling in Central America, “Reagan’s 
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other red carpet.” 27  Among a coalition of supporters, however, the loca  organization, Peace 
with Freedom (PWF), countered with the argument that “unilateral…disarmament by Britain or 
any Nuclear weapons/freeze that would give the Soviet Union a permanent built-in advantage 
over the United States.” Not unlike American evangelicals later on, however, PWF inevitably 
wanted to “see an end to the nuclear arms race”; disarmament was off the table so long as it was 
not multilateral.28 
  Defense communities paid close attention to the fre ze campaign as well. Silverdale, 
Washington high school teacher David Rawls wrote to the Committee on the Present Danger on 
November 8, 1982, asking to be placed on the organization’s mailing list and for other 
information for a class he was teaching on “Nuclear Age Decisions.” Rawls thought the CPD 
literature would stimulate debate on nuclear weapons, especially since “our community is home 
of the Trident missile system and the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard.”29  In Washington, 
Connecticut, locals clashed over a resolution to support the freeze, passed in April only to be 
voted down in June, after residents circulated anti-freeze pamphlets portraying activists 
(including one local Reverend) as Soviet spies. Michel Craig, who led the grassroots campaign, 
summed up his feelings by saying, “If you wish to vote for the Brezhnev, Kennedy freeze, I 
recommend you also vote to have Washington, Conn., re amed Marx, Moscow, or 
Misinformed.”30 
 The limits of waging a second Cold War were substantial considering Reagan's sizeable 
victory over Carter. Harangued by nuclear freeze activists, criticized by Congress, scrutinized by 
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the American people, the defense buildup Reagan said would save America from Soviet 
aggression was not as popular as he originally planned. Making policy from the White House 
meant having to answer and conform to preexisting structures of governance and catering to 
multiple constituents with competing and contradictory interests. Formulating a program of 
“peace through strength” that responded to the various concerns of his constituents was a 
Sisyphean task for Reagan. 
 
SDI and the Remaking of the Suburban West 
 The nuclear freeze movement muddied assumptions that the public wanted more defense 
spending, but Reagan continued to press on with “peace through strength,” feeling the activists 
did not represent the public sentiment at large. The nuclear freeze made the announcement of 
SDI more problematic than Reagan and his supporters wanted, however. SDI was the fulfillment 
of a decades-old dream to build a missile defense shield around the United States, using a system 
of satellites to deploy lasers intercepting Soviet missiles in the event of a nuclear war. A 
corollary to “peace through strength,” SDI emphasized the need for new weapons and 
technology to counter the Soviet Union. The program was grounded in more fantasy than 
science, and dubbed “Star Wars” by critics, after th  popular 1979 movie. To its skeptics, SDI 
seemed just as implausible as the movie’s plotline. Some members of the administration such as 
Richard Perle embraced the term; others thought it hindered the program even before its initial 
stages of research and development. John Lenczowski f the National Security Council 
recommended alternative nicknames for SDI, proposing ubstitutes for “Star Wars” such as 
“SHIELD” or “Sky Wall” or “Guardian System,” any name that signaled “that the SDI is the 
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functional equivalent of building a wall around your city to keep out the invaders.”31 Robert 
McFarlane like the idea, but other appellations failed to have the traction as the catchy “Star 
Wars.”  
 SDI was not a practical deterrent, but it was a useful tool in Reagan’s diplomatic arsenal 
when it came time to negotiate treaties with the USSR in 1986. Reagan officials dismissed 
suggestions that SDI would be a bargaining chip, but the President privately hoped SDI would 
cajole the Soviets into supporting arms agreements favorable to the U.S., as Nixon had tried to 
do with the anti-ballistic missile system (ABM).32 When Reagan met with Gorbachev in 
Reykjavik to discuss the reduction of nuclear weapons, SDI was used to force the Soviets to 
accommodate American proposals for a nuclear arms treaty.  Gorbachev refused. Before 
agreeing to universal cuts in nuclear weapons, he demanded Reagan relegate SDI to a research 
and development stage, not an active program. Reagan stonewalled, declaring SDI non-
negotiable.  
 At the time, Americans largely supported Reagan’s po ition. The Reagan administration 
promoted SDI as a defensive response to Soviet rearmament in the months before the summit.  
According to the administration, this was “the proper strategic context,” of the international 
situation with the Soviets.  The selling of SDI accompanied impressions of a Soviet Union 
diligently expanding its military and nuclear programs.33 SDI was therefore a “deterrent” 
mechanism to counter Soviet expansionism, Reagan officials claimed. This image was accepted 
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by a public concerned over renewed tensions between the two powers. Local and national polls 
taken years before the Reykjavik summit showed increased support for missile defense following 
the public relations campaign. Sixty-eight percent of Americans believed Reagan should not 
compromise over SDI; only 20 percent thought it was beneficial for the interests of nuclear 
disarmament.34 In the defense-rich state of California, 70 percent of those polled “clearly 
supported the President’s ballistic missile defense i itiative.” Indeed, public support for SDI was 
one of the reasons why the administration viewed th missile defense shield as “important” to 
American foreign policy.35  
 SDI was conceived within the discourse of American n tional security, but it enhanced 
the fortunes of the Cold War economy even more thanit contributed to American diplomacy. 
When Congress approved funding for SDI, upper-class suburban areas in the West, many that 
leaned toward conservative Republicans, benefited most. As the fortunes of SDI’s contractors 
rose, defense monies went disproportionately to suburbs outside Denver and Washington, D.C., 
regions with high property values and high incomes.  The chief contractor for SDI was Martin 
Marietta, located in Waterton, a Denver suburb. At the end of the third quarter in 1987, Martin 
Marietta had net sales of $4.75 billion, and net earnings of $202 million, capital assets of $535 
million, employed 11,397 in its Astronautics Group, 1,638 people in its Information & 
Communications Systems and 1,700 in Data Systems—a total of 14,735  employees. Martin 
Marietta’s headquarters in Denver also brought a large influx of revenue to the state. The 
company was withheld $20.6 million in Colorado taxes and paid 7.6 million in local property 
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taxes, less than 1 percent but still a significant number from a single source.36  Martin Marietta’s 
fantastic financial success was a direct product of Cold War spending. Before the federal 
government directed the aerospace and defense industry’s expansion into Colorado, cities like 
Waterton were sparsely populated towns without a driving economic force. Like with many 
defense communities, these were cities invented by the federal government. National regulations 
stipulated that defense factories be built in isolated regions away from population centers. This 
spurred suburban construction to accommodate the influx of defense employees, creating high-
tech Cold War defense communities populated by wealthy engineers and scientists.37 SDI also 
raised the stock prices of defense contractors. Investors bought up defense stocks in larger 
numbers during the first half of the 1980, as military stocks, The New York Times reported, were 
"in vogue.”38 
 SDI was a unique defense project, largely research-based rather than production-based. 
Unlike the manufacturing of Trident missiles or heavy ircraft carriers, large factories were not 
needed. With deindustrialization taking hold of American cities, even in Cold War communities, 
and SDI in a perpetual state of experimentation, there was little to manufacture. Political scientist 
Ann Markusen has argued that SDI represented the “tertiarization of the defense industries,” the 
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age of a “new trend—the development of pure research complexes.”39 SDI was indicative of how 
federal defense spending would function under a conservative President managing a post-
industrial economy. SDI ushered in a high-tech and experimental model for defense contracting 
that was replicated by companies across the nation. In addition to Lockheed, other defense 
contactors, companies such as Rockwell, based in Southern California, transitioned to high-tech 
commercial electronics work after orders for its largest plane, the B-1 bomber, were cancelled in 
1987.  Though the company earned $12.3 billion in revenues, over 18,000 people were laid off. 
Rockwell CEO Robert Anderson wanted the company to work toward diversification of its 
industry, the oft-stated, but elusive goal of defense companies since the 1950s. But Rockwell 
struggled to make up its losses from the B-1 by bidding for future defense contracts. So did 
Lockheed when the C-5B plane was cancelled.40 The defense industry was just as dependent 
upon government contracts in the 1980s as it was in the 1950s. 
  The transformation in defense was also a corollary of Wall Street's wider, steady capture 
of the economy. In addition to the expanding defense sector, Reagan provided federal assistance 
in the form of subsidies, tax cuts, and other “nontradable” changes to the law governing real 
estate and finance.41 As Wall Street came to direct the course of economic development in the 
1980s, the financial sector came to have greater input i  other areas of the economy. As 
America’s industrial economy deteriorated, investment markets did not respond well to 
undiversified defense corporations dependent upon federal procurement to manufacture large 
equipment.42 After the slight boom in defense stocks faded, downsizing, hostile takeovers, and 
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consolidated mergers and acquisitions threatened contractors who had not received an equal 
portion of funds from the defense buildup.  
 The decline in defense stocks most affected the Northeastern region of the Gunbelt. 
Fearing job losses, Jack Kemp wrote to Reagan asking him to prevent the acquisition of 
Grumman aerospace by LTV Corporation. Kemp was afraid the buyout would “lead to the 
liquidation of Grumman operations and the resultant loss of hundreds of jobs in New York.” The 
full weight of federal regulations and laws, including anti-trust laws and violations of federal 
statues regarding defense contracting, were impediments to any deal, Kemp implied. The 
preservation of Grumman would “insure the wellbeing of our national defense industrial base” 
and prevent disastrous “consequences for Grumman employees and shareholders, for New York 
aerospace workers and the state economy.” LTV dropped its takeover of Grumman in November 
1981, but Grumman struggled on, until merging with Northrop in 1994.  As major military 
electronics and defense companies were bought out or went bankrupt, Wall Street predicted the 
“takeover trend" would continue into the near future.43 
 SDI was also an issue that mobilized Gunbelt voters to support Reagan in forthcoming 
elections. During the 1984 campaign, Reagan official Jay Keyworth thought it was a “good idea” 
to follow Mike Schwartz’s suggestion to enlist local Republican voters to promote SDI. “We 
have, in the Republican Congressional candidates, a potentially effective grass-roots mechanism 
for making the case for SDI.”44 The Senate race between Representative Ken Kramer nd 
Democrat Tim Wirth in Colorado put this strategy into action during the 1986 midterm elections. 
Kramer, an anti-government conservative Republican, ran on his record of promoting SDI in the 
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waning weeks of his campaign. He used SDI to further his image to as a job creator, boasting to 
a newspaper reporter about his role in getting the National Test Facility to open in Colorado 
Springs: responsible for developing a large share of the necessary equipment for SDI. Kramer 
said that the National Test Facility’s arrival was ju t one significant good to come out of SDI. He 
claimed SDI would bring 8,000 jobs to Colorado, at a time when the region suffered from 
persistent economic problems. The Democratic Wirth recognized the salience of SDI, and did 
not want to center his campaign on his opposition to the missile defense system. As his campaign 
manager said, “there are a lot of livelihoods riding on S.D.I., and we don’t want to seem anti-
job.”45   
 With Election Day nearing, Reagan appeared at a rally for Kramer, praising him for his 
stance on SDI. Kramer’s supporters cheered while anti-SDI demonstrators confronted Reagan 
with signs: “Keep Star Wars in the Movie Theaters.”46 SDI was, Reagan said, “America's 
insurance policy to protect us from accidents or some madman who might come along, as a 
Hitler did or a Qadhafi, or just in case the Soviets don't keep their side of a bargain.” Linking 
anti-government rhetoric to the local and international context of the Cold War, Reagan went on 
to say that Kramer “has proven crucial in our efforts to cut your taxes and get big government off 
your backs,” but was also “central in our efforts to rebuild the nation's defenses.” Reagan 
continued on to a discussion of SDI, saying that Kramer was an early and “strong supporter of 
our Strategic Defense Initiative. And he helped convince the administration to put the major 
research center that will be the brains of SDI right here in Colorado.” Kramer understood “our 
Strategic Defense Initiative will open the door to a new technological age. Just as America's 
space program created new jobs and industries, SDI could open whole new fields of technology 
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and industry, providing jobs for thousands, as Ken said, right here in Colorado and improving the 
quality of life in America and around the world.”47  
  Even with Reagan’s endorsement, Kramer lost the election. The jobs SDI brought to 
Colorado could not make up for employment losses in other areas of the state. Considering 
Colorado voters’ concerns over unemployment and Krame ’s reputation as a right-wing radical, 
the election was quite close—Wirth won by only 16,455 votes. In the 6th congressional district, 
home of Waterton and Martin Marietta, Kramer defeated Wirth by a near two to one margin, 
104,359 to 53,384 votes.48  After Kramer’s loss, Reagan continued to turn to Coloradoans 
employed by SDI to promote his economic and defense policies. Approximately a year later after 
Kramer’s defeat, Reagan visited the Denver headquarters of Martin Marietta on November 24, 
1987 to launch a public relations event for SDI. The NSC prepared drafts of Reagan’s speech to 
two thousand employees Martin Marietta employees, telling Reagan that he should make clear 
that SDI is “strengthening deterrence,” and to downplay arms control while emphasizing Soviet 
efforts to build their own version of SDI. American intelligence showed the Soviets spent 200 
billion dollars in their budget “on strategic defens  programs over the last 10 years, roughly what 
they’ve spent on offense," versus America's $10 billion. Reagan should emphasize this point to 
workers, the NSC suggested. After Reagan toured the Martin Marietta facility and received 
updates on the Zenith Star (the program developing chemical lasers to be emitted from space), he 
took the podium, telling the scientists and engineers, “You are laboring to develop a defensive 
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system that will change history. Once you’ve completed your work, the world will never be the 
same.”49   
 But the election of George H.W. Bush, and the end of the Cold War, meant the end of 
SDI. Bush told Americans that SDI was unnecessary and the program was retooled and 
dismantled under Bill Clinton. In the final analysis, SDI accomplished little for American foreign 
policy, and did more harm than good for Reagan. The weapons system temporarily derailed a 
rapprochement between the superpowers that would have begun earlier in the decade. SDI was 
created with the means of foreign policy, but it functioned to serve the domestic ends of an 
austerity agenda. SDI was an expansive jobs program: a public works agency more than a 
deterrent to nuclear war. SDI employed the highly educated and affluent to build a missile 
defense system that had no feasible application to the current foreign policy environment. It 
reinforced class and regional tensions, steering federal benefits to an overwhelmingly white set 
of middle and upper-class elites. Forty years earlir, Truman had put unemployed members of 
the New Deal coalition (union members and the working-class) back to work through defense 
spending. Reagan now sought to do the same for his con ervative constituents.  Furthermore, 
SDI fulfilled the intentions of military Keynesianism, something Cold War Democrats pursued 
forty years ago. Containment was discarded in favor of “ ollback,” but Reagan officials were 
governing within Cold War Democrats’ parameters of h w to fight the Cold War. 
 SDI also reflected transformations in the political economy of defense. Defense had 
overwhelmingly benefited middle-class and upper-class Americans, but with the manufacturing 
base of the defense industry eroded, the Reagan administration provided a capstone to a thirty-
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year process of de-industrialization. Industrial areas in the Northeast were largely left out of SDI 
contracts as specialized and specific localities in the West and Sunbelt took over. This new era 
for defense was felt with a force in Cold War communities suffering from unemployment. As 
defense communities mobilized to oppose job losses at the end of the Cold War, Democrats and 
Republicans in power were faced with the question of what the federal government’s 
responsibility was–if any—to help Americans who were put out of work by the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the collapse of Soviet communism. 
  
The Political Economy of Peace 
 On December 8, 1987, Reagan met with Mikhail Gorbachev to sign the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) that eliminated the numbers of intercontinental ballistic 
missiles that carried nuclear warheads. Few of his supporters suspected Reagan would consider, 
let alone sign, a nuclear arms treaty with a Soviet head of state before 1987. The road to the INF 
treaty started at the Reykjavik summit in 1986. Days before the summit, Republican 
congressional representatives encouraged Reagan to retain suspicion of the Soviet Union and not 
fall into a discussion of the Soviet’s “arms control agenda” as the only “true cause of East-West 
tension is not armaments, but the totalitarian philosophy of the Soviet Union.” Where ten years 
ago Reagan had made the opposition to the Helsinki accords part of his campaign message, now 
the President praised them, and his supporters told him to mention to Gorbachev the point that 
the Soviet Union “continues to violate the modest human rights guarantees embodied in 
Helsinki.”50 Reagan did bring up human rights issues at Reykjavik, but it had little effect on the 
outcome of the talks. The Reykjavik summit failed to produce a new shift in Soviet-U.S. 
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relations, but the meeting allowed Gorbachev and Reagan to develop a bourgeoning friendship 
and recognition for each other’s desire to reduce nuclear weapons, particularly after the Able 
Archer disaster. When it was announced that Gorbachev would visit Washington, D.C. to sign 
the INF treaty, the right was in stunned disbelief, thinking the President had committed treason 
to their cause. After the INF Treaty was signed, columnist George Will wrote that Reagan 
revealed his true colors as a follower of détente. Will was puzzled by what had transpired in the 
last few years because Reagan’s foreign policy “produced much surprise but little delight” 
among the New Right. As Reagan’s presidency was ending, the time was right “for conservatives 
to look back with bewilderment and ahead with trepidation.”51 
 As Will’s comments reveal, despite close association with Reagan, the right was never 
completely satisfied with the President’s decisions, even before his personal diplomacy with 
Gorbachev. Disagreement first surfaced on a large basis in 1982, after the release of the Reagan 
budget and the President’s request for tax increases to make up for revenue lost in the 1981 tax 
cut. After the first hundred days, conservatives mourned the Reagan of the campaign trail. They 
were satisfied with the rhetoric, but at times upset with the policies themselves. Reagan 
campaigned on an austerity platform, but he was forced to compromise with Congress on federal 
spending. The Heritage Foundation complained that in 1982 that "Big Government continue[d] 
to grow.” Budget cuts were not enough to shrink government; “the big games in town—the 
Department of Energy and the Department of Education—still are operating full tilt, and success 
in other areas is primarily limited to cutting back on the size of budget increases.”52 Direct-mail 
strategist Richard Viguerie warned members of the administration that if the right did not get its 
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way, “Our efforts on these cuts will make our Panama Canal treaty fight look small by 
comparison.”53 
  That same year, members of the American Conservative Union, the Conservative 
Caucus, and National Defense Council complained that Re gan had not done enough to provide 
aid and diplomatic recognition to America’s allies, breaking his campaign promises for a more 
anti-communist foreign policy.54 The Conservative Caucus, the Eagle Forum, the Moral 
Majority, and the High Frontier urged Reagan to send needed arms so that Taiwan could prevent 
capitulation to China.55 As activist conservatives found the President modulating his foreign 
policy to political pressures, his luster wore. Richard D .Sellers from Montgomery, Alabama, a 
member of the Council on National Policy who contemplated running for Senate in 1984, told 
National Review publisher William Rusher that “Conservatives must start working even harder 
on these very important national survival issues, since we are losing: the nuclear freeze passed 
the House, the President’s proposed defense budget incr ase has been cut in half, and two House 
committees have voted to cut off covert aid  intended to stop  Communist expansion in Central 
America.” Sellers formed the “National Security Association” in Montgomery with the hope of 
raising $250,000 to make sure that no further steps were taken to counter conservatives’ foreign 
policy. Sellers wanted to enlist Rusher’s “financial help to reverse the national security defeats 
we are now suffering.”56  
 Cold Warriors had reservations about Reagan’s foreign policy throughout his two terms. 
Democratic and Republican hawks particularly questioned Reagan’s fortitude in dealing with 
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nuclear freeze and his commitment to overtaking the Soviet Union in military might. A March 
1982 pamphlet published by the Committee on the Present Danger asked, Is the Reagan Defense 
Program Adequate? It was not. “The administration’s defense program is a minimal one. It will 
not halt the unfavorable trends in the U.S.-Soviet military balance, let alone reverse them.”57 The 
organization’s members fought over its analysis of the Soviet threat, as disagreements mounted 
between those members in the administration and those without.  Responding to a June 20, 1984 
pamphlet critical of Reagan’s defense modernization, Undersecretary of Defense Richard Perle 
told Charls Walker of the CPD that “the draft gives the Administration too little credit for some 
of the strategic force improvements we have inaugurated, even granting the fact that some of 
those forces will not enter the inventory for another few years.”58 The CPD also suffered from 
self-inflicted wounds in the mid-1980s, as disagreem nts between the left and right wings of the 
organization made it difficult for the movement to press forward on defense. According to 
historian Justin Vaïsse, the main controversy was over “guns and butter” with the “Democrats 
and trade unionists among them” unwilling “to reduce other public spending (which Reagan had 
already cut drastically), ...”59 The American Security Council (ASC) jumped at the c ance “to 
capitalize on the strong defense and foreign affairs mandate of this administration,” encouraging 
Reagan to update America’s defense capabilities by building new technological defense projects 
instead of competing with the Soviet Union through outdated military equipment. Members of 
the ASC, Veterans of Foreign Wars, College Republicans, and the Reserve Officers Association 
recommended the President meet with foreign anti-communist leaders, too, such as the Angola 
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UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. Savimbi was treated to lunch by ASC in December 1981 and was 
a guest of honor at a Heritage Foundation reception. The events were meant to illustrate the 
lengths Reagan would go to “resisting the expansion of Soviet influence,” evident in the 
intervention in Grenada and Reagan's support for the Sandinistas in El Salvador. 60 
 Reagan did not, however, feel he had to accommodate his right-wing base on all national 
defense matters. In his second term, Reagan collaborated with Gorbachev to reduce tensions 
between the two superpowers to the chagrin of his con ervative backers. The right’s fears aside, 
diplomatic negotiations between Reagan and Gorbachev fail d to translate to a complete 
“reversal” of Reagan’s approach to American foreign relations and defense spending. Reagan did 
not think the INF treaty and the subsequent reduction of nuclear weapons were opportunities to 
reduce the defense budget. On the contrary, Reagan still wanted increases in the size of the 
defense budget to be paid for by cutting social programs. International diplomacy between the 
United States and the Soviet Union did not mean a reevaluation of American budgetary 
requirements for defense. In budget negotiations on N vember 30, 1987, one week before the 
signing of the INF treaty, Reagan said that “our team [went] back to the bargaining table twice 
for better deals, one time to get a billion dollars more from entitlement spending, another to get 
revenue increases down to the kind I called for in the budget” which he outlined earlier in the 
year.  The federal deficit, Reagan insisted, was not due to the decline in revenue taken in by 
federal coffers, as the “cuts in tax rates aren’t par of the deficit problem. They’re part of the 
solution. Our tax rate cuts haven’t lowered revenues one bit; in fact, just as we predicted, cutting 
tax rates produced a healthy, expanding, vibrant economy that enlarged tax revenues.”  The new 
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budget projections left even more for defense “with about $3-1/2 billion more in defense outlays 
than last year,” as Reagan touted the new defense programs that would lead to advances in 
military weaponry. Simply because there was talk of arms agreements between the United States 
and Soviet Union it was no time to be cutting defense programs that “have given us bargaining 
leverage,” and on top of that, “with negotiated missile reductions coming, we will need even 
more urgently a strong conventional force to deter th  Soviet Union’s massive conventional 
force.”61 Reagan (and a Democratic-controlled Congress) approved a defense budget of $304 
billion dollars for the fiscal year 1989, a more than fifty billion dollar increase in the past four 
years.62 
 But large defense reductions did occur after the Berlin Wall came crumbling down in 
1989. With the Cold War’s end nigh, the companies and workers in defense communities were 
thrown into a state of panic, concerned for their economic future. Leslie Gelb of The New York 
Times wrote that “with the demise of the Soviet Union, a battle is shaping up for the soul of the 
nation, and the defense budget now more than ever will be at the center.”63 Adding to the stress 
among the members of the military-industrial complex was that the Reagan years did not mean 
an automatic boost to all regions in the Gunbelt. Major defense companies like Fairchild 
Industries in Nassau County, Long Island went bankrupt. By the end of the 1980s, Fairchild’s 
financial portfolio was so poor that when the company did not win a contract for the T-46A jet, 
executives made the decision to lay off 2,500 employees. The competition for the T-46A contract 
went to Cessna Manufacturing Company in Wichita, Kansas (because of the lobbying efforts of 
Republican Senator Bob Dole) and took the fate of Fairchild with it. By the end of the year, 
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Fairchild closed its doors. Once again, the failure to diversify left the company dependent upon 
the Cold War. Without it, the company could not thrive. The loss of Fairchild was a loss for all 
of Nassau County. It meant declining profits for the various subcontractors to Fairchild, the 
suppliers of Fairchild’s equipment, and even the closing of restaurants who supplied the workers 
with their lunches and coffees. Democrat Thomas Downey, who represented Suffolk County and 
was a leading voice against Reagan’s foreign policy in the House of Representatives, as well as a 
supporter of arms control and the nuclear freeze move ent, nevertheless felt bound to the Cold 
War interests in his district.64 Downey pronounced Fairchild’s collapse as “a human tr gedy of 
the first order. Not only are we losing the manufacturing jobs—jewels in any economy—but we 
also stand to lose the jobs of all the contractors, vendors, and others who have depended on the 
factory.” Wall Street fund managers, ever more powerful, believed that companies like Fairchild 
could not survive with “the current condition of the defense budget” and the “politics involved” 
of defense contracting.65  
 Fairchild was not the only defense contractor in Lo g Island that endured defense 
cutbacks. At one point in its history, Grumman employed 36,000 employees; by 1991, it had 
only 13,000. Shortly before merging with Northrop, Grumman executives touted their 
diversification efforts, saying that the company’s lo ses were “not a result of what has happened 
with perestroika” and predicted no need for mass layoffs down the road. They were wrong. One 
year after their prediction, Grumman laid off 1,400 workers in Long Island, 1,900 throughout its 
workforce.  The defense economy in Long Island, once employing more than fifty percent of the 
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area’s work force, by 1988 was responsible for only twenty five percent of the jobs in the 
region.66 
 Economists thought a variety of other high-tech areas such as biotechnology would 
replace the defense economy in Cold War communities. More often, however, the low-wage 
service industry supplanted the defense economy after the Cold War. The decline of the defense 
industry in Long Island made tax rates, public school spending and other areas of local 
government a growing concern to its residents. A drop in defense, combined with the downturn 
in the stock market after it crashed in 1988 following the Savings and Loan scandals, made Long 
Island residents search to make up for lost revenue. Rising tax rates, the inability to find 
“affordable housing,” and cutting “the cost of public education” were now high on the list of 
concerns among business leaders and residents of the area.67 Suburban Long Island’s crippling 
reliance on the Cold War economy led its residents to search for solutions to the downsizing of 
defense, with little answers. With jobs disappearing a d the local manufacturing base wearing 
down, the problem of deficits and budgets became more pressing than ever before in the region’s 
postwar history. 
 Cold War communities in the Northeast were hit hardest by the end of the Cold War. Job 
losses in defense at the end of Reagan’s presidency culminated a process of layoffs in the 
Northeastern Gunbelt that began in the 1970s. In Southern Connecticut as well as Long Island, 
workers prepared for job losses after 1989. President of UNC Naval Products (based in 
Montville, Connecticut), Bruce Andrews, told the House committee on Economic Stabilization 
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that federal help must be provided for his employees who were “veterans of the cold war.” 68 
Republican representative (and later governor) of Connecticut, John G. Rowland, worked with 
UNC employees to get them another contract after they lost one building a Navy reactor to 
Babcox &Wilcox, based in Lynchburg, Virginia. Rowland appeared to be weary of the impact 
global peace had on workers in his state as unemploy ent was “the other side of the peace 
dividend.” Workers at UNC organized the S.O.S. (Save Our State) Committee that coordinated 
with “federal officials to help find Government contacts to replace the defense work at UNC and 
other Connecticut companies.”69 
 The Sunbelt also suffered from the “peace dividend,” although no major companies went 
out of business. Lockheed Aircraft laid off 7,000 employees in Southern California; McDonnell 
Douglas did the same to its workers, reducing its ranks by 6,000 employees. Defense companies 
in the Midwest also felt compelled to lay off employees. Executives at General Dynamics in St. 
Louis, which made Trident submarines, talked in hushed whispers about peace, calling it “the P-
word.” While St. Louis rapidly worked to make up for the losses in defense (at a much better rate 
than other parts of the Gunbelt), defense workers wre resentful at the lack of government help 
for its workers. Former employees of McDonnell Douglas in St. Louis drew comparisons 
between unemployed autoworkers with strong unions and themselves, who saw their benefits 
packages run out after six months. McDonnell Douglas employee Frank Hutson was angry that 
the government did nothing for defense workers. “If you have car makers that give their 
employees one, two, three years at 85 percent of their salaries, then I feel that McDonnell 
Douglas should have done the same thing.” But if the company couldn’t provide comparable 
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packages alone, “then the Government should have stepped in and helped.”70 The Governor of 
Ohio too lamented “the dark side of the peace dividend” as détente meant layoff notices for 
thousands of Ohioans. Like their colleagues in St. Louis, defense workers in Ohio and California 
were worried about how a transition to a peacetime economy would occur without disrupting 
their livelihoods. Southern Californians were skeptical of federal programs that employed them 
on non-defense projects to build mass transit systems. While “beating swords into plowshares” 
after the Berlin Wall was “a nice theory” it was “not so easily translated into reality.”71  
 Cutbacks in defense on a dramatic scale once againmade defense workers and their 
political representatives into citizen lobbyists for the Cold War. The new era of international 
relations after 1989 offered a crisis in the economic and political fortunes of many Americans, 
who then fought to maintain the structure of the national security state beyond the Cold War. The 
local constituents of the Cold War kept militarizaton a distinct feature of American foreign 
policy, as they argued that the federal government had a commitment to their financial well-
being. Having made them dependent upon the military- ndustrial complex, the federal 
government could not discard them and their communities when the international environment 
did not align with the interests of Cold War workers.  
 Grassroots activists on the left realized the potential trouble local politics had for scaling 
back the defense economy. The end of the Cold War made the push for economic conversion of 
defense communities to non-defense work a primary issue for the anti-Cold War left and nuclear 
freeze activists. After it was defeated in Congress, the freeze campaign did not retreat, but 
regrouped to deal with the social effects of the Cold War in local areas. The fall of the Eastern 
bloc of Soviet states provided momentum for anti-nuclear activists to challenge the need for a 
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national security state. Instead of protesting in the streets of New York City, the nuclear freeze 
movement reformed to sever the cord between defense monies and Gunbelt towns. Conversion 
was the way to disarmament, and congressional repres ntatives should not be “held hostage to 
continue the arms race as a condition of supplying jobs and money to their constituencies.”72 
 Nuclear freeze activists and anti-militarist liberals worked together to create conversion 
programs to reemploy workers in the name of peace.  Kevin Bean, Chairman of the Economic 
Conversion Task Force of the Connecticut Campaign for a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Nuclear Arms Freeze, 
rightly stated that once skilled defense workers were laid off, their high-skilled jobs were 
replaced by the low-wage service sector. “Low-paying service jobs are the only alternatives for 
many laid-off defense workers whose skills are mismatched with the limited number of civilian 
jobs that would pay comparable to their previous jobs in defense facilities.” Bean grounded 
conversion in the rhetoric of economic efficiency, tr ing perhaps to win Republican fiscal hawks 
to his side.  Jobs in defense were inherently unstable, nd companies needed to stop going from 
contract to contract to survive, he suggested. The “permanent war economy” he said, cost the 
nation increases in productivity, interfered in themarket economy, and was inefficient in 
creating jobs compared to the private sector. Globalization and outsourcing contributed to the 
problem too as defense dollars that went to Connecticut “go right back out to out-of-state-
subsidiaries, vendors in the Sun Belt or the third world and coproduction setups overseas in order 
to cash in on cheaper labor, tax breaks, and to widen Congressional influence.”73 If the market 
did not have to compete with the federally subsidize  defense sector, there would be more jobs 
available for Connecticut’s residents. 
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 The Reagan administration, the military, and defense i dustry workers resisted 
conversion to non-defense labor. The Reagan administration seemed to think conversion was 
unimportant, as it slashed federal funds to the Economic Development Administration, the 
federal organization responsible for conversion plas.74 As cuts appeared an inevitable reality, 
military lobbyists worked overtime on Capitol Hill, pushing for their specific companies and 
programs to remain in the defense budget. Resistance to onversion came from a range of 
political groups who would normally be at odds with one another on most domestic and foreign 
policy issues, but not on defense spending. A coaliti n of Democrats, Republicans, labor unions, 
and business interests colluded to stop defense cut and conversion, wanting to preserve the 
American defense apparatus for profits and employment, and keep defense communities happy 
and voting for incumbent candidates. Right-leaning Republican Curt Weldon from Pennsylvania 
defended the V-22 Osprey helicopter program that employed 600 workers at a Boeing plant 
under his jurisdiction. To Weldon, the Osprey was “not a pork program. I believe in the 
technology.” In defending the Osprey, Weldon found company with the United Auto Workers 
(UAW) who feared that its 8,000 members would be out of work if the Osprey were defunded. 
When the union’s close association with Boeing and other contractors for the Osprey was 
pointed out to the UAW’s Dirk Warden, he admitted that the two groups made strange 
bedfellows. Warden said he did not “want to leave the impression that we’re in lockstep with 
[Boeing management]. But they can talk to some people we can’t talk to and vice versa.”75 
 Some Republicans in the George H.W. Bush administrat on also supported reductions to 
the defense budget. The left wanted to cut drastically the defense budget to meet social needs, 
but conservative Republicans felt that post-Cold War American foreign policy had to be 
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redesigned to fight new threats. American military power was necessary; fighting the Cold War 
was not. Hawks from the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administration such as Richard Perle, 
Dick Cheney, and Fred Iklé pushed for reductions in traditional Cold War weapons, arguing that 
stockpiling nuclear weapons was an anachronistic strategy to deal with an obsolete threat. But as 
Secretary of Defense under Bush, Cheney vacillated on efense cuts. On June 12, 1991, Cheney 
testified before Congress to say that more defense cuts would damage America’s strength in the 
world, but said that specific helicopters and airplnes needed to be scrapped and replaced. Perle 
was sympathetic to Cheney’s statements on defense and his call for cutting certain defense 
programs. He departed from character when he said th t cuts to America’s nuclear arsenal could 
be “probably to half the levels now contemplated. We have other requirements for our resources, 
even within the military, and I do not like to see us buy more than we need.”76  Fred Iklé, in the 
National Review of all places, said that the United States could afford to reduce its Cold War 
arsenal even further than the original estimates offered by the Bush administration. Right-wing 
libertarians joined the ranks of men like Perle, Cheney, and Iklé. Think tanks like the Heritage 
Foundation wrote reports with the thesis that the United States could save money by eliminating 
defense programs that had no purpose, including the C-17 Cargo plane made by McDonnell 
Douglas. In response to the Heritage Foundation report, McDonnell Douglas promptly cut off its 
funding to the organization. After giving the Heritage Foundation $30,000 dollars in 1989, the 
defense contractor refused to give a grant to the organization in 1990.77 Politicians like 
Republican Arlen Specter from Pennsylvania and Democrat Daniel K. Inouye from Hawaii also 
wanted to keep defense programs in their districts intact. Specter, like his Republican colleague 
in the House, Curt Weldon, worried about the cancellation of the V-22 Osprey helicopter. 
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Specter argued there was “a predisposition against the V-22 and a rather conclusive one on the 
part of the Department of Defense.”78  
 The financial power of defense industrialists, defense labor, and certain labor unions 
made the difference in keeping the national security state alive when it was questioned by current 
and former policy makers in the Reagan and Bush administrations. But opposition to defense 
cuts was selective among the right. Most movement co servatives were critical of defense cuts to 
reduce the size of the military, and cautioned hasty responses to the geopolitical consequences of 
the Soviet Union’s fall—which included the disbandig of the national security state and the 
Cold War economy. With communism in retreat, the right thought it was time to use the savings 
on the defense budget for cutting tax rates. Experts in defense within the Heritage Foundation 
argued that now was a time for the government to rerout  taxpayer dollars that would have been 
used on defense to fund school vouchers or marriage tax credits.  The end of the Cold War was 
another means to restore the market as a solution to what ails the country, for “a peace dividend 
could fund innovative market solutions to pressing social and economic problems.” After close 
to fifty years, the right recognized that “today’s Big Government is the result not so much of the 
New Deal as of the massive power assembled in Washington to wage World War II and the cold 
war” and are now able to focus on domestic issues.  As members of Congress, defense 
executives, and Cold War workers demanded federal bailouts for a weakened defense industry, 
activist conservatives saw opportunities for remaking tax and social welfare policy to correspond 
to the changing dynamics of world politics following the fall of the Soviet empire.  The right 
should welcome the new era in U.S. foreign relations, said Heritage Foundation member Burton 
Yale Pines, as the “peace dividend” can be important “ o conservatives for what it can do for 
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their movement.” The end of the Cold War provided opp rtunities for the right to “demand a 
dollar-for-dollar domestic cut for every Pentagon dollar cut” by anti-militarist liberals.79 
 These conservative proposals for tax cuts, deficit reduction and less government 
intervention (on non-defense matters)  became more attractive to towns dependent upon the 
military economy — even though residents of defense communities still requested more 
government involvement in the form of defense contracts. The remaining years of the 1980s 
offered Cold War communities pessimism about the rol  of the federal government and its ability 
to come to the aid of Americans in times of economic crisis. The end of the Cold War seemed to 
be a reason why the country slipped into a recession in the 1990s, as defense companies had 
difficulty selling their products to former markets at home and abroad, affecting the economy as 
a whole.80 While economists assured Americans that the country would recover, for Americans 
in defense communities, any recovery was insufficient if it did not restore the jobs lost to peace. 
 
Conclusion  
 During his administration from 1981 to 1989, Ronald Reagan affirmed the endurance of 
the Cold War state in American political culture and its continued influence on the economic 
structure of American foreign policy.  Diplomacy with the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold 
War during the Reagan-Bush years allowed Republicans to make the federal state an agent of 
inequality, as increased defense spending and tax cuts for the wealthy meant gains for upper-
class suburban defense communities—particularly ones located in Republican strongholds. 
While Reagan’s policies were a product of his conservative agenda, his administration was far 
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from an unconditional victory for the right. Reagan officials confronted detractors and opponents 
at both the grassroots and leadership levels that curtailed the more motivated right-wing defense 
hawks within the Reagan administration. While the context of international affairs favored a 
return to militarism and market forces to fix global strife, anti-militarism existed during the 
1980s and was even appropriated by former members of the Reagan and Bush administrations. 
When confronted with the remains of Cold War liberalism and the political economy of the Cold 
War, anti-militarism offered Americans a way out of their dependency on the Cold War that was 
rejected by the elements of the Cold War coalition. Democrats and Republicans in power 
beholden to the national security state inadvertently condoned Reagan’s foreign policy of “peace 
through strength” by defending the military programs that others wanted to cut.  When 
congressional anti-militarists were therefore presented with the advantageous moment to 
drastically abate the growth of the Cold War state af r 1989, they fell victim to the same 
constituent pressures they had been faced with for over forty years, leaving the Cold War 
coalition in a position to continue influencing American domestic and foreign policy after the 
Cold War’s demise.  
 Nevertheless, the limits to Reagan’s defense buildup reveal how the postmortem praise 
given to Reagan by conservatives obscures the important gains made by the left during the 1980s 
as well as the contentious and complicated reality of he New Right’s relationship to Reagan. 
Sycophantic praise for Reagan’s handling of the Cold War following the demise of global 
communism reinforced the cultural and political justifications for the national security state. In 
the minds of conservatives, Reagan singlehandedly en ed the Cold War through massive 
military spending—and the right had therefore been correct about the need for a large defense 
structure. Once “New Democrats” took over the Presid ncy and the Congress in the 1990s, 
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however, this image of the Reagan legacy went unchallenged, and Democrats came to view the 
national security state as an unfortunate material requirement to preserve American military 
power abroad.  
 The end of the Cold War also made many Americans in defense communities 
disenchanted with government. Feeling burdened with hig  taxes and the increased costs of 
living after the defense industry downsized, middle-class and blue-collar defense workers 
believed they had been abandoned by the federal government. Nassau and Suffolk County, Long 
Island never fully recovered from the peace dividend. The area became a haven for wealthy 
vacationers and commuters to Manhattan, but the local economy was typical of many post-
industrial towns. While the region was touted by the Wall Street Journal as an “unlikely jobs 
engine,” after the Great Recession of 2008, the papr cknowledged that half of the over 30,000 
jobs created in Long Island “were in low-wage industrie  like retail and restaurants” that catered 
to tourists.  The high paying “manufacturing and defense industry jobs that once defined the 
island aren’t likely to return after being trimmed during the most recent recession.” Indeed, 
Northrop Grumman’s workforce in Long Island went from 22,550 workers in the 1980s to 550 in 
2013.81  
 The realization by Long Island officials that the “d fense pie is shrinking” after the Cold 
War meant heightened attention to rising spending and t x rates. In austere times, increases in 
local and federal taxes created upheaval amongst defense communities unaccustomed to such 
harsh recessions. Poor economic conditions (unemploy ent, low wages) made Cold War 
communities like Nassau and Suffolk County favor proposals for reducing taxes and eliminating 
the size of government. Indeed, the cuts in the defnse brought local Long Island politicians like 
                                                




Republican county executive Thomas Gulotta of Nassau County to plea with state officials to 
alleviate the county’s spending obligations, asking New York Governor Mario Cuomo to not 
“shift more of the burden onto the shoulders of loca  government, our taxpayers, and our home 
owners.” State and federal officials had seemingly abandoned the defense community after the 
Cold War, thus leaving its residents at the mercy of the unemployment line and the impersonal 
forces of the market. More than the achievements of movement conservatives, the fall of the 
Cold War economy made Americans who depended on it favor conservative ideas and policies, 








 Two years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, President Bill Clinton saw an 
opportunity to eliminate the needless remnants of the Cold War. Clinton viewed military cuts as 
part of the puzzle of deficit reduction. The Cold War was over, and Clinton reasonably 
concluded that stockpiles of nuclear weapons, military installations, and high-tech experimental 
weaponry were not strategically valuable to the United States, but instead, were a burden on the 
nation’s finances. During the 1992 presidential camp ign, Clinton promised to cut George H. W. 
Bush’s defense budget by sixty billion dollars, and o ce elected, he ordered the Department of 
Defense to conduct a comprehensive examination of all defense outlays.1  
 When that review was complete, Clinton proposed a multipronged approach to trimming 
the Cold War economy, asking for the closure of military bases, the retraining of defense 
workers to civilian work, and cuts to expensive technological programs favored by conservatives 
and Republicans, including the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and the B-1 bomber. Far from 
radical, Clinton’s first defense budget wanted to reduce military expenditures by fourteen billion 
dollars over the previous year to adjust the United States to the new strategic and international 
post-Cold War environment. Doing away with the political economy of defense was not on 
Clinton’s agenda—while opposed to a massive defense budget, he was not anti-defense. But 
when Clinton’s Secretary of Defense Lee Aspin annouced in March a plan to eliminate at least 
thirty one military bases across the country, members of Congress with military bases in their 
districts denounced the cuts. Democratic Senator Dianne Feinstein was deeply disturbed by the 
“real problems” posed to defense workers in her state of California who were victims of the 
cutbacks, which Feinstein said she had “just begun to fight.” Her colleague from South Carolina, 
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Democrat Ernest F. Hollings, said that the “base closure lists clobbers Charleston” and vowed to 
wage “a unified front to keep the Navy in South Carolina.” Clinton assured his fellow Democrats 
in Congress that base closures would not eliminate all positions, and the federal government 
would provide at least 15 billion dollars in aid money to Cold War communities adversely 
affected by the changes. Clinton believed the market would adjust to the new defense economy.2 
“The private sector is the engine of lasting economic growth in our system, and therefore our 
plan must help our companies make these transitions, t  compete and to win,” Clinton said.3 
 Clinton’s pro-market rhetoric failed to convince Rpublicans with military bases in their 
districts and states to back his defense program. Arizona Republican John McCain said it was 
“unconscionable” for Clinton to have “politicized the process in this fashion.” Republican 
Alphonse D’Amato swore he would “fight tooth and nail” to ensure the Staten Island Home Port 
stayed open.4 As plans for base closures and mergers went forward du ing the 1990s, Republican 
from Missouri (and later member of the Heritage Foundation) Senator Jim Talent worked to save 
civilian Army workers from being relocated from St. Louis to Huntsville, Alabama. In didactical 
language, Talent claimed that because the federal government was ineffective in both creating 
jobs and liquidating them, employees in the fields of engineering and aviation had to remain in 
St. Louis.  In Talent’s view, “the problem is that the government doesn't downsize efficiently 
either."5  Free-market ideologues (and those Republicans who were safe from the closure 
process) split with members of Congress who argued against the realignment of the military 
bases. Texas Representative Dick Armey, whose district escaped defense cuts and budget 
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closures in 1993 believed “the process is never easy for members of Congress with bases in their 
districts,” but promised that better times would come afterward.6  
 Post-Cold War workers also felt conversion was a distant possibility, that defense cuts 
would take their jobs without another waiting for them. Diane Lester, a bookkeeper for the Navy, 
struggled to support her two children on just one income. Lester said that she already “had to talk 
to my parents about taking in my kids, because I don’t know what I am going to do for income” 
without federal aid to dislocated defense workers. Le ter’s colleagues shared her cynicism. Larry 
Wagner, a middle-aged mechanic who worked on jet engin s near Oakland, distrusted the federal 
government to provide help. “All we’re going to hear is appeasement—promises that aren’t 
going to be fulfilled,” said Wagner.  The pall of failed attempts at conversion was far too familiar 
to defense workers. With abounding job losses in an age of austerity, the economic security of 
defense employees was that more fragile.7 
 Mounting and unrelenting opposition to the base closures overwhelmed Clinton. 
Eliminating bases rallied defense communities as the administration received complaints from 
the “bottom up” over the impact the base closings would have on civilian jobs and the financial 
health of the middle-class in affected areas. Letters from residents residing on or near military 
bases poured into members of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, asking 
them to take their hometown off their list.  Grassroots lobbyists summoned a variety of reasons 
lawmakers should save military bases: national security being chief among them.  The Cold War 
was over, but the need for preponderant American power was continual. Miriam M. Mills from 
Nash, Texas wrote that the Red River Army Depot (RRAD) (Texarkana’s major employer) 
should stay open because the United States “is not at peace and never will be. The threat will 
                                                
6 “Defense Chief Lists 31 Big Bases for Closing, and Outcry is Swift,” New York Times, March 13, 1993. 
7 “Clinton Preaches Military Conversion to an Area Hit ard by Cuts,” New York Times, August 14, 1993. 
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always be there. The wall may be down but there are still communists and terrorists.” The RRAD 
has served the country well against its enemies “and never let our military down.”8 Residents of 
New Mexico signed a petition in support of Kirtland Air Force Base saying it had “contributed to 
our strong deterrent posture throughout the Cold War ye rs and visibly demonstrates its worth 
during Desert Storm.”9 Defense communities even argued that the world was less safe without 
the Soviet Union. One woman who wanted to keep the Long Beach Naval Shipyard in California 
open “for its military and strategic value” said she did “not feel safe from war in todays [sic] 
world even if the cold war is over.  I remember Pearl H rbor and I pray we have learned a little 
over the years and do not put all our ships in one area.”10 
 Clinton proceeded with the military base closures, but following the uprising among 
defense workers and members of the United States military, they were not as extensive as 
originally planned.  Schedules for base closings were put off or delayed after 1995, pleasing the 
Republican right who called for higher defense spending under the “Contract for America” led 
by Newt Gingrich. The New York Times reported that delayed base closures “would spare mny 
communities economic turmoil,” but would unnecessarily dd to the defense budget as the 
United States military was “keeping open more bases, d pots, shipyards and laboratories than the 
shrinking post-Cold War military needs.”11 Concern for the national deficit, so paramount in the 
1992 election, was less important within the debate over national defense spending. When 
                                                
8 Letter from Miriam Mills to the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, General Mail - Red River 
Army Depot (Folder 2 of 2), 1995, University of North Texas Digital Library.  
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc26915/, accessed February 22, 2013. The Red River Army Depot was 
saved from closure in 1995. 
9 “Citizens Petition Protesting Kirtland Air Force Base Realignment,” General Mail - Plattsburgh AFB, NY; 
Kirtland AFB, NM, 1995, University of North Texas Digital Library, 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc27380/, accessed February 22, 2013. 
10 Letter to the Realignment Commission, April 9, 1995, General Mail - Navy - Long Beach Naval Shipyard, CA 
(part 2 of 2); Naval Air Station, Meridian, MS; Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, KY – 1995, University of North 
Texas Digital Library,  http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc27883/, accessed February 22, 2013. 
11 “Defense Department Plans to Close Fewer Bases,” New York Times, January 27, 1995. 
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McGuire Air Force Base in Wrightstown, New Jersey was taken off the closure list, it was saved 
from being “a ghost town.” Wrightstown now expected o see rising numbers in its workforce 
and overall property rates. Marjorie Stine, a retired Air Force sergeant who relocated to 
Wrightstown after moving from Philadelphia when thenaval yard went under in the city, was 
relieved she no longer had to experience the feeling of “pins and needles waiting for the axe to 
fall.” 12 International events also informed the staying power of the Cold War economy. With 
small-scale “humanitarian” wars breaking out in Somalia and Bosnia, and the administration’s 
widened effort to target Islamic terrorism in the Middle East, calls for heightened military 
preparedness came surging back.  Republicans now lied up to defend the defense budget 
believing the “example of Kosovo reminds us that warfare in the 21st century will demand the 
deployment over greater distances from airfields and ports at home.”13  
 The moment where it seemed possible to begin “dismantling” the political economy of 
the Cold War was therefore all too brief. The inability of the United States to relinquish its 
attachments to the Cold War economy contributed to the rise of what historian Andrew Bacevich 
has called the “new American militarism.”14 As resistance against defense cuts carried on into 
the 1990s, a series of foreign policy events fortuitously justified the domestic commitment to the 
Cold War state. When the Berlin Wall fell and the treat of global war dissipated, policymakers 
could wield American power without fear of nuclear annihilation, giving the U.S. greater 
advantage in policing international affairs. The massive military arsenal the United States 
accumulated throughout the Cold War was now necessary precisely because no nation rivaled 
the U.S. in its military strength. In a unipolar world, American power presided over global 
                                                
12 “Lives Constructed Around Military Can Go Forward,” New York Times, June 27, 1993. 
13 “Senate Rejects Pentagon’s Request to Close More Military Bases,” New York Times, May 27, 1999. 
14 Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
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conflicts with fewer restraints. The American victory ver communism also gave the national 
security state new symbolism. With the Soviet Union supposedly gone bankrupt trying to 
outspend the U.S. on defense (as was often repeated by right-wing followers of Reagan), the 
national security state represented the triumph of go d over evil; the global struggle against 
communism another benchmark in the nation’s ongoing rise to greatness.  The terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 intensified these feelings and fortified the national security state in 
American culture. The coordinated assault by the terrorist group Al Qaeda on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon awakened Americans to the continued instability of global politics and 
the numerous and seemingly unpredictable threats the United States still faced after the Cold 
War. Indeed, the continued existence of the Cold War defense apparatus, combined with the 
absence of a geopolitical counterpart to American power, has made the military option attractive 
to policymakers looking to eliminate not only the pr etrators of terrorist acts, but also the 
overarching ideologies and material conditions thatfuel Islamic terrorism.  
 The ways the United States prosecuted and fought the “War on Terror” during the 
presidency of George W. Bush prove that while the Cold War is gone, the legacy of 
militarization during that fifty-year conflict conti ues to influence the American right. In 
responding to the 9/11 attacks, Bush outspent Clinton on defense (with an average growth rate of 
5.7 each year of his presidency) and expanded the network of federal agencies dealing with 
foreign policy matters such as the Department of Homeland Security, whose responsibilities 
included securing America’s borders and warning Americans of impending terrorist attacks. 
Bush also increased the size of the “surveillance state,” signing the Patriot Act that allowed the 
federal government greater intrusion and involvement in the privacy of Americans under the 
auspices of anti-terrorism. Under Bush, like Presidnts before him, defense served a military, 
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international, and social purpose. When he passed the 2002 National Defense Authorization Act, 
Bush lauded the legislation for establishing a “substantial and well-deserved increase in basic 
[military] pay” that also provided “improved educational opportunities as an incentive to reenlist, 
and more resources to improve military housing.” Moreover, the legislation enhanced “job 
training and education opportunities for military spouses and access for home-schooled children 
of military families to facilities and programs of Department of Defense dependent schools.”15 
Earmarking these programs as “defense” gave Bush and is fellow Republicans the semantic 
leeway to continue their deficit spending without attention to the ongoing costs to the federal 
government. 
 In growing the national defense budget, Bush appealed to a culture of anti-terrorism in 
the United States, claiming the threat of Al Qaeda was not just a military one, but cultural. Bush 
was careful not to say the United States was at war with Islam, but he often juxtaposed American 
values against the nihilist ideologies offered by the errorists. After 9/11, anti-terrorism became 
the substitute for anti-communism. As Cold War liberals did in building the national security 
state in the 1940s, Bush demanded more defense monies a d the enhancement of America’s 
military to defeat another abstract, yet imminent threat to the United States. Indeed, the ominous 
threat of terrorism informed the run-up to the Iraq War. Couched as another battle within the war 
against Al Qaeda, Bush faced little dissension from anti-statist Republicans when he sent the 
United States into war against Saddam Hussein. Republicans also authorized tax cuts along with 
military spending increases during the years of the Iraq War, enlarging the federal deficit even 
further. Again, the right found little wrong with Bush’s governance. Human Events praised 
Bush’s big-government policies, citing former Reagan Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger 
                                                
15 George W. Bush, “Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002,” 
December 28, 2001, Public Papers of the Presidents, George W. Bush, 2001-2009, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63433&st=national+defense&st1=.  
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who said the 9/11 attacks proved that Clinton was misguided in cutting the military budget, 
claiming he had weakened U.S. defense capabilities to pursue terrorists. The war on terrorism 
demonstrated “there is no peace dividend. The world’s emaining superpower cannot run its 
military on the cheap.”16 
 But national security did not always unify the right. The politics and economics of U.S. 
foreign policy continue to create strife between the deficit-reducing, government-downsizing 
purists within the Republican Party and those officials with connections or affinities to the 
defense economy or the national security state. Libertarian Republicans like Texas representative 
Ron Paul, for example, have strongly criticized the national security state and American foreign 
policy in general. In arguing for federal downsizing, Paul has repeatedly said the economic 
capacity of America’s military must be significantly reduced. Paul has also come out against 
American intervention in the Middle East, claiming that the United States’ involvement in the 
region “provides us with an excuse to keep the military-industrial complex active.”17 
  Paul, however, remains a minority in a Republican P rty dominated by defense hawks. 
Indeed, Republicans rushed to defend the defense economy during the showdown over the 
budget “sequester” in early 2013.  The result of the failed budget “supercommittee” negotiations, 
the “sequester” of 500 billion dollars in military spending threatened defense jobs from Alaska to 
New Hampshire. In Maine, near the Portsmouth Naval Yard, defense workers did not “care 
which side caused Washington’s latest crisis,” they worried how to feed their families. Feeling 
alienated from government, shipyard worker “Butch” Huntley wondered how he was going to 
pay his wife’s medical bills if he lost his job. "Both sides put us here," complained Huntley, 
believing “Congress doesn’t look at the individual. They just look at the bottom line.” One of his 
                                                
16 Lynn Wooley, “Bill Clinton and the Decline of the Military,” Human Events, December 21, 2006. 
17 Ron Paul, A Foreign Policy of Freedom (Lake Jackson: Foundation for Rational Economics and Education, 2007), 
136. 
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co-workers said he and his family “basically put the American dream on hold” because of the 
poor economy.18 Like other Americans, defense workers were angered by the intransigence of 
congressional ideologues, and placed considerable blame on national politicians for their failure 
to prevent possible defense cuts. During the “sequester,” anti-statist Republicans were thwarted 
by the truism that all politics are local, even ones involving national security. In 2013, 
Republican Representative from Virginia, Scott Rigell, had an eighty percent lifetime voting 
record from the American Conservative Union, but also had the Newport News Shipyard in his 
district. When the sequester threatened to layoff a portion of the 21,000 employees at the 
Newport News that made nuclear aircraft carriers, Rigell joined a minority of House Republicans 
in breaking with the anti-tax, anti-statist wings of his Party to try to compromise with Democrats 
and spare the shipyard from cuts. Any budget without revenue increases was not “a wise position 
and I don’t hold that value,” Rigell now said in order to keep Newport News safe from the 
budget axe. 19   
 The “problem” of Cold War militarism was one that afflicted Democrats and liberals as 
well. The apocalyptic anti-communist rhetoric employed by Cold War liberals to justify the 
defense buildup during the early Cold War was fodder for the American right. Indeed, when 
Cold War Democrats formulated a grand strategy to confront communism through military and 
economic containment, few imagined the national security state becoming a problem for New 
Deal liberalism. Dire warnings by the authors of NSC-68 for more defense spending made the 
appearance of military power limitless. Like economic growth, there were no set boundaries to 
militarization—increased defense spending was only a positive good for the nation. Cold War 
                                                
18 “Naval Shipyard Workers Anxious Amid Budget Stalemate,” The Detroit News, March 1, 2013, 
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liberals argued that the nation was capable of handling economic militarization without lasting 
consequences to its democratic foundations. These pr mises went unchallenged by much of the 
anti-communist right (save for isolationists  like Robert Taft), who invoked the tyranny of the 
present danger to justify more spending increases, leading to collaborations between Republicans 
and Democrats on defense spending that continue to resonate within political culture today. 
Never satisfied with “enough” military spending, hawkish Republicans used the amorphous and 
undefined aspects of Cold War strategy as a discursive weapon against those who aimed to cut 
the defense budget, scale back American intervention, or otherwise reject the bipolar paradigm 
of the Cold War.  
 When the Vietnam War and the accompanying culture of anti-militarism in the United 
States discredited Cold War liberalism, anti-militarists within the New Left and anti-defense 
liberals in Congress assailed the gratuitous military spending that had gone on under the name of 
anti-communism, lending rise to claims that liberals had abandoned American security to the 
communists. As the era of superpower détente fell apart in the mid-1970s, national security 
activists conflated Cold War politics with Americans’ economic and cultural insecurities over the 
inadequacy of the federal state. In an increasingly eoliberal age, a unique and diverse Cold War, 
anti-détente coalition unified longstanding connections and found new constituencies by framing 
Cold War politics and foreign policy within a discussion of Americans’ antipathy and apathy 
toward “big-government.”  
 The class of Democrats elected during the late 1970s and 1980s tried to make foreign 
policy within this anti-government culture. While opposed to massive defense spending, “New 
Democrats” were inhibited by the remilitarization of American foreign policy during the Reagan 
years. While the defense economy seemed less important to most liberals after 1989, Cold War 
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communities demanded more defense contracts to keep and create jobs in their districts, 
restricting opportunities for a drawdown in defense. Moreover, as wages declined, productivity 
fell, prices rose, and job security proved elusive, occupations in the defense economy were 
justified as integral to lowering the unemployment rate.  The political economy of the Cold War 
was therefore shaken but intact after the Soviet Union fell in 1991. 
 Indeed, the foreign policy of President Barack Obama reflects the legacy of the Cold War 
economy on the United States. As a Senator and candidate for office, Obama opposed the Iraq 
War and argued that the nation should redirect its attention to domestic issues after fighting 
protracted wars in the Middle East. As President, however, Obama has closely followed the path 
of his predecessor in conducting the “War on Terrorism.” Obama has expanded the used of 
unmanned drones to target suspected terrorists and retained a secretive policy making culture 
within the White House. Obama has also vigorously defended the national security state, arguing 
against the budget sequester because it would weaken Am rican economic and international 
security. Obama supported the jobs created by the defense economy, telling shipyard workers in 
2013 that their vital “work, along with hundreds of thousands of jobs, are currently in jeopardy 
because of politics in Washington.”20 Obama’s policies prove that unless Americans decide to rid 
themselves of the defense economy, the militarization of the Cold War will continue to have an 
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